Minimizing Targeted Activations: Input-Only Suppression of Evaluation-Awareness Latents in Large Language Models

Large language models can recover mid-generation from task-misaligned activation steering, producing explicit verbal restarts (e.g., ``wait, that's not right'') and continuing on-topic even while the steering perturbation remains active. We term this Endogenous Steering Resistance (ESR). Using sparse autoencoder (SAE) latents to steer model activations, we find that Llama-3.3-70B exhibits explicit ESR at 3.8%, with smaller models from the Llama-3 and Gemma-2 families showing the explicit form less frequently. Two controls dissociate ESR into a detection event and a sustained-resistance component that conditioning on recent on-topic tokens does not fully explain. We identify 26 SAE latents through contrastive on-topic/off-topic search; zero-ablating them reduces the multi-attempt rate by 25%, with random-latent and held-out-prompt controls supporting specificity. ESR can also be deliberately enhanced through both meta-prompting and fine-tuning on synthetic self-correction examples. ESR has dual implications for safety: it could harden models against adversarial activation-space manipulation, but may equally interfere with beneficial steering-based interventions, since the model has no way to distinguish the two. Code is available at https://github.com/agencyenterprise/endogenous-steering-resistance.

Activation steering provides a lightweight inference-time mechanism for controlling large language models (LLMs) by modifying their internal activation vectors toward desired behaviors. Most existing methods compute a fixed steering direction in the original activation space, typically from pairs of contrastive examples using mean differences, linear probes, or arbitrary separability criteria. While effective to a certain extent, these methods treat behavioral control as a global, linear, additive offset: the same direction is applied across inputs, and behaviors are linearly separable. This can be restrictive when behavioral features vary nonlinearly across the activation space or lie on curved and anisotropic manifolds, where the optimal intervention may be input-dependent. To address this limitation, we propose INNSteer, a nonlinear activation steering framework based on invertible latent transformations. Rather than searching for a better steering vector in the original representation space, INNSteer learns a lightweight invertible neural network $φ$ that maps an LLM's activations into a latent space where behavioral classes are more amenable to linear control. At inference time, activations are mapped through $φ$, steered in the latent space, and mapped back through the exact inverse transformation $φ^{-1}$. This makes a simple latent-space translation become a nonlinear, input-dependent intervention in the original activation space. Across experiment settings on multiple LLM families, scales, behavioral traits, and safety benchmarks, INNSteer consistently improves model control over linear, transport-based, and nonlinear steering baselines while largely preserving generation fluency.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) sometimes note in their chain of thought (CoT) that they may be under evaluation. Researchers worry that this verbalised evaluation awareness (VEA) causes models to adapt their outputs strategically, optimising for perceived evaluation criteria, which, for instance, can make models appear safer than they actually are. However, whether VEA actually has this effect is largely unknown. We tested this across open-weight LRMs and benchmarks covering safety, alignment, moral reasoning, and political opinion. We tested this both on-policy, sampling multiple CoTs per item and comparing those that spontaneously contained VEA against those that did not, and off-policy, using model prefilling to inject evaluation-aware sentences where missing and remove them where present, with subsequent resampling. VEA has limited effect on model behaviour: injecting VEA into CoTs produces near-zero effects ($ω\leq 0.06$), removing it causes small shifts ($ω\leq 0.12$) and spontaneously occurring VEA shifts answer distributions by at most 3.7 percentage points ($ω\leq 0.31$). Our findings call for caution when interpreting high VEA rates as evidence of strategic behaviour or alignment tampering. Evaluation awareness may pose a smaller safety risk than the current literature assumes.