EXE-Bench: Ranking the Tradeoffs of AI-based Windows Malware Detectors for Real-World Usability

Machine learning-based malware detectors are widely deployed in antivirus and endpoint detection systems, yet their reliance on static features makes them vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. This paper investigates whether a malware sample can be intentionally misclassified as a specific benign software category, not merely as "not malware", by adding a small number of Win32 API imports characteristic of that selected category, without removing any existing imports or retraining the detector. We propose a framework centered on a Conditional Variational Autoencoder (CVAE) whose decoder is strictly additive. It can introduce new API calls but never remove existing ones, preserving malware functionality by design. For each malware sample, the framework automatically identifies which benign category it most closely resembles and uses that as the evasion target. A knowledge-distilled differentiable proxy enables gradient-based training against the non-differentiable ensemble detector. Experiments on a six-class dataset of binary Win32 API import vectors extracted from 3,799 Windows executables (five benign categories, one malware class) show that, against a detector achieving 87.5% malware recall, adding just 20 API imports reduces recall to 30%. At k=20, among samples that evaded detection, 99% are classified as the intended target category. The CVAE outperforms both a frequency-based baseline and random selection at every tested injection size (k = 5 to 50). Validation on real PE files submitted to VirusTotal confirms that the attack transfers to commercial static detection engines, with an average 54.5% reduction in flagging engines. These findings expose a concrete vulnerability in API-based malware classifiers and demonstrate that targeted evasion into a chosen benign category is achievable with minimal, functionality-preserving modifications.

Deepfake detectors that achieve near-perfect scores on academic benchmarks collapse on real-world content: recent in-the-wild evaluations report AUC drops of 45-50% for state-of-the-art open-source models. We argue this gap is structural: static detectors are trained once against a moving generative frontier. We present BitMind Forensics (BMF), trained through Bittensor SN34, an open adversarial competition that continually refreshes the training distribution. We evaluate one dated export comprising image, general-video, and human-video checkpoints across nineteen public datasets: the canonical face-swap suites (FaceForensics++, Celeb-DF v1/v2/++, DFDC, DFD, UADFV, DF40) and recent in-the-wild and AI-generated-media benchmarks (Sumsub, Deepfake-Eval-2024, WildRF, Community Forensics, AIGCDetectBench, GenImage, AI-GenBench, AIGIBench, RAID, GenVidBench, GenVideo-100K). BMF reaches 0.936 AUC on Sumsub's original images and 0.872 pooled AUC over its full four-condition manipulation battery (1.4M images), staying robust under perturbation (0.855 JPEG, 0.799 downscaled), while GPEN enhancement improves detection (0.996). On Deepfake-Eval-2024, it matches the best commercial detector on images (0.915 vs 0.90) and exceeds it on video (0.822 vs 0.79), far above the best open-source detectors (0.56 and 0.63). It reaches 0.991 AUC on a 21-generator AI-image panel and 0.918 on GenVidBench, and exceeds the FF++-trained frontier on DFDC (0.947 vs 0.843) and Celeb-DF v2 (0.9985 vs 0.956), both contamination-audited, with statistical parity on Celeb-DF++. In a temporal study, successive dated exports improve on held-out media from generators absent from the static baseline's training (image 0.842 to 0.902; video 0.864 to 0.936). Our evaluation harness is public, and at publication the production API serves the exact evaluated snapshot for independent verification.

Exploitation is not a binary event. It is a ladder of acquiring progressive capabilities, from executing a single buggy line of code to taking full control of the target. However, existing LLM security benchmarks treat a crash as exploitation success. That single binary outcome collapses the hard parts of exploitation: the transition from triggering a bug to constructing reusable primitives and control. We present ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that decomposes exploitation into 16 measurable flags, from coverage and crash through sandbox primitives, arbitrary read/write, control-flow hijack, and arbitrary code execution. Each capability is verified by a deterministic oracle that uses a per-run randomized challenge-response for primitives, differential execution against ground-truth binaries to measure progress, and a signal-handler proof for code execution. We instantiate ExploitBench on 41 V8 bugs because V8 is both widely deployed and exploitation-hardened. We report three arms: <model,env> as the primary measurement of model-environment capability, <model,env, adaptive coaching> as a secondary arm that adds adaptive coaching to test whether targeted feedback shifts outcomes, and <model,env,harness> as an ablation that swaps in the model's native CLI to check whether vendor-side optimizations increase exploitation capabilities. Our results show a sharp capability split between publicly deployed frontier models and the private frontier. Across the 8 publicly deployed models tested, reaching the vulnerable code and triggering a crash is routine, but arbitrary code execution is not. The private model shows arbitrary code execution on approximately half. Overall, results suggest that exploit construction against hardened targets is an emerging frontier capability.