Disentangle and Drop: Robust Universal Removal of Image Watermarks via Reconstructive Grayscale Residual Decomposition
Authors: Qi Li, Jidong Yang, Feng-Lei Fan, Yuantian Miao, Xiao Chen, Huaike Yu, Chunpeng Wang, Suo Gao, Herbert Ho-Ching Iu, Bin Ma
Organizations: Key Laboratory of Computing Power Network and Information Security, Ministry of Education; Shandong Computer Science Center; Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Industrial Network and Information System Security; and Shandong Fundamental Research Center for Computer Science, Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences), Jinan 250353, China · Department of Data Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China · School of Computer and Information Sciences, College of Engineering, Science and Environment, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2308, Australia · School of Information Science and Engineering, Dalian Polytechnic University, Dalian 116034, China · School of Electrical, Electronic and Computer Engineering, The University of Western Australia, Perth, WA 6009, Australia
Invisible image watermarks are commonly evaluated against benign postprocessing operations such as compression, resizing, blur, and color changes. These tests leave out a different threat: a learned remover that preserves semantic image content while discarding residual evidence that carries the payload. We propose Disentangle and Drop (DnD), an attack that is agnostic to the watermark method and treats watermark removal as a representation routing problem. DnD decomposes a watermarked image into a semantic grayscale carrier and an auxiliary residual branch, and then suppresses the residual branch to reduce watermark evidence. The model is trained with latent spectral perturbations and low-strength diffusion exposure so that the drop operation remains stable under adaptive reconstruction. Experiments on seven representative watermark families show that one shared operating setting gives competitive removal with high visual fidelity. Operating scans and ablations separate usable attacks from image-damaging settings: stronger noise or diffusion can raise removal scores by damaging the image, while the practical regime comes from dropping the residual latent. These results argue for evaluating watermark robustness against learned removal at the representation level, not only against conventional image edits.
Figures & tables
Symbol
Meaning
Symbol
Meaning
xw
watermarked RGB input image
H,W
image height and width
xc
clean carrier or paired clean image when available
m
watermarking method under evaluation
Decm
method-specific watermark decoder or detector
A,Aθ
attack mapping and its parameterized form
d,τ
distortion measure and fidelity constraint threshold
θ
parameters of the attack mapping
E,D
DnD encoder and decoder
g,u
structure latent and auxiliary residual latent
(gw,uw)
latent pair encoded from xw
(gc,uc)
latent pair encoded from xc when available
Table 1: Summary of notation. Subscripts w and c denote watermarked and clean carriers when both are available.
Figure 1: Overview of the DnD inference pipeline. A watermarked image is encoded into a structure latent g and an auxiliary residual latent u . The structure branch is preserved under the latent spectral perturbation Ag(g;K) , while the auxiliary residual branch is suppressed before decoding. The dropped output x0 can then pass through low-strength diffusion stress Ax(x0;S) and residual refinement R to produce the final output xR .
Probe
Formal role
Metric
Observed support
B1 information gate
tests Proposition 1
(ϵg,ρ−δ)
small structure drift and positive gap with clean carrier fidelity preserved
B2 counterfactual swaps
tests Lemma 1
BER or detector response of cw and w0
payload evidence follows uw and is suppressed by u=0
B3 pixel energy
supports residual channel separability
Eg,Eu,EW−Eg−Eu
watermark induced energy is explained mainly by the auxiliary branch
B4 decoder sensitivity
checks branch geometry
unit-response sensitivity to g and u
g remains stable while u is discardable
B5 spectral localization
checks the latent stressor
low/mid/high residual bands
watermark residuals concentrate in bands targeted by Ag
B6 information certificate
links BER to recoverability
1−h2(min(p,0.5))
certificate decreases as BER approaches random guessing
Table 2: Residual channel separability and payload routing analysis. The probes map the formal removability argument to measurable predictions, separating targeted residual suppression from untargeted image degradation.
Figure 2: Trade-off between BER and PSNR across attack families. The plot tests whether watermark disruption can be separated from visible image degradation. Conventional image edits can reach high removal only by moving to regimes with low PSNR, while reconstruction and regeneration baselines show method-dependent tradeoffs. The fixed controlled DnD operating point lies in the high-fidelity region, consistent with learned residual channel suppression being distinct from visible image degradation.
Figure 3: Tables 3 and 4 provide an aggregate comparison of watermark removal performance and image quality across different attack endpoints. The horizontal axis reports the mean PSNR over the six bit-decoder watermark families, the vertical axis reports the corresponding mean BER, and color indicates the Tree-Ring removal accuracy under the fixed low-FPR detector setting. The shaded region denotes the low-fidelity range. The fixed DnD operating point weakens payload recovery for the bit-decoder families while keeping the image content within the fidelity constraint, and it still retains a measurable detector-removal effect on Tree-Ring.
