Parameterized Fair Resource Allocation under Diversity Constraints
Authors: Keke Huang, Yik Yu Ng, Laks V. S. Lakshmanan, Xiaokui Xiao
Abstract
Resource allocation across multiple agent groups arises in many applications including e-commerce recommendation systems, housing assignment, and course allocation, and is commonly formulated as an optimization problem with diversity constraints to ensure group fairness. Existing approaches typically enforce these constraints as hard conditions, which overly restrict the feasible solution space and often lead to suboptimal allocations. In this paper, we propose PRA, a parameterized framework for fair resource allocation under diversity constraints. Inspired by the use of risk-aversion parameters in economic models, PRA introduces a set of controllable inequality-aversion parameters to softly regulate group-level diversity, thereby enabling flexible trade-offs between fairness and allocation efficiency. With appropriately calibrated parameters, PRA yields fairness-optimal assignments that comply with the specified diversity constraints. To accommodate additional application-specific constraints, we further extend the framework to an adaptive variant, APRA. We establish that the optimality of both PRA and APRA holds regardless of the chosen fairness metric and the nature of the additional constraints, underscoring the generality and robustness of our approach. Extensive experiments on three real-world applications demonstrate that our proposed framework consistently outperforms existing baselines in both effectiveness and robustness.
Dynamic multi-resource allocation is a central problem in shared computing environments, where users' demands arrive sequentially and resources must be distributed fairly without knowledge of future demands. Existing methods emphasize fairness guarantees such as Sharing Incentive, Envy Freeness, and Dynamic Pareto Optimality, but often overlook system utility. Moreover, these fairness criteria are mutually incompatible, preventing strict enforcement of them at the same time. We propose a neural allocation mechanism that reconciles fairness with utility through multi-objective optimization during sequential rollout. We first formalize fairness in the dynamic setting via stepwise loss functions for Sharing Incentive, Envy Freeness, and Dynamic Pareto Optimality, enabling differentiable training. Leveraging non-wastefulness, we parameterized the solutions by constraining allocations to the subspace of demand while allowing elastic over-allocation when resources remain available. Empirical results demonstrate that our learned allocator achieves substantially higher utility at comparable levels of fairness, uncovering clear Pareto-frontier-like tradeoffs across metrics.
We study the problem of fair online resource allocation, motivated by applications such as refugee resettlement and airline scheduling, where agents arrive sequentially and must be assigned to facilities with limited capacities. We introduce a model that maximizes the overall welfare subject to resource constraints and a Lipschitz fairness requirement, which ensures that similar agents arriving in the same batch receive similar expected outcomes. We first analyze the offline problem, proving that the value of the optimal fair allocation is at least an Ω(1/γ) fraction of the optimal unfair allocation, where γ is the fairness coefficient, thereby bounding the price of fairness. For the online setting, we propose an algorithm based on dual mirror descent that enforces fairness constraints within batches while estimating optimal dual variables. We prove that this algorithm achieves sublinear regret relative to the optimal offline fluid benchmark. Finally, we validate our theoretical results using real-world data from the Refugee Economies Programme, demonstrating the algorithm's performance and examining the trade-offs between welfare maximization and fairness enforcement.
We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agent or to charity, which holds all unallocated goods, while fairness is evaluated only against budget-feasible subsets of every recipient's bundle. We first show that, without additional structure, no deterministic online algorithm can guarantee any fixed approximation to feasible envy-freeness, even in highly symmetric instances. We then identify bounded density spread as a structural condition that restores meaningful guarantees, obtaining approximation algorithms for arbitrary item sizes and showing that, under common valuations and sufficiently small goods, these guarantees can be strengthened to an optimal deterministic frontier. We further study resource augmentation, where the online algorithm is allowed slightly larger budgets than the fairness benchmark, and characterize the resulting improvement in the achievable guarantees. Finally, we develop a learning-augmented framework based on predicting joint value-size types, proving consistency under perfect predictions, robustness to prediction error, and showing that separate predictions of value and size marginals are insufficient to recover strong fairness guarantees.