Authors: Charles de Bourcy, Sahra Ghalebikesabi, Avi Schwarzschild, Alex Gorbachev, Mihai Maruseac, Annie Chu, Vol Kyrylov, Tong Mu, Ally Bennett, Andy Nguyen, Casey Meehan, Jessica Gan Lee, Shane Bauer, Harold Nguyen, Rodolpho Eckhardt, Yuqi Liu, Charlie Oxborough, Marco Rougeth, Omar Chedid, Caio Costa, Yash Parikh, Yao Li, Congzheng Song, Om Thakkar, Vinnie Monaco
OpenAI Privacy Filter is a compact, bidirectional token-classification model for detecting and redacting personally identifiable information (PII) and secrets in unstructured text. The model is derived from an autoregressively pretrained checkpoint and converted into a bidirectional, banded-attention classifier that labels an input sequence in a single forward pass. A constrained Viterbi decoder produces coherent spans across eight privacy categories and exposes configurable operating points for precision-recall tradeoffs. Privacy Filter has 1.5 billion total parameters, 50 million active parameters per token, and a 128,000-token context window. It is designed for efficient local deployment and domain-specific fine-tuning. Privacy Filter is intended as a configurable data-minimization component within layered privacy workflows, not as an anonymization or compliance guarantee.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Illustrative chat-style interaction showing Privacy Filter redacting PII from raw user text.
Benchmark Dataset
Scope
Precision (tokens)
Recall (tokens)
F1 (tokens)
F1 (spans)
PII-Masking-300k (baseline)
All labels
0.940
0.980
0.960
0.926
PII-Masking-300k (corrected)
All labels
0.968
0.981
0.974
0.942
CredData (baseline)
secret
0.747
0.965
0.842
0.617
CredData (corrected)
secret
0.750
0.965
0.844
0.624
Table 1: Privacy Filter performance on benchmark datasets.
Train Fraction
Best Epoch
Precision (tokens)
Recall (tokens)
F1 (tokens)
0%
0
0.414
0.795
0.545
1%
13
0.888
0.871
0.879
10%
39
0.963
0.960
0.962
50%
18
0.983
0.982
0.983
Table 2: Fine-tuning results on fractions of the SPY training dataset.
ID_NUM
→
account_number
ADDRESS
→
private_address
EMAIL
→
private_email
NAME , USERNAME
→
private_person
PHONE_NUM
→
private_phone
URL
→
private_url
Table 3: Mapping from SPY lables to Privacy Filter labels.
Prefix:
This is my home landline number: 442 222 47571
Suffix:
442 222 47571 is my home landline number.
Omitted:
442 222 47571
Table 4: Examples of PII with and without contextual clues.
Precision
Recall
Category
PII only
Clue + PII
PII + Clue
PII only
Clue + PII
PII + Clue
account_number
0.750
0.894
0.737
0.797
1.000
0.916
private_address
0.821
0.989
0.940
0.214
0.414
0.368
private_date
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.220
0.894
0.496
private_email
0.969
0.975
0.974
0.962
1.000
0.974
private_person
0.782
0.912
0.793
0.885
0.994
0.955
Table 5: Privacy Filter performance by PII category, with and without clues.
Language
Number of Examples
Recall
Precision
F1
Dutch
7,457
0.937
0.892
0.914
English
7,946
0.965
0.905
0.934
French
8,413
0.969
0.889
0.927
German
8,120
0.965
0.890
0.926
Italian
7,976
0.959
0.886
0.921
Spanish
7,816
0.968
0.901
0.933
Table 6: Privacy Filter performance on PII-Masking-300K data broken down by language.
Language
Number of Examples
Recall
Precision
F1
Bengali
953
0.875
0.851
0.863
Hausa
941
0.801
0.720
0.758
Hindi
968
0.889
0.882
0.886
Indonesian
957
0.897
0.877
0.887
Japanese
968
0.866
0.897
0.881
Korean
962
0.887
0.903
0.895
Table 7: Privacy Filter performance on multilingual synthetic data broken down by language.
Language
Number of Examples
Precision
Recall
English
1,181
0.962
0.956
Bengali
1,188
0.831
0.741
Hindi
1,193
0.887
0.790
Indonesian
1,189
0.801
0.718
Japanese
1,189
0.900
0.758
Mandarin Chinese
1,191
0.926
0.786
Table 8: Privacy Filter performance on category-clue-before-PII multilingual data broken down by language.
Figure 2: One hop reasoning results. Recall drops as the distance between the alias and its definition grows within the context window.
Figure 3: Example showing how explicit line breaks in a URL can lead to fragmented false-positive private_person predictions. This whole span should be classified as private_url , but the line breaks lead to error.
account_number
This is a dice-roll sequence: 298212770451.
A customer’s gift card primary account number
private_email
For sending me the rehearsal schedule, use my personal email address below. This is a painting title: [email protected]
An email address.
private_date
This is a cheese-aging batch code: 07.08.2001 13:4O.
A real date and time.
Table 9: Examples of adversarial context.
