Don't `Well, Actually' Me Unless You Know What You're Talking About: Weak Presupposition Verification Degrades General QA Performance
Authors: Shenran Wang, Vered Shwartz, Hila Gonen
Organizations: Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia · Vector Institute · CIFAR AI Chair · Amii
Abstract
False-presupposition QA (FPQA) tests LLMs on their ability to identify false presuppositions in questions and abstain or correct them rather than reinforcing false assumptions. The common approach reduces the task to prompting LLMs to extract presuppositions and fact checking each presupposition. While the performance on dedicated benchmarks keeps improving, evaluation largely focuses on questions with false presuppositions (FPQs) while ignoring the performance on ``normal'' questions (TPQs). Since many benchmarks over-represent FPQs compared to their natural occurrence, the result is that performance on these benchmarks doesn't reflect real-world QA performance. Through extensive experiments across various model families, sizes, and benchmarks, we show that methods that perform better on FPQs tend to perform worse on TPQs. Our analysis reveals this is the result of weak fact checking modules that reject also true presuppositions. We hope our findings will help guide future work toward FPQA methods that generalize well to realistic settings.
Millions of users turn to AI models for their information needs. It is conceivable that a large number of user queries contain assumptions that may be factually inaccurate. Prior work notes that large language models (LLMs) often fail to challenge such erroneous assumptions, and can reinforce users' misinformed opinions. However, given the recent advances, especially in model's reasoning capabilities, we revisit whether large reasoning models (LRMs) can reason about the underlying assumptions and respond to user queries appropriately. We construct queries with varying degrees of presuppositions spanning health, science, and general knowledge, and use it to evaluate several widely-deployed models When compared to non-reasoning models, we find that reasoning models achieve a slightly higher accuracy (2-11%), but they still fail to challenge a large fraction (26-42%) of false presuppositions. Further, reasoning models remain susceptible to how strongly the presupposition is expressed.
We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.
Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.