Abstract
The impressive visual quality and ubiquity of AI-generated images call for reliable and robust detection methods. Reconstruction-based detectors have emerged as a promising direction for transparent and training-free identification of synthetic images. However, due to their fundamentally different mode of operation (compared to standard, classifier-based methods), little is known about their adversarial robustness. In this work, we propose two novel attack methods targeted at detectors that leverage autoencoder reconstruction error. We find that by constructing imperceptible adversarial examples, the distance between original and reconstruction can be artificially increased, causing fake images to be wrongly classified as real. Our evaluation including images from three state-of-the-art generators and three detectors demonstrates that detection performance is significantly decreased, even if attacked images additionally undergo real-world degradations. Critically, our adversarial examples naturally transfer across detectors, as they all share the same principle, pointing towards an inherent vulnerability of reconstruction-based detectors.
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Aug 13, 2026cs.CV
Detecting AI-generated images is only half the task: a deployed detector must also justify its verdict, yet existing detectors inherit three failure modes from their training data: real and fake images collected from different sources invite provenance shortcuts, supervised explanation corpora teach templated rationales, and a static forgery corpus leaves the decision boundary standing still while generators keep moving. We introduce \methodname{}, an adversarial reinforcement learning framework that pits two heterogeneous models against each other. A diffusion image editor learns to edit real photographs into fake counterparts of those same photographs that fool the current detector, while a reasoning MLLM learns to expose them with a verdict grounded in free-form reasoning. Both rewards are shortcut-proof by design: the attacker is credited only when its edit is faithfully executed, and the defender only when its verdict is correct. As the two models alternate, each round's attacker regenerates a harder training pool aimed at the current detector's blind spots, so the detector must generalize rather than memorize any fixed artifact distribution. Although the explanation is never rewarded, its quality rises round over round as a side effect of accuracy-only training. A detector trained within this loop improves monotonically across rounds on each of three external benchmarks.
Yicheng Bao, Xiahui Guo, Xuhong Wang +1
1East China Normal University · 2Shanghai Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Jun 18, 2026cs.CV
Training-free detectors of AI-generated images promise generator-agnostic deployment without classifier training, yet their reported numbers are rarely compared under a single controlled protocol. We audit two representative training-free scores -- an autoencoder-reconstruction score (AEROBLADE-style) and a noise-perturbation feature-similarity score (RIGID-style) -- plus a naive feature-kNN control, on a common 1,500-image GenImage-derived benchmark spanning seven generators and JPEG compression at quality 70 and 50. The audit yields three cautionary findings. (i) Implementation details masquerade as method differences: replacing the LPIPS backbone (AlexNet -> VGG-16) changes overall AUROC by +0.085, and switching between resize-to-512 and native-resolution preprocessing flips per-generator conclusions by up to 0.38 AUROC. (ii) Score direction is not a property of the method but of its hyperparameters: the RIGID-style score is inverted (AUROC < 0.5) on SD1.5 and Wukong at noise level sigma=0.05, recovers to >0.5 for every generator at sigma=0.01, and collapses to 0.15 at sigma=0.3. (iii) Dataset format bias inflates robustness claims: without unified re-encoding, AUROC under JPEG-50 exceeds the clean condition for the AlexNet-backbone reconstruction score; after bias correction the residual anomaly localizes to a single generator (BigGAN). The audited scores have complementary per-generator failure sets, but naive z-score fusion does not beat the best single score, indicating that exploiting complementarity requires direction-aware combination.
Jingwen Zhou, Mingzhe Wang
Xidian University, Xi’an, China
Sep 29, 2026cs.CV
The rapid evolution of image generators calls for forensic cues that generalize beyond known generation mechanisms. Existing detectors often rely on static image representations or endpoint reconstruction discrepancies, leaving the evolution of intermediate reconstruction stages underexplored. We observe that the relative token predictability of real and generated images can reverse across reconstruction scales, suggesting that intermediate stages may expose forensic evidence overlooked by endpoint comparisons. Motivated by this observation, we propose RED (Reconstruction Evolution Dynamics), a framework that captures transferable forensic cues from coarse-to-fine reconstruction evolution. To our knowledge, RED is the first framework to use scale-wise token predictability to guide forensic evidence aggregation across intermediate reconstruction states. It represents the reconstruction trajectory produced by a frozen multiscale VQ-VAE in the shared feature space of a frozen CLIP encoder. To connect the observed predictability variations with visual evidence, RED learns image-adaptive stage weights from scale-wise token negative log-likelihoods provided by a frozen VAR model. A cross-stage evidence aggregation module then jointly models the original-image representation and the weighted reconstruction features, capturing complementary forensic cues through interactions along the reconstruction trajectory. Experiments on six diverse benchmarks demonstrate that RED achieves the highest average accuracy of 92.5% and average precision of 97.5% among the evaluated methods. Further evaluations show strong robustness to common image degradations, supporting the value of reconstruction evolution for generalizable AI-generated image detection. The code will be made publicly available upon acceptance of this paper.
Wenpeng Mu, Junshan Jin, Tanfeng Sun +2
School of Computer Science, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China