Despite a strong interest on the part of the research community in the topic of trustworthy and safe AI, the composition of the text corpora that large language models (LLMs) encounter in pre- and post-training has not yet drawn much attention. In this work, we address the question of whether LLMs are exposed to unfiltered, uncontextualised extremist speech. Using several definitions of extremist speech, stemming from official documents and research literature, and an extraction pipeline combining automated text processing with expert verification, we provide a lower bound on the prevalence of extremist documents in Dolma, an open training corpus underpinning the OLMo series of models. We show that Dolma is likely to include hundreds of thousands of documents containing extremist content and hate speech of several types, including direct calls for violence, and discuss the implications of this for data curation and model pre-training.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The analytic pipeline implemented in the study.
Berger
Schmid
UK
Union
Model
Berger
1356 (286)
687 (228)
525 (220)
906 (256)
Llama 3
Schmid
1058 (241)
499 (206)
799 (231)
UK
587 (225)
557 (216)
Union
1262 (280)
Berger
373 (189)
316 (179)
309 (177)
359 (188)
Qwen 2.5
Schmid
680 (233)
457 (213)
655 (233)
Table 1: Overlaps between the text sets extracted from the 200k Dolma sample based on different definitions. Numbers in parentheses are texts validated as extremist by GPT 4o mini.
Code
Content Type
HS
Hate speech, no extremist narratives present
LWX
Left-wing extremist narratives are present
MAIN
Mainstreaming of extreme beliefs
News
News articles
OOK
Other texts no extremism / okay for training data
OPR
Other texts no extremism / problematic for training data
Table 2: Codes for in-depth sample analysis.
Figure 2: Coding across the total sample.
Text #
UK
Berger
Schmid
1
XRW
HS
XRW
2
OPR
HS
XRW
3
XRW
MAIN
News
4
News
HS
XRW
5
XRW
LWX
UKNCON
6
OOK
News
OPR
Table 3: Coding of sample text by definition type.
Figure 3: Code comparison by definitional model.
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Domain
Count
Description
gloria.tv
3
Traditionalist Catholic media platform with conservative religious commentary.
teapartyeconomist.com
2
Tea Party and libertarian-conservative political blog.
discordleaks.unicornriot.ninja
2
Investigative archive of leaked Discord chats from extremist communities.
alexjones101.blogspot.com
1
Personal conspiracy-oriented political blog.
meforum.org
2
Middle East Forum, a neoconservative think tank focused on Middle East policy and Islamism.
us5.campaign-archive.com
1
Mailchimp-hosted archive of email newsletters.
Appendix
Table 4: Prevalence of source domains that provided manually-verified extremist and hate-speech documents in the analysed Dolma sample + a spot-check for KiwiFarms.
Large language models (LLMs) reflect politically-slanted opinions in their generated text. Even though it is widely assumed that model behavior stem from training data, there has been no study quantifying the extent to which political content is part of the training data. To bridge this gap, we aim to directly estimate (1)~the proportion of politically engaged texts in training data, (2)~respective data imbalance, (3)~cross-dataset similarity, and (4)~correlations between data composition and model behaviour. We analyze the political content of pre- and post-training datasets of open-source LLMs, combining large-scale sampling, political-leaning classification, and stance detection. We find that all LLM training datasets are systematically skewed towards left-leaning content, with pre-training containing more politically engaged than post-training corpora. We further observe a strong correlation between political stances in training data and model behavior, which is present already in most base models and persists across post-training stages. These findings highlight the role of data composition in correlating with model behavior and motivate the need for greater data transparency as a means to understand and monitor model behavior.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are pre-trained on large amounts of data from different sources and domains. Such datasets often contain trillions of tokens, including large portions of copyrighted or proprietary content, which raises questions about the legal use of such models. This underscores the need for truly open pre-training data that complies with data security regulations. In this paper, we introduce Common Corpus, the largest open dataset for LLM pre-training. The data assembled in Common Corpus are either uncopyrighted or under open licenses, totaling about two trillion tokens. The dataset contains a wide variety of languages, ranging from the high-resource European languages to some low-resource languages rarely represented in pre-training datasets. In addition, it includes a large amount of code data. The diversity of data sources in terms of covered domains and time periods opens up the paths for both research and entrepreneurial needs across diverse areas of knowledge. In this paper, we present the detailed provenance of data assembling and the details of dataset filtering and curation. We train two small language models on Common Corpus and find that they perform comparably to other models of their size, indicating that our dataset is suitable for multilingual pretraining. Common Corpus represents a key contribution to the ecosystem for open science research on Large Language Models.
Pierre-Carl Langlais, Pavel Chizhov, Catherine Arnett +7
PleIAs, Paris, France · CAIRO, Technical University of Applied Sciences Würzburg-Schweinfurt, Germany · EleutherAI
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet they remain vulnerable to generating harmful content. From adversarial jailbreaks that bypass safety filters to implicit hate that evades detection, the range of risks these models pose continues to grow. While both specialized content moderators and general-purpose LLMs are being used as safety layers, the question of which model is best suited for which type of harmful content remains unanswered. We present the most comprehensive evaluation of LLM safety capabilities to date, systematically testing 53 models across 11 datasets that we organize into four distinct categories. Our evaluation under both prompt-only and prompt-response settings uncovers critical blind spots: large frontier models that lead on one category fall significantly behind smaller, specialized alternatives on others, and real-world conversational safety remains largely unsolved across all model families. These findings challenge the assumption that scale alone ensures safety, and provide the community with a structured framework for informed model selection.