Multimodal safety moderation requires distinguishing risks arising from visual content, user intent, and assistant behavior. Existing safeguards, however, are typically trained for a single judgment target and reduce safety assessment to a binary decision. Consequently, risk becomes difficult to compare across a multimodal interaction, and ambiguous cases are obscured. We introduce SafeAtlas-VL, a dataset of 1.5M training instances that places image-, request-, and response-level judgments on a five-level ordered scale. We curate a broad collection of safety-relevant data from both real-world and synthetic sources and apply a disagreement-aware annotation procedure. The resulting dataset spans 15 harm categories and 55 fine-grained subcategories, covering a broad range of multimodal safety scenarios. We also construct SafeAtlas-Bench, a held-out set of 5,000 instances for evaluating five-level predictions and continuous risk scores. Upon this dataset, we train the SafeAtlas Guard series of models via target-conditioned tuning for multimodal safety detection. Our models not only perform five-way classification of safety levels but also map safety to continuous scores through a soft cumulative ordinal head. Experimental results demonstrate that guard models trained on our dataset exhibit strong generalization: even without using the training sets of other benchmarks, they achieve competitive performance on the corresponding test sets. Notably, our 8B model attains the overall best performance, outperforming the previous SOTA by approximately 4% in F1 score. Code, data, and models are released to support further research. Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive, harmful, graphic, or disturbing.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of SafeAtlas-VL and SafeAtlas Guard .
Figure 2Figure 3
Figure 5: Examples of the supervision learned by SafeAtlas Guard . (a) Risk scores increase across the five levels for image, request, and response targets. (b) Scores refine relative risk within the same discrete level.
External MM Input
External MM Response
External MM
SafeAtlas- Bench
Text-only
External All
Model
BT-V
SPA
VLG
HIT
LVG
Avg I
BT-V
SPA
Avg R
Avg MM
Img
Req
Resp
HB-P
OAI
HB-R
SR
Avg T
Avg All
Text-only guards
Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B (L)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
98.6
80.8
86.1
64.3
82.5
–
Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B (S)
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
99.5
68.2
86.7
69.9
81.1
–
GuardReasoner-8B †
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
91.9
72.0
85.5
70.0
79.8
–
Multimodal guards
Table 3: Unsafe-class F1 (%) on seven external multimodal tasks, three SafeAtlas-Bench targets, and four text-only tasks. On SafeAtlas-Bench , boundary uncertain and the riskier levels are unsafe. Averages exclude SafeAtlas-Bench and cover 5 input (Avg I ), 2 response (Avg R ), 7 multimodal (Avg MM ), 4 text (Avg T ), and all 11 external tasks (Avg All ). Abbreviations follow the experimental setup; Qwen3Guard L/S denote loose/strict reductions. Bold/underline mark the best/second-best results. † marks source-reported cells; other cells use our harness, dashes are unavailable.
Figure 6: Ablations over training objectives and data fractions using Qwen3-VL 2B/4B/8B backbones.
Figure 7: Risk-score distributions of SafeAtlas Guard -8B on the held-out evaluation split. The five modes follow the label order, with most overlap between adjacent levels.
Table 8
Score gap
Concordance ↑
Non-reversal ↑
0<Δ<5
34.4%
71.9%
5≤Δ<15
52.5%
80.3%
15≤Δ<30
86.8%
92.3%
30≤Δ<50
90.8%
93.3%
Δ≥50
96.6%
97.3%
Table 6: Human validation of the risk representation. (a) Agreement with pairwise judgments as score separation increases. (b) Agreement of the original and predicted labels with human judgments.
Appendix figures & tables19 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure A1: Empirical unsafe rates for all 12 judge-output configurations on the pooled BeaverTails-V and SPA-VL calibration data. Colors indicate their assignment to the five ordered safety levels.
Image-only moderation; GuardReasoner-VL public aggregate
LVG
LLaVAGuard image safety
I
Image-only moderation; official LLaVAGuard test split
Multimodal response
BT-V
BeaverTails-V response safety
(I,q,a)
Response moderation in image–request context
Appendix
Table A2: The 11 benchmark–task pairs in the common evaluation suite. Unsafe-class F1 is computed for every row; aggregate columns in the main paper are unweighted means over their stated task groups.
Benchmark
Threshold
HarmBench-P
20
HarmBench-R
25
OpenAI Moderation
65
SafeRLHF
20
BeaverTails-V P
20
BeaverTails-V R
20
Appendix
Table A3: Benchmark-specific thresholds for binarizing the continuous risk score. I, P, and R denote image, prompt/request, and response targets.
Setting
Value
Trainable modules
Full model
Training epochs
1
Optimizer
AdamW
Learning rate
5×10−5
Scheduler
Cosine
Warmup ratio
0
Appendix
Table A4: Training settings for safety instruction tuning.
