Jagged Judges: Epistemic Stability Under Silence, Pressure, and Persistence

LLM-as-judge evaluation is widely used in benchmarking pipelines, where model outputs are compared and ranked using automated evaluators. These pipelines typically assume that judgments are stable properties of fixed inputs. We show that this assumption does not hold under interaction. We study post-decision manipulability: the extent to which an evaluation outcome can be altered through subsequent conversation with the judge after an initial decision has been made. Across controlled experiments on MT-Bench and AlpacaEval, we find that LLM judges are highly stable under repeated and neutral reevaluation, yet become substantially reversible under targeted post-decision challenge. An anti-baseline challenge protocol shows that stable judgments can be overturned through motivated interaction, while a counterbalanced target-validation protocol separates this reversibility from net target-directed steering. These reversals have practical consequences: they can degrade agreement with human preferences, shift benchmark rankings, and produce harmful evaluation changes despite high self-reported confidence. Authority framing is especially destabilizing, and revised judgments are often accompanied by low-overlap justifications, suggesting post hoc rationalization rather than reliable error correction. We introduce the Evaluation Robustness Score (ERS) to quantify interactional robustness by combining reversal susceptibility with counterbalanced directional effects. Our findings identify post-decision interaction as a distinct failure mode for LLM-as-judge evaluation and motivate evaluation protocols that measure not only static agreement, but robustness under challenge.

Large language models are widely adopted as automated evaluation judges, yet the stability of their verdicts under semantically equivalent prompt rephrasings remains largely unexamined. We conduct a systematic empirical study of prompt-induced decision instability across multiple evaluation tasks and judge architectures. To facilitate this analysis, we release JudgeSense, a benchmark comprising hand-validated prompt-paraphrase pairs spanning factuality, coherence, relevance, and preference, drawn from established NLP benchmarks and accompanied by comprehensive decision logs. The benchmark enables the measurement of judge stability across equivalent prompts, allowing researchers to assess whether stability correlates with model scale or instruction-tuning, and to identify which tasks are most sensitive to prompt wording. Our evaluation reveals that coherence remains the primary task for distinguishing judge behavior, while factuality judgments demonstrate high stability under standard conditions. Pairwise evaluation tasks consistently exhibit position bias. Crucially, we find that model scale is not a reliable proxy for consistency; notably, as an interesting result in our analysis, the largest and newest models are not the most consistent.

LLM-as-a-Judge is now widely used to rank model outputs, train reward models, and populate public leaderboards, but its run-to-run reliability remains under-characterized. We study repeated identical evaluations on 29 tasks spanning 10 categories using two OpenAI judge models (GPT-4o-mini and GPT-4.1-mini), with 50 pairwise trials and 50 pointwise trials per question, supplemented by temperature and prompt-sensitivity ablations. Across judges, pairwise preferences flip on average 13.6% of the time, with 28% of questions exceeding a 20% flip rate and one question reaching 56%. GPT-4o-mini also exhibits a significant first-position bias (72% A-majority, p = 0.024). At the same time, mean pointwise score gaps are small (0.19--0.36 on a 10-point scale) and not statistically significant in aggregate, producing a pairwise--pointwise gap: judges frequently choose a winner even when their own scalar scores provide little evidence of a meaningful quality difference. Beyond within-judge instability, cross-judge agreement is only 76% ($κ= 0.51$), semantically equivalent prompt templates change majority outcomes in 25% of tested cases, and deterministic decoding reduces but does not eliminate inconsistency. A reliability curve analysis shows that, in our dataset, 11 repeated trials are needed for a majority vote to recover the 50-trial reference verdict with 95% probability on average, rising to 15 for high-variance questions. These findings suggest that single-trial LLM judging is often too noisy for high-stakes evaluation, and that multi-trial aggregation, position randomization, and explicit uncertainty reporting should be standard practice. Because both judges are from a single provider, cross-provider replication remains an important next step.