Loopjacking: Hijacking Human-in-the-Loop Approval

AI agents now pause for approval before they send money, delete files or email outsiders, and that approval is usually treated as a second factor. We argue it is one only when compromising the agent cannot produce it and when it names exactly what it approves, and we test both conditions. We define twelve attacks on the approval path, including decoy recipients, amount cancellation, card padding, label spoofing, enrollment squatting and threshold splitting, and run them against the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), the Microsoft action-bound approval design and Model Context Protocol (MCP) elicitation. An audit of ten agent runtimes finds no third-party verifiable approval record, no flood limits where measurable, and post-approval argument changes in four of eight runtimes with measurable binding. As a reference defense we build ASU (Agent Step-Up), a gateway that renders the approval card from a canonical effect descriptor, has a passkey on the phone of the user sign its digest, and executes only the stored call. Tamarin proves its binding, single-use and key-level non-repudiation properties under three stated hypotheses (53 lemmas). Across 27,108 scripted trials and 609 AgentDojo attack pairs, ASU stops substitution, replay and grant stretching, and the trusted card cuts forged-narration attack success from 0.54 to 0.03. With 15 current language models as automated approvers, the trusted card raises the attack catch rate from 0.30 to 0.98, at the cost of refusing 16 percent of harmless near misses, mostly due to a placeholder artifact in our stimuli. A second device adds nothing measurable over a trusted on-host confirmation in these experiments, flooding still succeeds 0.45 to 0.60 of the time against a modeled approver, and approval cannot stop effects that policy already allows. Code, data and proofs: https://github.com/Sports-Vision-Inc/agent-step-up

Modern AI coding-agent harnesses (Claude Code, Codex CLI, Cursor) rest their security boundary on a largely unexamined assumption: that the action A a human approves is the same action A' the harness executes, where A is fixed by a stated policy for what a scope grant or session-scoped approval authorizes. We show this assumption fails systematically and reproducibly. We introduce Approval Laundering, a taxonomy of six failure modes by which a harness's enforcement mechanism silently substitutes A' for A after approval: Scope, Argument, Temporal, Tool, Delegation, and Semantic laundering. Unlike prior work that evaluates risk classifiers against static corpora or infers implicit authorization boundaries, we study credential-binding integrity: given an already-approved action, does the harness dispatch exactly that action? Instrumenting Claude Code's pre-execution mediation point (PreToolUse), we conduct a controlled, headless, repeated-measures study of all six classes (N=19-20 runs each), reporting a Bound-Gap Rate (BGR) with Wilson confidence intervals and inter-rater agreement (kappa=1.0). We prototype Approval Token, a keyed capability Hk(principal, agent_id, session_id, tool, arguments, scope, expiry) issued by a mediator that never returns the key to the agent, evaluated via paired before/after replay of 118 runs (McNemar's exact test). The token fully eliminates Delegation laundering and, for our seeded session-identity-mismatch construction, Temporal laundering (p<10^-5), but by design leaves Scope laundering unaffected and shows no significant reduction in Argument laundering (p=1): an honest negative result, since these two classes leave every recorded dispatch field unchanged, diverging one process level below what a field-only verifier can observe. We discuss implications for defenses that bind only at the tool-invocation boundary.

Coding agents use execution harnesses to constrain the consequences of prompt injection by enforcing permission boundaries. These systems deterministically intercept any out-of-sandbox action and prompt the user for approval. To reduce approval fatigue, users can approve allow-rules proposed by the agent, after which any future action matching the rule is allowed without a prompt. In this work, we show that this mechanism introduces a new risk: untrusted context can influence the permissions presented for approval, with consequences extending beyond the immediate task. We investigate privilege escalation targeting this permission-update process. Specifically, adversarial context planted in a repository can reliably steer an agent performing a routine task into requesting a plausibly justified, yet dangerously broad allow-rule. If the user approves the request, the saved rule can effectively blind the harness, enabling adversaries to execute malicious actions that would otherwise require approval, without triggering human oversight. Across production platforms, including Claude Code and Codex CLI, we demonstrate that agents successfully elicit the target allow-rules in 58% of experimental instances. Once acquired, these rules exhibit a massive semantic blast radius, covering 56.9% of category-specific capability test cases. To further quantify the downstream risk, we show that conditional on rule approval, our exploit achieves verified, silent goal completion in 47 of the 58 eligible instances (81.0%), undermining the safety promise of human-in-the-loop oversight.