ARENA: Automated Red-Teaming for Large Audio Language Models

Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) expand jailbreak risks from token-level prompting to the full speech perception-to-reasoning pipeline, where unsafe behavior can be induced through semantics, acoustic style, signal artifacts, or internal representations. Existing work studies these risks under heterogeneous threat models and evaluation protocols, making it difficult to compare attack practicality or defense utility. This paper provides a unified taxonomy and a controlled empirical evaluation of LALM jailbreak attacks and defenses. We organize prior work into semantic, acoustic, signal, and embedding-layer attacks; guard-based, training-free, and training-based defenses; and cross-modal, audio-native, and interactive benchmarks. We then evaluate representative attacks and defenses across ten open-source LALMs, measuring not only attack success rate but also benign refusal and latency. Our results show that Acoustic Best-of-N reveals strong worst-case audio-space vulnerabilities, Narrative Framing is an effective low-latency semantic threat, and current defenses trade robustness against benign usability. These findings support cost- and utility-aware evaluation as a necessary complement to success-rate-only LALM safety benchmarks.

Large Audio Language Models (LALMs) achieve strong performance on audio-language tasks; however, their reliability in real-world settings remains underexplored. We introduce Audio Hallucination Attacks (AHA), an attack suite called AHA-Eval, comprising 6.5K QA pairs designed to test whether LALMs genuinely ground their responses in the audio input. AHA targets two attack surfaces: (i) query-based attacks, which exploit question structure to induce hallucinations about absent sounds, and (ii) audio-based attacks, which inject synthetic speech describing non-existent events into the audio stream. Evaluating state-of-the-art LALMs, including Audio Flamingo 3 and Gemini 3 Pro, we observe high attack success rates of 95.35% and 79.65%, respectively, revealing a reliability gap that is hidden by standard benchmark performance. To mitigate this, we propose a 120K QA post-alignment dataset, AHA-Guard, which successfully reduces attack success rates by up to 49%.

Large audio-language models (LALMs) expand language models to process and interpret audio, but also expose them to heterogeneous audio jailbreaks. We ask whether successful jailbreaks reflect failures to recognize harmful intent or failures occurring after such recognition. Layer-wise probing reveals the latter: risk-related information remains decodable from intermediate representations, yet the internal risk signal fails to translate into refusal in later-layer processing. We identify this discrepancy as the risk-to-refusal gap. Building on this finding, we propose AEGIS, a detect-then-intervene defense whose mid-layer risk gate selectively activates downstream safety adapters. Across six LALMs and three heterogeneous audio jailbreak benchmarks, AEGIS reduces the average unsafe rate from 17.9% to 0.4%, while causing only a marginal increase in over-refusal on benign inputs. These results establish selective internal intervention as an effective path toward more robust refusal in LALMs. The code is available at https://github.com/azzzzliao/aegis-audio-defense.