Pessimistic Meta-Induction and Its Limits: Lessons from Frequentist Statistics and Machine Learning Theory

Classical statistical theory is insufficient to explain the successes of general-purpose AI models, because it depends on handcrafted inductive biases that it cannot justify. No Free Lunch (NFL) theorems force any learner that beats chance on some environments to underperform on others. We might hope that past experience informs which environments to expect, but NFL applies equally to meta-learning. Thus, any method that makes meaningful predictions necessarily begins with an inductive bias external to the data. Choosing to bias toward short programs yields Solomonoff induction (SI), whose performance is competitive against all computable learners - albeit up to "constants" that become large when comparing against specialized methods that exploit background information. We therefore relativize SI to an information vantage point, biasing toward short programs with access to all preexisting information. This reframes the inductive bias: instead of seeking some absolute notion of simplicity, we favor accessibility with respect to our vantage point. An algorithm can only outpredict the relativized SI to the extent that its code contains additional information about the data, and no algorithm can generate such information. While SI is incomputable and hence not a practical algorithm, it provides a formal optimum for inference in the limit of infinite compute, and there is evidence to suggest that frontier AI systems roughly approximate it. Thus, the only known answer to meta-NFL is rooted in algorithmic information theory, which we should expect to play a fundamental role in explaining the generalization behavior of modern (and future) AI systems.

The principle of Occam's razor, which instructs us to prefer simplicity in inductive inference, has attracted much scrutiny both in the philosophy of science and in machine learning. In either field, however, a justification for the principle has been elusive. In this paper, building on an earlier "core argument," I spell out a justification from statistical learning theory for the procedure of regularization: for trading off fit for simplicity. The means-ends argument is that in order to profit from theoretical reliability and "what-you-see-is-what-you-get" guarantees, one must implement a certain preference for simplicity over fit. This is a genuine methodological justification, which neither collapses to a purely pragmatic principle that we prefer simplicity for its own sake, nor to an ontological assumption that the truth is simple.

When can a learner make only finitely many prediction errors along every infinite sequence labeled by a fixed, unknown hypothesis? We characterize this form of consistency for arbitrary binary hypothesis classes in ZFC, without requiring a uniform mistake bound. The characterization uses a single linear order on finite realizable traces. Each trace selects its least subtrace, and the order must satisfy two conditions: conflicting traces select different subtraces, and the order is well-founded on the traces of each fixed target. These conditions induce a learner whose selected evidence decreases on every mistake. Conversely, a consistent learner yields such an order through canonical mistake transcripts and the Kleene--Brouwer ordering. The result provides a representation of consistent prediction by finite evidence, answering a question of Lu (2024).