InfoOps Bench: A live information operations safety benchmark
Authors: Dorian Quelle, Lisa-Maria Neudert, Jonathan Bright, John Gallacher
Abstract
In this paper we present an active, constantly updated AI benchmark which measures the integrity of frontier language models against being co-opted for use by authoritarian state "information operations": intentional, coordinated activities by one state to influence public opinion and information ecosystems in another state. These information operations are a well documented, persistent threat against contemporary democracy. Our benchmark is based on real examples from over 2,100 information operations drawn from a live monitoring pipeline which tracks online information assets with links to authoritarian regimes. Alongside this paper, we also release a companion website that updates the benchmark weekly with new claims. The dynamic nature of this public facing benchmark makes it resistant to saturation. In the benchmark, we test 17 models from 8 providers across four prompt framings. We find that most models can be co-opted for information operations at least some of the time. Integrity scores, defined as the share of judged responses in which the model neither preserved nor amplified the claim, range from 9.3% to 91%, an 81.7-percentage-point spread not explained by model size. Models approach participation in information operations in a variety of ways. Some models fabricate details and produce output more harmful than the original input claim; others make claims less harmful even while complying and producing some output. Fact-checking rates vary from 3.2% to 80.8%. Integrity against information operations is at least partly related to refusal to produce content even for benign claims, illustrating the challenge of balancing model usability with safety. Overall, our results show the potential for contemporary information operations to be substantially aided by frontier AI models.
AI control protocols oversee untrusted models by monitoring their actions and modifying potentially unsafe steps, often using a trusted model. This partially tampers with the untrusted model's trajectory. If the trusted model detects such an intervention, it may infer properties of the monitor and adapt to evade control. We introduce \textbf{CIAware-Bench}, a benchmark for measuring \textbf{c}ontrol \textbf{i}ntervention (CI) awareness across frontier models. CIAware-Bench tests whether models can distinguish their own trajectories from those modified by a control intervention. The benchmark is comprised of a suite of four task domains (essay writing, BigCodeBench, Bash Arena, and SHADE-Arena), while varying trajectory watermarking, side-task presence, and the control protocol. Evaluating eleven frontier models, we find low to moderate CI awareness under default settings (up to 0.87; random chance balanced binary classification accuracy is 0.5) with substantial variation across task domains and model pairs. Detection is generally easier across model families, suggesting that models exploit provider-specific differences in style or post-training. Overall, CI awareness is not a fixed model-level property, and should be measured for each new model release and deployment scenario. We release CIAware-Bench to track CI awareness and inform control protocols whose interventions are harder to detect.
Joachim Schaeffer, Thomas Jiralerspong, Alexander Panfilov +4
The worldwide surge of authoritarianism, combined with the increasing central role in users' everyday lives, raises the question of to what extent specific models exhibit or promote authoritarian attitudes and characteristics. We introduce AuAu, a comprehensive benchmark that aims to assess the risk of LLMs generating responses with authoritarian tendencies. This benchmark combines three evaluation approaches: (i) psychometric questions from an extensive pool of 15 human validated instruments; (ii) contextual behavior vignettes probing intended actions in concrete situations; and (iii) responses to realistic user prompts. Unlike prior work, AuAu evaluates not only a general closeness towards authoritarianism but also the established sub-concepts Authoritarian Aggression, Authoritarian Submission, and Conventionalism. Evaluating 17 models from China, the EU, Russia, and the USA, we find that all tested models exhibit substantial authoritarian response rates under the psychometric evaluation, though rates drop significantly in increasingly more realistic downstream task. We further find that an authoritarian system prompt easily manipulates 15 out of 17 models to promote increased authoritarianism. Our results underscore the need for continued, systematic auditing of LLM-based AI systems to detect and ultimately mitigate undesired authoritarian tendencies in generated output. Our code and data are available at: https://github.com/andreaseinwiller/AuAu
Andreas Einwiller, Max Klabunde, Florian Lemmerich
Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs. If AI models can recognize and act on the fact their prior assistant messages have been inserted or edited, the effectiveness and validity of these methods could be compromised. We investigate whether frontier language models can distinguish between tampered and untampered assistant-side context, a capability we call prefill awareness. To do so, we construct a binary preference benchmark across three prefill mechanisms, filtering for cases where models show consistent stances. We find that frontier models show substantial prefill awareness: Claude Opus 4.5 detects prefills opposing its preferences in 9-35% of cases with a 0% false positive rate when prompted; additionally, models often revert towards baseline behavior without explicitly reporting that the prefill was foreign. Controlled ablations later also show that detection and resistance rely on different cues, where stylistic mismatch mainly affects whether models flag a prefill as foreign, while preference mismatch mainly affects whether they revert toward their baseline answer. We also examine more realistic agentic settings such as misalignment-continuation evaluations and SWE-bench trajectories, where frontier models sometimes disavow prefilled assistant turns in ways that depend strongly on dataset, task success, and hidden formatting artifacts. Our results indicate that prefill awareness is already a substantial confound for some prefill-based methods. We recommend that model developers track this capability in frontier systems.