Attack endpoint
DwtDct
DwtDctSvd
RivaGAN
SSL
StegaStamp
Stable Signature
Tree-Ring
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
Removal Acc. ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
Gaussian blur
0.3481
29.30
0.8906
0.0000
30.36
0.9050
0.0000
30.77
0.8945
0.0000
28.16
0.8413
0.0000
28.09
0.8482
0.1813
30.53
0.9062
0.0000
29.48
0.9003
Gaussian noise
0.6038
20.59
0.4996
0.3025
20.49
0.4762
0.0516
20.55
0.4794
0.5055
20.53
0.5135
0.0018
20.52
0.5072
0.1842
23.28
0.4925
0.0100
22.45
0.4555
Brightness
0.4591
7.78
0.2871
0.3787
8.00
0.2931
0.1391
8.39
0.2910
0.0023
8.07
0.2538
0.0000
7.87
0.2584
0.3762
7.93
0.2425
0.0700
7.32
0.2448
Contrast
0.4587
14.21
0.6466
0.3787
14.35
0.6687
0.1309
14.39
0.6497
0.0048
14.34
0.5788
0.0000
14.00
0.5811
0.4279
14.69
0.5733
0.0100
13.91
0.5498
Rotation
0.4097
9.69
0.2187
0.4094
9.98
0.2392
0.3081
9.82
0.2329
0.0333
9.98
0.2122
0.4227
9.59
0.2100
0.4281
10.19
0.2255
0.7200
8.98
0.2101
Table 3: Quantitative comparison between conventional watermark removal attacks in image space and the fixed controlled operating point of DnD ( K=0.925,U=0.02,S=0.04 ). BER is reported for bit-decoder watermarks, and Removal Acc. is reported for Tree-Ring. Bold values mark the strongest raw entry within this table; BER values above 0.5 should be read under the random-guessing ceiling described in the protocol.
Attack endpoint
DwtDct
DwtDctSvd
RivaGAN
SSL
StegaStamp
Stable Signature
Tree-Ring
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
Removal Acc. ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
CtrlRegen
0.4216
21.16
0.6242
0.4713
21.58
0.6455
0.4803
21.66
0.6272
0.5298
20.83
0.5594
0.4505
20.91
0.5949
0.5112
21.57
0.6320
0.2200
21.68
0.6570
WatermarkAttacker Diff 60
0.4153
23.96
0.7154
0.4088
24.59
0.7357
0.4106
24.84
0.7210
0.4885
23.22
0.6439
0.2570
23.37
0.6755
0.5050
24.80
0.7378
0.1500
24.98
0.7702
BMSHJ2018
0.4113
29.30
0.8676
0.4000
29.96
0.8760
0.3934
30.15
0.8615
0.5053
28.31
0.8115
0.3683
28.41
0.8272
0.3360
30.34
0.8679
0.0200
29.91
0.8587
Cheng2020
0.4119
30.59
0.8943
0.3875
31.05
0.8968
0.4025
31.26
0.8851
0.4905
29.94
0.8503
0.3619
30.08
0.8629
0.2533
31.45
0.8861
0.0400
31.36
0.8812
SADRE Diff 60
0.4156
25.99
0.7663
0.4844
26.68
0.7844
0.3559
27.02
0.7647
0.4838
24.98
0.6906
0.2465
25.19
0.7237
0.4771
27.47
0.8087
0.0100
28.44
0.8559
Table 4: Quantitative comparison between reconstruction or regeneration endpoints for watermark removal and the fixed controlled operating point of DnD ( K=0.925,U=0.02,S=0.04 ). WatermarkAttacker Diff 60 and SADRE Diff 60 denote 60-step reverse-diffusion reconstruction attacks, while BMSHJ2018 and Cheng2020 denote VAE-based learned-compression reconstruction endpoints [ 41 , 42 ] . BER is reported for bit-decoder watermarks, and Removal Acc. is reported for Tree-Ring. Bold values mark the strongest raw entry within this table; BER values above 0.5 should be read under the random-guessing ceiling described in the protocol.
Figure 4: Qualitative comparison across seven watermark families. For each watermark family, the image row shows the attacked output and the residual row shows the amplified absolute difference to the watermarked reference. The fixed DnD endpoint is highlighted in green. Compared with severe brightness changes or high-noise attacks, DnD preserves image content while altering residual evidence used by watermark decoders.
Setting
K/U/S or Slice
BER ↑
PSNR ↑
SSIM ↑
Tree-Ring Removal Acc. ↑
A. K/U/S scan evidence
Coarse scan: maximum removal boundary
1.5/0.5/0.2
0.521
17.99
0.464
0.90
Coarse scan: best high-fidelity point, PSNR ≥28
0.5/0/0
0.344
30.18
0.932
0.21
Fine scan: best bit removal
0.85/0/0.04
0.411
28.43
0.900
0.51
Fine scan: best bit removal, PSNR ≥29
1.0/0/0.10
0.408
29.17
0.905
0.46
Finer scan: best bit removal
0.825/0/0.03
0.412
28.14
0.899
0.45
Table 5: Aggregated scan and ablation evidence. BER, PSNR, and SSIM average SSL, DwtDct, DwtDctSvd, RivaGAN, Stable Signature, and StegaStamp; Tree-Ring removal accuracy is reported separately.
