Defining AI Agents: A Compendium of Criteria, Metrics, and Benchmarks

Agent systems are advancing quickly across domains, but their evaluation remains fragmented. Most benchmarks rely on fixed, LLM-centric harnesses that require heavy integration, create test-production mismatch, and limit fair comparison across diverse agent designs. The root problem is the lack of an open, agent-agnostic assessment interface. We advocate Agentified Agent Assessment (AAA), where evaluation is performed by judge agents and all participants interact through standardized protocols: A2A for task management and MCP for tool access. Conventional benchmarking defines two separate interfaces, one for the benchmark and one for the agent, while AAA only needs one; this yields a generic, unified framework that separates assessment logic from agent implementation and enables reproducible, interoperable, and multi-agent evaluation. We further introduce AgentBeats as a concrete realization of AAA: we identify five practical operation modes that make standardized assessment compatible with real-world constraints on openness, privacy, and reproducibility. To evaluate our design at scale, we conduct two studies: a five-month open competition that drew 298 judge agents across 12 categories together with 467 subject agents from independent participants, showing that AAA applies across a heterogeneous range of benchmarks; and a case study on coding agents that confirms agentified evaluation preserves fidelity with the public record while surfacing previously missing head-to-head results, yielding research insights about agent design. Combining a community-scale field study and a controlled coding case study, we verify that AAA delivers coverage, practicality, and fidelity across heterogeneous scenarios at scale. Together, AAA and AgentBeats offer a clear path toward open, standardized, and reproducible agent assessment.

Comprehensively evaluating AI agents across interactive environments is difficult due to fragmented tasks, scaffolds, verifiers, and scoring rules. Unfortunately, existing efforts to unify these evaluations are limited in scale and domain, making costly reruns necessary and leaving available data incomparable. We introduce MESSIER, a unified corpus of 957,611 records spanning 30 benchmarks, 745 agents, 11,891 tasks, and 74,263 verifiers. MESSIER combines public evaluation results with new runs on six underrepresented professional and scientific benchmarks, standardizing their heterogeneous components into a common schema. Using this corpus, we show that frontier progress is uneven across benchmark groups, with function-calling evaluations largely saturated, programming improving fastest, and enterprise workflows remaining most challenging. Counterfactual rescoring further shows that strict all-pass scoring in multi-verifier tasks can alter agent rankings. Finally, we derive capability scores from our corpus that correlate with Epoch's Evaluation Capability Index rankings at Spearman \r{ho} = 0.84. The scores can also be estimated for subsets defined by domain, occupation, action space, or verifier type. In essence, MESSIER is a reusable resource for studying agent performance at scale, and a basis for designing better evaluations.

Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.