Diffusion watermarking embeds verifiable signals into the generative process and commonly verifies them by recovering trajectory-dependent evidence, making the marks robust to conventional pixel-space distortions. Existing removal attacks either regenerate along deterministic trajectories, which often preserve the watermark-bearing latent structure, or optimize every image separately. We identify the reliance on a recoverable generative trajectory as a common attack surface among the schemes we study. Based on this observation, we propose DRIFT, a black-box attack that combines partial forward diffusion with stochastic reverse resampling. Forward re-noising limits source information available to a fixed-depth recovery pipeline, while stochastic reversal supplies alternative noise-driven paths whose removal benefit we isolate through matched sampler comparisons. Adaptive DRIFT searches a selected ladder for each image's first verifier-rejected rung and refines fidelity while retaining only updates rejected by the same verifier. At fixed depth, we derive information-theoretic and Wasserstein source-dependence bounds; under realized-ladder monotonicity, the first rejected rung is least distorted among rejected rungs on that ladder, and verifier-gated refinement preserves rejection. Across nine watermarks spanning three paradigms, DRIFT achieves 98-100% attack success and the best image quality among the compared attacks, without secret keys, verifier internals, or per-image gradient optimization.
Digital image watermarking has advanced rapidly for copyright protection of generative AI, yet the comparatively limited progress in watermark attack techniques has broken the attack-defense balance and hindered further advances in the field. In this paper, we propose FMDiffWA, a frequency-domain modulated diffusion framework for watermark attacks. Specifically, we introduce a frequency-domain watermark modulation (FWM) module and incorporate it into the sampling stages both the forward and reverse diffusion processes. This mechanism enables selective modulation of watermark-related frequency components, thereby allowing FMDiffWA to effectively neutralize the invisible watermark signals while preserving the perceptual quality of the attacked watermarked images. To achieve a better trade-off between attack efficacy and visual fidelity, we reformulate the training strategy of conventional diffusion models by augmenting the canonical noise estimation objective with an auxiliary refinement constraint. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that FMDiffWA achieves superior visual fidelity compared to existing watermark attacks, while exhibiting strong generalization across diverse watermarking schemes.
Inversion-based watermarking is a promising approach to authenticate diffusion-generated images, yet practical use is bottlenecked by inversion that is both slow and error-prone. While the primary challenge in the watermarking setting is robustness against external distortions, existing approaches over-optimize internal truncation error, and because that error scales with the sampler step size, they are inherently confined to high-NFE (number of function evaluations) regimes that cannot meet the dual demands of speed and robustness. In this work, we have two key observations: (i) the inversion trajectory has markedly lower curvature than the forward generation path does, making it highly compressible and amenable to low-NFE approximation; and (ii) in inversion for watermark verification, the trade-off between speed and truncation error is less critical, since external distortions dominate the error. A faster inverter provides a dual benefit: it is not only more efficient, but it also enables end-to-end adversarial training to directly target robustness, a task that is computationally prohibitive for the original, lengthy inversion trajectories. Building on this, we propose \textbf{FARI} (\textbf{F}ast \textbf{A}symmetric \textbf{R}obust \textbf{I}nversion), a one-step inversion framework paired with lightweight adversarial LoRA fine-tuning of the denoiser for watermark extraction. While consolidation slightly increases internal error, FARI delivers large gains in both speed and robustness: with approximately 20 minutes of fine-tuning on a single NVIDIA RTX A6000 GPU, it surpasses 50-step DDIM inversion on watermark-verification robustness while dramatically reducing inference time. Code and pretrained models are available at https://github.com/0xD009/FARI.
Watermarking combines an imperceptible change to an input image that will trigger a detector, to assert provenance and protect intellectual property. The literature has shown great interest in attacks on watermarking schemes: attackers are clearly motivated to steal copyrighted material or circumvent legislated deepfake protections. In this work, we make a simple-yet-powerful observation: that such attacks on watermarking-like watermarks themselves-seek an imperceptible change to an input image (now already watermarked) that will trigger a detector. This analogy comparing watermark attacks to watermarking itself is highly suggestive: that watermarks could be used to attack watermarks. Our first contribution validates this hypothesis. In rigorous experiments spanning 96 combinations of dataset, victim, and attack watermarks, we show that simply re-watermarking an already watermarked image reliably suppresses the original signal, without requiring gradients, surrogate models, or detection keys. Our second contribution is a simple classifier for detecting the presence and identity of an existing watermark in a given image. Surprisingly, experimental findings demonstrate outstanding overall accuracies 0.878-0.953. This result is of independent interest as a security vulnerability: research shows that method-specific attacks achieve substantially stronger removal than black-box attacks. Taken together, watermark identification combined with re-watermarking successfully reduces bit accuracy by at least 25% and up to 48%. Our work constitutes a cheap, generic, and highly effective attack pipeline, calling into question the reliability of current watermarking schemes to such a simple attack, as well as the value of existing sophisticated attacks.
Maria Bulychev, Neil G. Marchant, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein