Privacy-Preserving AI Verification via Minimal Information Disclosure

Frontier AI governance frameworks increasingly use cumulative training compute as the primary criterion for designating high-impact models, but enforcement rests on self-reporting because no technical verification primitive for training exists. Any future international agreement on frontier AI faces the same problem at higher stakes: coordinated regulation of technologies with significant externalities has historically rested on technical verification, without which agreements are declaratory. Recent governance analyses judge zero-knowledge proofs a promising candidate but currently impractical at frontier scale [26, 4]. We argue the impracticality is paradigm-bound rather than fundamental, and propose a verification architecture for frontier dense pre-training combining a pre-committed training specification, inter-node network observations, and on-the-fly Merkle commitments of intermediate computation, verified through a zero-knowledge Virtual Machine (zkVM) with native BF16/FP32 precompiles. The proof checks the actual floating-point computation the GPU performed rather than a fixed-point approximation, and preserves model-architecture confidentiality through a private training specification. The protocol produces three proof types: a genesis proof at initialisation, in-training step proofs across the run, and ex-ante attestations enforcing policy-relevant claims as running invariants, turning the training record into a governance-enforceable artefact. We estimate a deployable proof of concept within approximately 36 months at single-digit-percent training-side overhead, against a six-to-ten-year cycle for verification-grade custom silicon. Thirteen open research and engineering problems are catalogued as a research agenda for external contribution

Modern LLM-powered autonomous agents increasingly rely on rich user interface (UI) state observations to achieve reliable action grounding in complex digital environments. However, many deployments transmit the full UI state to remote inference servers even when most elements are irrelevant to the current task, which can leak sensitive but unnecessary context such as authentication codes, private notifications, and background application states. We propose MINIM, a trusted local broker that performs privacy-aware minimization on the client side before any observation leaves the device. Grounded in Contextual Integrity (CI), MINIM learns a dual-score representation for each UI element by predicting an inherent sensitivity score (s) and a task-conditioned necessity score (n). These scores drive a ternary disclosure policy that keeps essential elements, abstracts sensitive attributes when needed, and removes task-irrelevant content. We optimize a CI-aware objective that penalizes necessity errors more strongly on high-risk content, enabling aggressive pruning while preserving task-critical information. Experiments on real-world UI observations derived from WebArena show that MINIM substantially reduces task-irrelevant sensitive leakage while preserving task-critical semantic context and the interactive affordances required for reliable agent actions.

The rapid growth of AI has increased the demand for domain-specific post-training, while the cost and specialization of accelerator infrastructure push many model owners to outsource this process. Outsourced training lowers operational barriers, but creates a training-integrity gap: the owner receives a checkpoint, logs, and aggregate metrics without direct evidence that the declared training trajectory was faithfully executed. An untrusted provider may have incentives to deviate from that trajectory, either to save computation or to introduce targeted security risks. Auditing such deviations is difficult because floating-point execution on heterogeneous accelerators introduces benign numerical drift, making it hard to distinguish honest replay differences from integrity violations. Existing verification methods either observe training at too coarse a granularity or impose costs and deployment constraints that are impractical at scale. We present OVIG, an optimistic verification framework that audits outsourced post-training using an empirical boundary on gradient differences calibrated from honest heterogeneous replays. OVIG checks opened intervals against this boundary and combines optimistic sampling with a stride parameter $s$, which partitions training into stride-aligned intervals and retains only interval-endpoint evidence. Across shortcut training attacks and targeted manipulation attacks, OVIG maintains $0\%$ ASR on language, vision, and diffusion workloads. On Qwen3, increasing the stride from $s=1$ to $s=2000$ reduces off-chain storage and evidence transmission by $1996\times$ while preserving $0\%$ ASR; at this setting, OVIG incurs only $1.143\times$ total system overhead relative to training without verification. These results show that OVIG provides a practical integrity layer for outsourced AI post-training under heterogeneous execution.