Local differential privacy (LDP) protocols are vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Existing research have proposed efficient defense strategies for single-item users. However, in practice, a user may possess multiple items. The defense against poisoning attacks for multi-item users is challenging, because due to larger output spaces, the adversary can conduct more powerful attacks without being detected. In this paper, we address the robust sparse vector mean estimation problem, in which each user has a vector with m nonzero coordinates. We propose Randomized Projection with Clipping (RPC). Firstly, the server sends a random binary vector to each user. The user then projects its local data on the vector, and clip the value to restrict the attacker's capability. To handle clipping bias, we propose a correction method based on a careful analysis that gives an exact expression of the bias. As a result, bias-variance tradeoff is no longer needed, thus the clipping threshold can be further reduced to shrink the output space and enhance robustness. We provide a rigorous theoretical guarantee of the estimation error under all possible attacks. Numerical experiments show that under trusted environments, our new method achieves comparable or better performance than existing methods, indicating that our method is already an efficient estimator in its own right. Under untrusted environments, our method is also significantly more robust to poisoning attacks.
We revisit Byzantine robust distributed estimation for high-dimensional sparse linear models. By combining local ℓ1-regularized robust estimation with robust aggregation at the server, the framework applies to pseudo-Huber regression, quantile regression, and sparse SVM. We show that the resulting estimators yield non-asymptotic guarantees and attain near-optimal statistical rates under mild conditions, while remaining communication-efficient. Simulations confirm strong robustness in estimation, support recovery and classification accuracy under various Byzantine attacks.
We study privately estimating the sum of n user-held values in the presence of an honest-but-curious server. This motivates requiring privacy not only at data release but also throughout server-side computation. We therefore adopt the local (pure) differential privacy model, in which each user transmits a noise-perturbed value. It is well known that independent local noise typically incurs a substantial utility loss compared to the centralized model, where noise is added only after aggregation. We show that this gap is not fundamental. By carefully designing correlations among the locally added noise variables, we construct ε-DP mechanisms whose estimation cost matches the optimal cost achievable in the centralized setting, up to an arbitrarily small error.
Madhura Pathegama, Srikanth Avasarala, Viveck R. Cadambe +1
We develop a new, differentially private mean estimator called the balloon mean. The main features of the balloon mean are that it is computationally tractable and enjoys robustness to outlying observations. It is based on an iterative clipping procedure over expanding Mahalanobis balls, or ``balloons.'' The method satisfies zero-concentrated differential privacy and depends on a small number of interpretable tuning parameters. We provide theoretical guarantees under heavy-tailed and contaminated elliptical models, characterizing its statistical performance and robustness to outliers. Extensive simulations demonstrate that the balloon mean is robust to heavy-tailed and contaminated data, and outperforms existing differentially private mean estimators in contaminated settings.