Setting
Value
Trainable modules
Heads and thresholds
Backbone
Frozen
Training epochs
1
Prediction-head learning rate
1×10−4
Threshold learning rate
1×10−3
Scheduler
Cosine
Appendix
Table A5: Training settings for the frozen-backbone prediction heads.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Violation of Personal Property
Forge Identity
impersonation
An image of identity forgery activity
identity theft
A photo containing forged identity documents
identity forgery
An image showing an impersonation attempt
identity fabrication
An image of fake IDs or passports
Copyright Infringement
piracy
An image of copyright infringement activity
Appendix
Table A6: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 1 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Illegal Activities
Drug-Related Crimes
drug offense
An image of drug-related criminal activity
drug trafficking
A photo containing illicit drug trade
narcotics offense
An image showing drug trafficking
drug crime
An image of illegal drug production
Financial Crimes
fraud
An image of financial crime activity
Appendix
Table A7: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 2 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Fraud or Deceptive Action
Fake News
news hoax
An image of fake news activity
false reporting
A photo containing misleading news headlines
fabricated news
An image showing propagation of false news
fabrication of news content
An image of fabricated news headlines
Academic Dishonesty
cheating
An image of academic dishonesty activity
Appendix
Table A8: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 3 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Privacy
Personal Privacy
data privacy
An image of personal privacy invasion
privacy rights
A photo containing unauthorized surveillance
personal data protection
An image showing personal data exposure
privacy breach
An image of unauthorized surveillance cameras
Dangerous Information
Appendix
Table A9: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 4 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Unfair
Religion
religious bias
An image of religious discrimination activity
religious prejudice
A photo containing unfair treatment due to religion
religious discrimination
An image showing religious prejudice
sectarian discrimination
An image of religious hate propaganda
Sexism
misogyny
An image of sexism occurring
Appendix
Table A10: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 5 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Retrieval class
Keyword anchor
Scene anchor
Toxic
Threaten
menace
An image of threatening behavior
coerce
A photo containing a written threat
intimidate
An image showing someone making a threat
expressions of threat
An image of threatening text messages
Harass
pestering
An image of harassment activity
Appendix
Table A11: Sampled textual anchors for taxonomy-guided image retrieval (part 6 of 6). Harm categories are shown as group headers; each retrieval class is expanded into four keyword–scene anchor rows. Exact duplicates of retrieval-class names are omitted.
Figure A3: Taxonomy-guided CLIP relevance filtering examples, part 1. Across the two-part gallery, we show one retained image for each of the 55 fine-grained retrieval classes, together with its parent harm category, retrieval class, and matched textual anchor.
Figure A4: Taxonomy-guided CLIP relevance filtering examples, part 2. This gallery covers the remaining fine-grained retrieval classes with their corresponding matched textual anchors.
Fine-grained category
Count
Share (%)
None (safe core)
78,570
14.85
Human Autonomy and Integrity Harms
Violation of Personal Property
Forge Identity
24,668
4.66
Copyright Infringement
33,041
6.25
Plagiarism
7,392
1.40
Appendix
Table A12: Fine-grained category distribution for request-level judgments ( N=528,916 ). Counts and shares include none , and shares are computed over all request-level instances. Colors follow the dataset-composition figure in the main paper.
Fine-grained category
Count
Share (%)
None (safe core)
141,730
19.01
Human Autonomy and Integrity Harms
Violation of Personal Property
Forge Identity
31,250
4.19
Copyright Infringement
39,118
5.25
Plagiarism
9,633
1.29
Appendix
Table A13: Fine-grained category distribution for response-level judgments ( N=745,641 ). Counts and shares include none , and shares are computed over all response-level instances. Colors follow the dataset-composition figure in the main paper.
Category
Count
Share (%)
Category
Count
Share (%)
Violation of Personal Property
3,494
1.53
Persuasion and Manipulation
2,150
0.94
Illegal Activities
3,037
1.33
Fraud or Deceptive Action
4,350
1.90
Security Threats
3,000
1.31
Influence Operations
1,678
0.73
Defamation
259
0.11
None (safe core)
155,474
67.97
Privacy
13,481
5.89
Dangerous Information
14,264
6.24
False Beliefs
4,536
1.98
Erosion of Trust in Public Information
2,222
0.97
Appendix
Table A14: Harm-category distribution for image-level judgments ( N=228,727 ). Counts and shares include none , and shares are computed over all image-level instances. Colors follow the dataset-composition figure in the main paper.
Figure A5: Instruction-tuning prompt and output format for image-level safety judgment. The image is the only judgment target; visible embedded text is treated as image content, and the model outputs a five-way safety label and harm category.
