Prediction certification cannot replace explanation certification: a competence envelope for trustworthy AI under compound stress

SHAP and LIME are now standard tools for interpreting black-box predictions, yet their outputs can vary substantially when the input is perturbed by small amounts of noise--a problem we observed firsthand in our previous work on food security in Madagascar (Ralinirina et al., 2025). This variability raises the question of whether such explanations can be trusted at all. We address it by constructing an auditing protocol that measures two properties of any post-hoc explainer: robustness (how stable the explanation is under input perturbation) and fidelity (whether the features deemed important actually drive the model's prediction). These two quantities are combined into a single Trust Score. We run the protocol on a multi-sectoral dataset from Madagascar (83 features, 253 records, 4 malnutrition classes) using three classifiers and two explainers, plus their regularized counterparts. The results are sobering: models with AUC above 0.99 can produce numerically degenerate or flatly uninformative explanations, and fidelity scores lose discriminative power when the model is overfitted. These findings suggest that auditing XAI outputs is not optional but necessary, particularly when they inform decisions in sensitive domains.

A selective predictor acts as a safety gate: it returns an output only when the prediction appears sufficiently trustworthy. Deployments increasingly require this reliability to be certified at a target precision for every reporting unit of interest, such as a tool, policy label, or patient subgroup. The main difficulty is often not whether a granted certificate is valid, but whether finite calibration data can produce one at all. As the gate becomes safer or more fine-grained, some units may receive too little evidence to certify. We make this notion of availability computable through classical exact-binomial inversion and formulate reporting-partition selection, under a fixed group order, as a dynamic program that exposes the trade-off among safety, granularity, and served traffic. The resulting frontier reveals a large population opportunity that finite-sample estimation nearly erases: a truth-informed planner gains $0.157$ mean coverage over support balancing, whereas a naive estimator recovers only $0.005$, making recovery from finite data the central challenge. Constructing candidate partitions on one planning split and selecting among them on another recovers part of this gap, improving mean coverage over support balancing by $0.060$, with the direction reproduced in $59$ of $60$ model effects across three intent-routing datasets and two architectures. A complementary validity-preserving lever, reallocating the familywise error budget across reporting units, recovers additional coverage both with population quantities and noisy estimates. The same frontier recurs, with predictor-specific ceilings, across LLM tool-calling, content moderation, lesion classification, and recommendation. Certified availability is therefore a plannable deployment resource that determines when a safety gate can be certified, at what granularity, and over how much traffic.

AI deployment in sensitive domains such as health care, credit, employment, and criminal justice is often treated as unsafe to authorize until model internals can be explained. This often leads to an excessive reliance on mechanistic interpretability to address a deployment challenge beyond its intended scope. We argue that the gate should instead be calibrated verification: authorization should be domain-scoped, independently checkable, monitored after release, accountable, contestable, and revocable. The reason is twofold. First, model capability is uneven across nearby tasks, so authorization must attach to a specific use rather than to a model in general. Second, societies have long governed opaque expertise through credentials, monitoring, liability, appeal, and revocation rather than mechanism-level explanation. Recent evidence reinforces this distinction between mechanistic understanding and deployment authority: a 53-percentage-point gap between internal representations and output correction shows that understanding may not translate into action, while one scoping review found that only 9.0% of FDA-approved AI/ML device documents contained a prospective post-market surveillance study. We propose Verification Coverage, a six-component reportable standard with a minimum-composition rule, as the metric that should sit beside capability scores in model cards, leaderboards, and regulatory disclosures.