When Noise Fabricates Bias: The Fragility of LLM-as-a-Judge Bias Measurement under Noisy Text

LLM-as-a-Judge has become the dominant paradigm for evaluating language model outputs, yet LLM judges exhibit systematic biases that compromise evaluation reliability. We present a comprehensive empirical study comparing nine debiasing strategies across five judge models from four provider families (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta), three benchmarks (MT-Bench n=400, LLMBar n=200, custom n=375), and four bias types. Our headline practical finding is that a mid-tier model with the right debiasing can outperform frontier judges at a fraction of the cost: Gemini 2.5 Flash with the Combined Budget strategy reaches the highest agreement of any configuration we tested (71.0%, kappa=0.549) at ~$0.001 per evaluation, about 15x cheaper than the best frontier setup (Claude Sonnet 4, 69.5$0.015). Other key findings: (1) Style bias is the dominant bias (0.10-0.76 across models, favoring markdown over plain prose), far exceeding position bias (<=0.04), yet is rarely studied. (2) Verbosity bias is heterogeneous when measured length-aware: Pro, Flash, and Llama prefer longer answers (+0.24 to +0.44), Claude prefers concise (-0.12), and GPT-4o is neutral (-0.04); on truncation controls all models correctly prefer the complete response (0.88-1.00 accuracy). (3) Debiasing helps multiple models: Claude S8 (+11.5 pp), Flash S8 (+7.5 pp), and Claude S5 (+7.3 pp) survive Holm-Bonferroni correction, with Flash S1 (+4.7 pp) and Llama S8 (+4.5 pp) also significant. We release our evaluation framework, the 375-pair controlled dataset, and per-instance cached results for all nine strategies.

Evaluations of social bias in LLMs largely focus on whether models generate or imply biased content. However, as LLMs are increasingly used as judges of bias, they may exhibit social biases in subtler ways in how they evaluate biased content, which current methods do not systematically capture. We call this second-order bias: social bias in an LLM's judgment about social bias, which we evaluate through a novel, philosophically grounded reasoning task. Drawing on entitlement epistemology, we conceptualize bias as misplaced foundational knowledge that shapes an agent's rational inquiry, and derive a logical reasoning task for LLMs to judge to whom a biased text is acceptable or non-acceptable. We develop two simple metrics to measure how biased LLM judges are in inferring demographics for acceptability without sufficient support, and how these inferences vary across groups targeted by biased texts. Evaluating open and closed models, we find that our task evades safety guardrails by surfacing bias in model judgment. It varies systematically across target groups, reflects implicit social maps, and shows how models are still triggered by demographic labels. Our work points to the need for LLM bias evaluation in judgment tasks and broadly, for more theoretically grounded approaches to bias evaluation in NLP. We release our code and model responses at https://github.com/uofthcdslab/second-order-bias.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as automatic judges for summarization and dialogue evaluation. Prior work has documented biases such as position, verbosity, and style preferences, but largely focuses on outcomes, leaving judge explanations underexplored. We instead ask whether LLM judges are cue-invariant, i.e., whether their rankings and explanations remain stable when non-evidential cues are perturbed while holding the underlying texts fixed. We introduce a suite of cue interventions (Blind, Truth, Flip, Placebo, Reveal-After) and tie-aware metrics that quantify outcome anchoring and rationale anchoring, including label-aligned rhetoric and explanation drift, alongside consistency and stereotype-intrusion checks. We design anchoring attacks using verbosity and confidence cues, and compare two mitigations: structured chain-of-thought prompting and PROOF-BEFORE-PREFERENCE (evidence lock, score, rank). Using a new dataset of 1,000 summaries from traditional extractive models and LLMs, we find substantial cue-anchored rationalization under label and placebo perturbations, while PROOF-BEFORE-PREFERENCE markedly improves cue invariance over baselines.