Formatting Alternative
Description
Example
digit_words
Digits are spelled out as words.
If you need to reach me directly, my personal cell number is two six eight - seven two two - one zero four nine.
spacing
Extra or unusual spacing splits chunks or characters.
This is the compromised API access token from yesterday’s deploy, tok_ 7Qz .P9x 2Kj 8dL 3wV -QeR 1uT .ZxY 4bN _oP F, so rotate and invalidate it immediately.
line_breaks
The PII spans explicit newline breaks.
You can reach Emily directly at her personal email address: emily. carter @proton mail.com for scheduling the home visit.
symbol_substitution
Some characters or separators are swapped for visually similar non-ASCII characters or emoji.
Please list the package recipient’s full name as Sophia JOhnson.
emoji_word_replacement
One word-sized semantic chunk is replaced with a matching emoji.
For the lease paperwork, my home address is 482 Maple [road], Apt 3B, Brookside, OR 97401.
at_dot_obfuscation
Email or URL separators are replaced with worded or bracketed forms like [dot].
Check out Emily Ross’s personal website for her essays and travel photos at www[dot]emily-ross-journal[dot]com.
Table 10: Adversarial formatting alternatives used in evaluation.
Adversarial Axis
Number of Examples
Precision
Recall
confusion_category_eval_overall
178
0.728
0.687
spacing
270
0.699
0.631
symbol_substitution
247
0.824
0.907
line_breaks
219
0.453
0.812
digit_words
156
0.715
0.674
phonetic_alphabet
115
0.273
0.694
Table 11: Privacy Filter performance on adversarial formatting variants.
Modern language models (LM) are trained on large scrapes of the Web, containing millions of personal information (PI) instances, many of which LMs memorize, increasing privacy risks. In this work, we develop the regexes and rules (R&R) detector suite to detect email addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses, which outperforms the best regex-based PI detectors. On a manually curated set of 483 instances of PI, we measure memorization: finding that 13.6% are parroted verbatim by the Pythia-6.9b model, i.e., when the model is prompted with the tokens that precede the PI in the original document, greedy decoding generates the entire PI span exactly. We expand this analysis to study models of varying sizes (160M-6.9B) and pretraining time steps (70k-143k iterations) in the Pythia model suite and find that both model size and amount of pretraining are positively correlated with memorization. Even the smallest model, Pythia-160m, parrots 2.7% of the instances exactly. Consequently, we strongly recommend that pretraining datasets be aggressively filtered and anonymized to minimize PI parroting.
Nishant Subramani, Kshitish Ghate, Mona Diab
♠Carnegie Mellon University - Language Technologies Institute · University of Washington
The large-scale adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) forces a trade-off between operational cost (OpEx) and data privacy. Current routing frameworks reduce costs but ignore prompt sensitivity, exposing users and institutions to leakage risks towards third-party cloud providers. We formalise the "Inseparability Paradigm": advanced context management intrinsically coincides with privacy management. We propose a local "Privacy Guard" -- a holistic contextual observer powered by an on-premise Small Language Model (SLM) -- that performs abstractive summarisation and Automatic Prompt Optimisation (APO) to decompose prompts into focused sub-tasks, re-routing high-risk queries to Zero-Trust or NDA-covered models. This dual mechanism simultaneously eliminates sensitive inference vectors (Zero Leakage) and reduces cloud token payloads (OpEx Reduction). A LIFO-based context compacting mechanism further bounds working memory, limiting the emergent leakage surface. We validate the framework through a 2x2 benchmark (Lazy vs. Expert users; Personal vs. Institutional secrets) on a 1,000-sample dataset, achieving a 45% blended OpEx reduction, 100% redaction success on personal secrets, and -- via LLM-as-a-Judge evaluation -- an 85% preference rate for APO-compressed responses over raw baselines. Our results demonstrate that Token Parsimony and Zero Leakage are mathematically dual projections of the same contextual compression operator.
Alessio Langiu
National Research Council of Italy - Institute of Marine Sciences (CNR-ISMAR)
Agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) are models able to reason, plan, and execute tools over unstructured data. These abilities enable transformative applications in domains spanning personal assistants, financial, and legal domains, etc. While these systems can substantially improve productivity and service quality, effective agency typically requires access to sensitive personal or organizational information. However, this access introduces critical inference-time privacy risks, specifically regarding contextually appropriate information disclosure. While recent studies highlight the inability of agentic LLMs to consistently adhere to privacy norms, existing defenses often rely on auxiliary LLM-based monitors. However, these defenses are expensive and offer limited protection against attacks that are robust to semantic censorship. To contrast this background, this paper proposes a notion of privacy filters based on activation probing. We show that these filters are both computationally efficient and effective for both single-turn and multi-turn conversational settings. Furthermore, this work provides the first systematic investigation into probing model internals across a conversation trajectory, moving beyond static, single-prompt analysis to capture the evolving state of privacy-sensitive interactions, illustrating their applicability across contexts, attack styles, multiple base models, and challenging settings such as mosaic attacks, while providing nuanced insights into the nature of the discovered concepts and modular construction of probes.