LLM-based Vulnerability Discovery in Business Process Documentation
Authors: Ben Falchuk, Himanshu Garg, Euthimios Panagos, Sioan Zohar
Organizations: Peraton Labs, Basking Ridge, USA · peraton.com2
Abstract
Just like software and hardware, business processes are susceptible to vulnerabilities that can lead to product quality issues, delays, and increased costs. Business process vulnerabilities can arise from a variety of sources, including conflicting requirements, ambiguous documentation, invalid measurement spec-ifications, omission of quality checks, or implementations that differ from speci-fications. MIRABELLE is a system that identifies and characterizes business logic (BL) vulnerabilities from available business process representations, in-cluding ISO 9000/9001 documentation, user guides, work instructions, and pro-cess execution logs. MIRABELLE leverages recent advances in AI/ML to pro-cess available business process documentation and generate attributed graph rep-resentations of the business logic that can be processed using both graph and for-mal logic approaches for identifying potential vulnerabilities. However, extract-ing the business logic (e.g., operation execution sequences, decisions, input/out-put resources) from mostly natural language artifacts is challenging due to the required domain expertise, inherent process complexity, and the sometimes very large volumes of information. This paper focuses on our experimentation with Large Language Models (LLMs) and their role within MIRABELLE. We report on the performance of several LLMs across vital stages of vulnerability detection, from grammatical and technical error-flagging in short phrasings, to complete process structure recovery and extraction.
Automated vulnerability detection is a fundamental task in software security, yet existing learning-based methods still struggle to capture the structural dependencies, domain-specific vulnerability knowledge, and complex program semantics required for accurate detection. Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown strong code understanding ability, but directly prompting them with raw source code often leads to missed vulnerabilities or false alarms, especially when vulnerable and benign functions differ only in subtle semantic details. To address this, we propose VulTriage, a triple-path context augmentation framework for LLM-based vulnerability detection. VulTriage enhances the LLM input through three complementary paths: a Control Path that extracts and verbalizes AST, CFG, and DFG information to expose control and data dependencies; a Knowledge Path that retrieves relevant CWE-derived vulnerability patterns and examples through hybrid dense--sparse retrieval; and a Semantic Path that summarizes the functional behavior of the code before the final judgment. These contexts are integrated into a unified instruction to guide the LLM toward more reliable vulnerability reasoning. Experiments on the PrimeVul pair test set show that VulTriage achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming existing deep learning and LLM-based baselines on key pair-wise and classification metrics. Further ablation studies verify the effectiveness of each path, and additional experiments on the Kotlin dataset demonstrate the generalization ability of VulTriage under low-resource and class-imbalanced settings. Our code is available at https://github.com/vinsontang1/VulTriage
Large language models are increasingly used to reason about software vulnerabilities, but their outputs can silently violate domain knowledge, limiting their reliability in safety-critical settings such as medical devices. Prior work either treats that output as a prediction to be scored or constrains it to walks within a single knowledge graph; neither checks whether reasoning over a binary is consistent with an independent body of domain knowledge. We present EntailLLM, which validates each LLM-proposed analyst path by entailment: the path is a traversal of the binary's function call graph, the domain knowledge is represented in a separate graph, and verification aligns the two under temporal annotated logic. Across three CWE classes, four LLMs, three prompting strategies, and seven binaries varying in size from 405 to 12,696 function call-graph nodes, domain knowledge raises pooled entailment from 78% to 98%, with entailment decreasing in only 3% of the experiments. EntailLLM is deployed end-to-end on real medical-device binaries, reaching 98% pooled entailment without per-device tuning. Our system inherits the formal guarantees of generalized annotated logic, providing logical verification of LLM output that is both explainable and grounded in well-defined semantics.
Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various cybersecurity tasks, including vulnerability classification, detection, and patching. However, their potential in automated vulnerability report documentation and analysis remains underexplored. We present RAVEN (Retrieval Augmented Vulnerability Exploration Network), a framework leveraging LLM agents and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) to synthesize comprehensive vulnerability analysis reports. Given vulnerable source code, RAVEN generates reports following the Google Project Zero Root Cause Analysis template. The framework uses four modules: an Explorer agent for vulnerability identification, a RAG engine retrieving relevant knowledge from curated databases including Google Project Zero reports and CWE entries, an Analyst agent for impact and exploitation assessment, and a Reporter agent for structured report generation. To ensure quality, RAVEN includes a task specific LLM Judge evaluating reports across structural integrity, ground truth alignment, code reasoning quality, and remediation quality. We evaluate RAVEN on 105 vulnerable code samples covering 15 CWE types from the NIST-SARD dataset. Results show an average quality score of 54.21%, supporting the effectiveness of our approach for automated vulnerability documentation.