When Absence Is Evidence: Evaluating Completeness-Sensitive Negative Reasoning in Large Language Models

We study how Large Language Models (LLMs) process negation mechanistically. First, we establish that even though open-weight models often provide wrong answers to questions involving negation, they do possess internal components that process negation correctly. Their poor accuracy is due to late-layer attention behavior that promotes simple shortcuts; ablating those attention modules greatly improves accuracy on negation-related questions. Second, we uncover how models process negation. We consider two hypotheses: models could use attention heads that attend to the phrase being negated and suppress related concepts, or they could directly construct a representation of the entire negative phrase (e.g., representing "not gas" as a vector that promotes liquids and solids). We apply a range of observational and causal interpretability techniques on Mistral-7B and Llama-3.1-8B to show that models implement both mechanisms, with the "constructive" mechanism being more prominent. Combined, our work deepens the understanding of LLMs' internals, highlighting construction-dominant computations and the coexistence of competing mechanisms within LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) deployed for logical reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains exhibit a subtle but critical failure: coherence can be vacuously achieved through systematic abstention. A model that withholds commitment to either entailment or refutation satisfies negation consistency while providing no utility. We introduce Coherence Under Commitment (CUC), a dual-query evaluation paradigm that jointly measures consistency and decisiveness. CUC contributes three innovations: (1) a commitment score $c(\varphi) = p(\varphi) + p(\lnot\varphi)$ quantifying probability mass allocated to decisive outcomes; (2) a \textbf{deterministic elicitation protocol} via normalized YES/NO log probabilities, eliminating sampling variance; and (3) a 3-way decision framework (True/False/Uncertain) operationalizing the coherence-commitment trade-off into metrics. Experiments on four open-weight LLMs (1B-3B) across 204 FOLIO examples expose a sharp frontier. Qwen2.5-3B achieves near-zero contradiction ($\mathbb{E}[v_{\mathrm{neg}}]{=}0.025$) but only $7.4\%$ coverage, while TinyLlama-1.1B reaches $79.4\%$ coverage with violations on every example. Coherence-only evaluation would rank the abstaining model first; CUC exposes this as vacuous, and the frontier generalizes to LogiQA~v2 ($ρ{=}0.97$). We argue that evaluation must report both coherence and non-vacuous commitment and release a toolkit for standardized assessment.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.