cs.CRAug 11, 2026

Cross-Corpus Evaluation of Generalizable Vulnerability Detection in IoT Firmware

Authors: Sadib Hassan RummanMd. Shariful IslamMd. Rayhanur Rahman

Abstract

IoT firmware vulnerability detection remains challenging due to heterogeneous firmware ecosystems, resource-constrained platforms, and limitations in existing benchmarks. Many datasets are synthetic or general-purpose and lack human-verified, contamination-screened annotations, limiting evidence on cross-corpus generalization across training sources, model architectures, and curriculum strategies. To address this gap, this paper introduces IoTVulBench, a human-verified benchmark for cross-corpus firmware vulnerability detection. IoTVulBench-Core was constructed from GitHub repositories, validated by three expert reviewers, and evaluated on a contamination-screened held-out target across five model architectures, two tuning methods, and three curriculum strategies, with ensemble, distillation, and robustness analyses. Models trained on IoTVulBench achieved the highest MCC among matched single-source datasets, reaching 0.58 versus 0.44 for PrimeVul and 0.39 for D2A. Staged curriculum learning increased MCC to 0.69, while a diversity-optimized ensemble achieved 0.73, improving by 0.42 MCC over the strongest reference comparator, a static analyzer at 0.31, and by 0.29 over PrimeVul. At a 0.5% false-positive rate, the model missed only 21% of vulnerabilities, compared with 71% for the strongest comparator. It retained 86% of its performance under identifier renaming and demonstrated strong calibration and largely faithful explanations. These findings indicate that domain-matched training data and curriculum design, rather than model scale alone, are key drivers of generalization in firmware vulnerability detection. The results provide a benchmark for future research and deployment-ready configurations for practical IoT security applications.

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