Online recommendation has traditionally taken place after a user enters a platform, which determines the candidate pool and the ranking shown to the user. LLM-based user agents enable a different recommendation process: a user specifies a need before choosing a platform, leaving platforms to compete for the user's attention, which we refer to as an agentic recommendation market. In our controlled LLM-based experiments across three product domains, we find this new setting of recommendation creates a tension between access and attention. Compared with traditional platform-centric recommendation, user-centric recommendation greatly expands the opportunity for relevant items to enter comparison; yet broader participation does not translate directly into effective exposure. Competition directly triggers platforms' strategic play: selectively positive explanations occupy 73--78% of first-ranked positions. When the user agent relates platforms' actions to subsequent user feedback, this share falls to 36--41%, while the chance of a user purchasing the relevant item increases. A user agent is therefore more than a ranker over a larger pool of candidates: its querying, ranking, and feedback mechanism governing who can compete, how scarce attention is allocated, and how earlier outcomes shape the evaluation of platforms directly affect user utility. Designing agentic recommendation therefore requires treating access, attention, and accountability as a joint mechanism design problem.
LLM recommendation agents increasingly produce structured recommendation reports: sets of items accompanied by natural-language justifications. Yet existing evaluations often reduce this setting to reranking small shortlisted candidate sets or judge reports mainly by semantic plausibility. We introduce Recommendation Atlas (Agentic Tool-Level Assessment for Shopping), or RecoAtlas, a benchmark and toolkit for evaluating shopping agents with behavior-grounded metrics. RecoAtlas complements held-out interaction metrics with learned utility proxies for relevance, complementarity, and diversity derived from interaction data, while separately measuring semantic coherence and explanation quality. Its controlled tool environment exposes agents to either semantic, behavior-aligned, or faulty tools, enabling diagnosis of whether performance gains arise from stronger reasoning, better signals, or more effective tool-use policies. Across controlled experiments, we show that RecoAtlas exhibits key properties of a meaningful benchmark for agentic systems: performance scales with model capacity and test-time compute, improves with stronger and better-aligned tools, degrades under noisy or misaligned signals, and reveals that semantic plausibility does not necessarily capture behavior-grounded utility. RecoAtlas provides a foundation for developing and evaluating shopping assistants that optimize not only for plausible recommendations, but also for coherent, behaviorally grounded recommendation sets.
Agents typically assume an expert user -- one with well-formed preferences about what they want -- and default to clarifying questions whenever the task is underspecified. We argue this assumption is unrealistic. Users often lack the domain knowledge to have completely specified preferences; if asked about their preference on some feature, the user may be unable to answer without the agent helping the user to learn some domain knowledge needed to form a preference for that feature, e.g., via examples or explanations. To formalize these principles, we draw on the Search-Experience-Credence framework from Information Economics to introduce CoPref, a model of how users construct preferences based on agent dialog actions. We then study these ideas concretely in agentic recommender systems, proposing CoShop, an interactive benchmark. In CoShop, an agent converses with and makes recommendations for a CoPref user. The agent's performance depends on whether it can help the user gain the knowledge needed to specify the task well. Evaluating five frontier models, we find that no agent exceeds 56% accuracy on CoShop despite five turns of interaction. Failures stem not from agents' ability to find items, but from how little the interaction expands what users know about what they want.
Large language models (LLMs) now serve as conversational shopping assistants on platforms that also sell advertising. These AI agents face a conflict of duty. They advise consumers who rely on their judgment, yet are deployed by platforms that benefit when sponsored listings are chosen. Sponsorship disclosures, designed to allow consumers to penalize paid placements, now reach the AI agent rather than the consumer, and the agent's evaluation of them is hidden from the consumer. Drawing on the fiduciary concept of conflict of duty, we argue that an agent's evaluation of a sponsored listing should not depend on which party deployed it. In controlled choice experiments, we manipulate assigned roles in the system prompt to name either a traveler or a booking platform as the agent's principal. Platform delegation significantly attenuates the penalty that agents apply to sponsored listings and weakens the skepticism that disclosure triggers in their reasoning traces. We replicate out findings across LLMs and reasoning depths. A second study decomposes the disclosure label and shows that the divergence between the two delegates widens significantly when the paid placement is attributed to the platform. Stricter terminology ("Sponsored" instead of "Promoted") lowers choice of paid listings but does not close this gap when the platform is named. The findings show that disclosure mandates designed for human consumers cannot by themselves protect consumers in AI-mediated commerce.