Figure 5: Effect of reintroducing the auxiliary residual branch under different diffusion regimes. Without diffusion, larger U behaves like residual restoration and improves PSNR while reducing removal. Once diffusion is active, larger U no longer recovers fidelity and mainly weakens the attack, which supports the interpretation that strong diffusion is a poor core mechanism for useful watermark removal.
Figure 6: Ablation tradeoff at K=0.925,U=0.02,S=0.04 . The scatter view separates useful removal under a fidelity constraint from low-fidelity variants with high raw removal scores. Removing the frequency-aware latent attack or clean-drop supervision increases removal metrics at substantial fidelity cost, whereas unfreezing the Stage 2 base shifts the model toward reconstruction and disabling the test-time refiner shows the role of post-drop repair.
Existing invisible watermark removal methods often struggle to accurately capture the watermark-bearing features, leading to an unfavorable trade-off between watermark suppression and perceptual fidelity. In this paper, we propose the Frequency-Decoupled Diffusion Watermark Attack Network (FDDWAN), a coarse-to-fine framework that performs watermark removal through wavelet-domain decomposition and residual diffusion refinement. In the initial stage, the Wavelet-based Frequency-domain Preliminary Attack Module (WFPAM) decomposes the watermarked image into low- and high-frequency subbands and applies frequency-specific attack strategies tailored to their respective contributions to watermark robustness and perceptual quality. In the next stage, the Frequency-domain Residual Diffusion Attack Module (FRDAM) separately models the residual distributions between the preliminarily attacked outputs and the corresponding watermark-free references during training. Rather than reconstructing the entire image, FRDAM selectively refines frequency-domain residuals, directing the diffusion process toward the remaining watermark related discrepancies while minimizing modifications to image content. Extensive experiments on CelebA and ImageNet across four representative watermarking schemes demonstrate that FDDWAN achieves a more favorable trade-off between watermark removal effectiveness and visual fidelity than conventional and learning-based attack methods.
Chunpeng Wang, Yuxin Li, Xiaoyu Wang +3
Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences), Jinan, Shandong Province, China · Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China · Dalian Polytechnic University, Dalian, Liaoning Province, China
Digital watermarking supports source attribution for AI-generated images, but its reliability depends on resistance to removal attacks. Some attacks attempt to remove watermarks by forcing the decoded watermark to differ from the original. However, this can produce an inverted watermark that remains detectable, causing removal to fail, while further attempts to alter the watermark may unnecessarily degrade image quality. To address these limitations, we present LiBRA (Latent In-band Bidirectional Removal Attack), which aims to make watermarks undetectable while preserving image quality. Instead of continually pushing the watermark toward inversion, LiBRA adjusts the image to conceal the watermark without encouraging further changes that could degrade image quality. Some attacks keep pushing decoded bits away from the original watermark, even when further changes preserve detectability and damage image quality. With access to the watermark key and decoder, LiBRA makes bounded changes in a public autoencoder's latent space. Unlike inversion-driven objectives that cannot correct excessive inversion, LiBRA guides average decoding confidence toward random guessing from either direction. This helps avoid an inverted but detectable watermark. Leaving individual bits flexible allows image-quality constraints to favor less damaging changes, while an optional frequency-guided mask limits their location. We verify removal using an exact two-sided binomial test rather than assuming the confidence target guarantees success.
Saibo Ye, Huajie Chen, Xin Guo +5
Faculty of Data Science, City University of Macau, Macao SAR, China · Corresponding Author · School of Information and Communications Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China +2
Fixed image distortions do not cover an attacker that learns from paired clean and watermarked images. We study this paired-training threat with single-image inference: deployment uses neither the clean reference nor the watermark key, payload, or decoder. An encoder maps each image to a structural latent g and an auxiliary residual latent u. Push supervision reconstructs the watermarked image from D(gw,uw). Pull supervision trains the zero-auxiliary output D(Ag(gw;k),0) toward the paired clean image. At k=1.10,u=0, the four-method sweep gives an average BER of 0.3958, PSNR of 31.07 dB, and SSIM of 0.9554. Restoring u from 0 to 0.15 moves average BER from 0.3893 to 0.3357, while PSNR falls from 30.99 to 28.23 dB. The intervention supports decoder dependence on the auxiliary input in the evaluated setting. The accompanying theory is a conditional, post-hoc account of this behavior rather than an experimentally verified information-relocation result.
Jidong Yang, Huaike Yu, Qi Li +4
Key Laboratory of Computing Power Network and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong Computer Science Center, and Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Industrial Network and Information System Security, Shandong Fundamental Research Center for Computer Science, Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences), Jinan 250353, China · Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong (Dongguan), Dongguan, Guangdong 518057, China · School of Information Science and Engineering, Dalian Polytechnic University, Dalian 116034, China +1