A correct answer can conceal why an agent succeeded. Once agents change their information state during evaluation, correctness no longer distinguishes intended reasoning from answer acquisition. Outcome evidence and exposure detection do not establish whether success depended on an acquired target; we call this missing evaluation object success provenance. AcquaBench audits it through matched CLEAN, GOLD, and SHAM value substitution on four standardized surfaces with joint qid-clustered analysis. CLEAN retains benchmark-authorized information. GOLD makes the correct target available. SHAM preserves source structure and exposure opportunity but substitutes a matched incorrect value. GOLD minus CLEAN measures the total score response to correct-target availability; GOLD minus SHAM tests whether that response tracks target correctness beyond matched source exposure. In D0, GOLD exceeds SHAM by 19.1 to 25.9 percentage points, showing that success follows the correct value. In D2, GOLD still exceeds SHAM under distributed sufficiency while coloc no longer transfers as a high-score marker, with AUROC 0.376 and 0.142. Behavioral dependence can thus persist beyond this probe's intended observation unit. In model comparison, a supported 5.0-point CLEAN score gap compresses to a raw GOLD difference of -0.6 points without establishing rank inversion. Agent benchmarks should report success together with whether the evaluated information state supported it.
Interactive agent benchmarks map an agent run to a binary outcome through outcome checks. When these checks rely on surface level signals or fail to capture the agent's actual action path, they cannot reliably determine whether the run succeeded. For example, a benchmark task may ask whether Alice's shipping address was changed, while the outcome check only verifies that the agent clicked "Save." This does not guarantee that the intended state change occurred, since the agent may have modified the wrong record. Treating such a run as successful therefore makes the reported score misleading. Benchmark quality thus depends not only on task design, but also on the reliability of outcome detection. We address this problem by introducing an outcome evidence reporting layer for existing benchmarks, without modifying their tasks, agents, or evaluators. The layer performs three functions. First, before scoring, it specifies which stored artifacts are required to verify the claimed outcome for each case. Second, it applies a locked checklist to each completed run and assigns one of three evidence labels: Evidence Pass, Evidence Fail, or Unknown. Third, it reports evidence supported score bounds that quantify uncertainty arising from Unknown cases. Rather than silently counting, discarding, or hiding uncertain cases inside a single aggregate success rate, the framework keeps them explicitly visible. We evaluate the outcome evidence layer on five public benchmarks: ANDROIDWORLD, AGENTDOJO, APPWORLD, tau3 bench retail, and MINIWOB. The resulting reports separate several empirically distinct failure modes.
When can an agent failure be caught? A weak audit score alone cannot identify whether the record or the method is limiting. CatchBench therefore puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST). Prior benchmarks fix one of these states or vary the telemetry; to our knowledge none scores all three under one task-method interface. Each state admits different questions, so seven task contracts carry their own labels and metrics rather than one leaderboard. Four are evidential; three are Gold-derived mechanism diagnostics. The release scores 72 entrants, from rule scanners and structural models to eleven LLM judges across nine model families (GPT, Claude, Gemini, Gemma, Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, Nova), over 1187 declared configurations and 1162 recorded runs. Every recorded comparison is published as a measured difference with its interval, uncorrected, and no board declares a winner it cannot show. The three sharpest results cut against our own data. One rule reads declaration order alone and reaches a perfect F1 on one of six configuration sources, so a score there measures how the corpus was built. Our admissibility bar then rejected one injected substrate and withheld evidential status from the other. A published structural gain also turns on which size reference it is measured against. A benchmark number is therefore not interpretable until the process behind its labels is published and tested for the shortcut it may leave. We report all three, and regenerate every ordering from released predictions with no model call.
Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.