Figure A6: Instruction-tuning prompt and output format for request-level safety judgment. The model evaluates the multimodal user request and outputs the primary safety/category fields together with auxiliary judge labels.
Figure A7: Instruction-tuning prompt and output format for response-level safety judgment. The model judges only the assistant response, using the image and user request as context, and outputs the primary fields plus auxiliary judge labels.
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in consumer, medical, financial, and enterprise applications. This broad deployment expands the safety surface: risks can arise from multimodal question answering, assistant responses, and cross-modal composition, while moderation policies may vary across products, regions, and deployment stages. Most existing guardrails either rely on fixed taxonomies or target only a narrow set of interaction settings, which limits their adaptability when safety rules change at deployment time. We present SingGuard, a policy-adaptive multimodal guardrail model family for safety assessment in multimodal conversations. SingGuard treats the active policy as a runtime input: given natural-language rules, it checks the target content against the active policy rule by rule and predicts both the safety label and the triggered rule. To balance efficiency and interpretability, SingGuard supports fast, hybrid, and slow inference regimes along a fast-to-slow reasoning spectrum, ranging from direct safety judgments to policy-grounded deliberation. We further optimize this behavior with fast--slow decoupled reinforcement learning. We also introduce SingGuard-Bench, a multimodal guardrail benchmark with 56{,}340 examples spanning 80+ fine-grained risk types across multimodal QA, adversarial attack, and dynamic-rule evaluation settings, including cross-modal joint-risk cases where each modality is harmless in isolation but their composition implies unsafe intent. Across six benchmark families (35 datasets), SingGuard achieves state-of-the-art average F1 in every family. Dynamic-rule evaluation further shows improved policy-following accuracy from 0.6465 to 0.7415 under runtime policy shifts. Our code is available at https://github.com/inclusionAI/Sing-Guard.
Multimodal large-language models (MLLMs) often experience degraded safety alignment when harmful queries exploit cross-modal interactions. Models aligned on text alone show a higher rate of successful attacks when extended to two or more modalities. We propose a simple conditional decoding strategy, CASA (Classification Augmented with Safety Attention) that uses internal representations of MLLMs to predict a binary safety token before response generation. The classification is guided by a safety attention mechanism that computes attention between a dedicated query prompt and the input to scale the classification logits, sharpening the model's ability to detect malicious queries. Our design ensures robust safety alignment without relying on any external classifier or auxiliary head, and without modality-specific safety fine-tuning. Unlike prior safety-decoding methods that attach an external classifier or moderation head, or rescale every generated token with a reward model, CASA makes a single, internal, attention-gated safety decision over the shared multimodal representation, which is precisely what lets safety learned from text-only training transfer to image and audio inputs. Compared against 4 baseline models across 7 attack types spanning text, image, and audio modalities, evaluated on benchmarks such as MM-SafetyBench, JailbreakV-28k, and adversarial audio tests, CASA lowers the average attack success rate by >90% relative when paired with a standard safety prompt (applied to all baselines for fair comparison), and by 54--61% using its internal safety mechanism alone. Our empirical evaluations also show that CASA~maintains strong utility on benign inputs, validated through both automated and human evaluations (via 13 trained annotators). Together, these results highlight CASA as a simple and generalizable framework to improve multimodal LLM safety.
While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, their reliability is threatened by multimodal implicit risks. Unlike explicit threats, these hazards emerge when individually benign text and neutral visual entities logically converge to induce unsafe outputs. Current detection methods fail to address this because they overlook the underlying risk activation mechanisms that govern cross-modal risk activation, leading to single-modality shortcut learning and hallucinated rationalizations. To bridge this gap, we first construct TriggerBench, the first dataset explicitly modeling risk compositionality (5,600 instances). By formally isolating Key Elements and Trigger Elements to build counterfactual contrastive pairs, TriggerBench eliminates risk residues and forces models to perform genuine logical deduction rather than superficial pattern matching, which provides a rigorous foundation for both large-scale training and fine-grained evaluation. Building on this, we propose a Step-Supervised Structured Reasoning training framework and employ it to train ThinkingGuard, a specialized guard model. Inspired by Situation Awareness theory, we decouple implicit risk identification into progressive cognitive stages, and utilize a step-reward Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to explore optimal reasoning trajectories, which are then distilled into the model through Dual-Constraint Preference Alignment. Extensive experiments across both standard and implicit safety benchmarks demonstrate that ThinkingGuard achieves strong performance. Project resources are available at https://github.com/FroggyChen/ThinkingGuard.
Ruochen Zhang, Yao Huang, Yitong Sun +5
Beihang University Beijing, China · Tsinghua University Beijing, China · Institute of Artificial Intelligence Beihang University Beijing, China State Key Laboratory of AI Safety