Faults That Fortify: CNN Adversarial Robustness via GPU Undervolting

Deep neural networks (DNNs) deployed on resource-constrained neuromorphic hardware face three concurrent challenges: the need for model compression through pruning, vulnerability to adversarial input perturbations, and susceptibility to hardware-induced weight faults such as stuck-at-zero errors. While each of these factors has been studied in isolation, their combined effects on model reliability have received little attention. This paper presents an empirical investigation of how pruning, adversarial training, and hardware fault injection interact to affect the robustness of convolutional neural networks. Using a compact three-layer CNN trained on MNIST, we conduct three experiments: (1) comparing the fault tolerance of naturally and adversarially trained models under simultaneous hardware faults and adversarial attacks, (2) evaluating how pruning affects adversarial robustness, and (3) characterizing the joint accuracy surface across fault rates, adversarial perturbation magnitudes, and pruning levels. Our results show that adversarial training improves robustness against input perturbations but increases sensitivity to stuck-at-zero weight faults. Contrary to intuition, pruning did not significantly increase fault sensitivity, and varying the pruning level had little effect across fault rates and attack strengths. These results highlight the need to jointly consider adversarial robustness and hardware reliability.

The vulnerability of deep neural networks to adversarial examples poses a significant challenge for real-world deployment. Existing techniques to enhance deep network robustness rely on adversarial training, an approach that is powerful but computationally intensive and typically tailored to specific attack types. To address these limitations, existing works have explored techniques such as adding gaussian noise or filtering images, both of which can boost the network robustness to various adversarial attacks, albeit modestly. Here, we theoretically demonstrate that these two approaches enhance robustness against adversarial attacks through complementary mechanisms, resulting in supralinear robustness when combined. Building on this insight, we experimentally show that a simple preprocessor combining Gaussian noise and bilateral filtering yields supralinear improvements in adversarial robustness with minimal computational cost. Next, we combine our preprocessor with adversarial training and test on RobustBench to assess its supralinear improvement over state-of-the-art defenses. First, this combination ranks second on AutoAttack and third overall, while using only $\sim$35% of the training FLOPs, using a model with $\sim$50% less parametets, trained with $\sim$33% of the epochs and $\sim$15% the data compared to state-of-the-art defenses. Second, our method scales efficiently, matching the accuracy of competing models with roughly 2-8x less total compute across 3 orders of magnitude. Overall, our approach provides a principled and easily integrable framework for enhancing adversarial robustness, offering negligible computational overhead and a simple yet theoretically grounded design.

Adversarial Training (AT) improves neural network robustness, but most methods train a fixed parameter space from the start. This paper asks whether the order in which parameters become optimizable can affect the final robust solution, even when the final architecture or computation budget is controlled. We propose GRAPE, Guided Parameter-Space Evolution, a training framework for compact adversarial robustness. GRAPE combines parameter-space stabilization with progressive hidden expansion: it stabilizes robust optimization in the currently exposed space, gradually releases new optimizable dimensions, and uses an adversarial spectral utilization score to guide newly released capacity toward high-pressure modules. In contrast to fixed-structure AT, GRAPE treats robust model learning as a process of progressive parameter-space exposure and evolution. Under the standard $\ell_\infty$ threat model on CIFAR-10, with fixed-structure ResNet-18 AT as a controlled reference, GRAPE improves PGD-20 robust accuracy from 51.70% to 56.94% at a nearly matched computation budget with a FLOPs ratio of 1.009x, while reducing parameter count by about 21.4%. A sequential grow variant with the same final ResNet-18 architecture reaches 56.52% PGD-20 robust accuracy, indicating that the gain is not only due to final architecture differences but also to the parameter-space exposure path. These results suggest that guided parameter-space evolution can yield compact and robust parameter configurations under matched computation.