Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for natural-language logical reasoning, where the final answer is easy to check but the proof behind it is not. In natural-language logical reasoning, an intermediate conclusion should follow from its premises, and the resulting derivation should support the final answer. Existing methods lack machine-checkable verification of intermediate conclusions and answer-supporting proof dependencies, so they may assign credit to invalid or answer-irrelevant steps. We propose Proof-R1, an RL framework from formal verification that trains LLMs to construct verifiable proofs for natural-language logical reasoning. Proof-R1 admits a generated conclusion into the verified proof state only when the corresponding reasoning action satisfies the proof obligations through UNSAT-based machine-checkable formal verification. Proof-R1 also recovers the answer-supporting dependency closure to trace the proof structure of the final answer and align outcome credit with the proof dependencies. Experiments demonstrate that Proof-R1 improves answer accuracy across three logical reasoning benchmarks and four backbone models and outperforms training-free agents and training-based methods in terms of reasoning-process verifiability.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Performance of Proof-R1 on ProverQA. Left : Accuracy and step verification. The x-axis shows answer accuracy, while the y-axis shows RVR reflecting the logical correctness of generated reasoning under schema, semantic, and rule checks. Middle : Performance of different methods. The total height of each bar represents the proportion of correct answers, while the blue segment indicates the portion whose proof traces pass formal verification. Right : Generated-to-reference proof-length ratios across methods on hard subset of ProverQA.
Figure 2: Illustrative contrast between normal LLM reasoning and verifiable logical reasoning. The normal LLM reasoning incorrectly infers that “Alex lacks access from not being a manager,” committing the fallacy of denying the antecedent. The verifiable logical reasoning derives access from “Alex’s engineer status” and exposes semantic proof obligation checked through formal verification.
Figure 3: Framework of Proof-R1 . MCFV formally verifies structured reasoning actions and maintains verified proof states. ASDC maintains the candidate proof-certificate graph and constructs the answer-supporting dependency closure. Verification-aligned optimization integrates the supervision signals from MCFV and ASDC into the policy update.
Table 1: Results on ProverQA, reported as means followed by standard deviations in gray. and denote training-free and training-based methods, respectively. Bold and underline denote the best and second-best means within each backbone model. ProverQA-Hard denotes the hard split of ProverQA, whereas ProverQA-Overall denotes the evaluation set across all difficulty levels.
Model
Variant
Avg@3 ↑
Pass@3 ↑
FVR ↑
RVR ↑
RGD ↓
Qwen2.5 7B-Instruct
w/o MCFV
37.86
68.34
40.16
11.65
1.08
w/o ASDC
41.37
71.86
44.18
16.69
1.34
Proof-R1
44.89
76.88
58.74
19.38
1.05
Qwen3-8B
w/o MCFV
90.28
98.49
82.52
57.73
0.37
w/o ASDC
89.61
97.99
93.55
85.71
0.40
Proof-R1
92.63
99.00
93.55
90.22
0.36
Table 2: Ablation results on ProverQA-Hard.
Table 6
Figure 4: Training diagnostics of Proof-R1 . Shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. (a) Performance during training, measured by Pass@3, FVR and RVR of Qwen3-8B on ProverQA. (b) Proportions of each verification signal of Qwen3-8B. (c) Prediction error of the global and rule-conditioned centering values during training.
Figure 5: Layer-wise and module-wise gradient at training on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Figures show angles between (a) MCFV and ASDC, (b) MCFV and the joint direction, and (c) ASDC and the joint direction.
Appendix figures & tables15 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Table 5: Additional results of Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct and Qwen3-8B on the ProverQA Easy and Medium splits, reported as means followed by standard deviations in gray. and denote training-free and training-based methods, respectively. Bold and underline denote the best and second-best means within each backbone model and split.
Table 6: Additional cross-dataset results of ProverQA-trained Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct models on FOLIO and ProofWriter. and denote training-free and training-based methods, respectively. Bold and underline denote the best and second-best results within each dataset.
Table 7: Additional ProverQA-Hard results across backbone models. and denote training-free and training-based methods, respectively. Bold and underline denote the best and second-best results within each backbone model.
Figure 6: Z3–cvc5 paired local-check outcomes for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct outputs from Backbone, SFT, and Proof-R1 . Rows denote Z3 and columns denote cvc5, using SAT / UNSAT / Other . Each cell shows its count and percentage of that method’s local check attempts.
Figure 7: Z3–veriT paired local-check outcomes for the same frozen Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct outputs. Rows denote Z3 and columns denote veriT, using SAT / UNSAT / Other . Each cell shows its count and percentage of that method’s local check attempts.
Figure 8: Z3–Isabelle paired local-check outcomes for the same frozen Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct outputs. Rows denote Z3 and columns denote Isabelle, using SAT / UNSAT / Other . Each cell shows its count and percentage of that method’s local check attempts. Isabelle requires a genuine Nitpick countermodel for SAT and an oracle-free kernel proof for UNSAT . Other retains input-processing failures and unresolved searches.
FVR ↑
RVR ↑
Method
Z3
cvc5
veriT
Isabelle
Z3
cvc5
veriT
Isabelle
Backbone
67.64
67.64
67.64
67.64
18.91
18.91
18.91
18.91
SFT
66.39
66.39
66.39
66.39
19.94
19.94
19.94
19.94
Proof-R1
70.17
70.17
70.17
70.17
41.19
41.19
41.19
41.19
Appendix
Table 8: Cross-backend verification of the same frozen Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct outputs on ProverQA Overall. Values are percentages; every semantic check uses the indicated backend.
Figure 9: Z3–GPT-5.5 local semantic review of 2,000 sampled steps from frozen Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct outputs. Rows denote Z3 outcomes; columns denote GPT-5.5 judgments. SAT corresponds to invalid and UNSAT to valid . Each cell shows its count and percentage of reviewed steps.
Reviewer
Number
Valid
Invalid
Uncertain
Agreed / reference
Weighted (%)
GPT-5.5
2,000
1,199
778
23
1,952 / 1,957
99.73
Appendix
Table 9: Agreement is measured on determinate Z3/cvc5 outcomes. The weighted percentage uses the sampling weights of the 2,000-step cohort.
Rule
Symbolic form
IE : IMPLICATION_ELIMINATION
A→B,A⊢B
MT : MODUS_TOLLENS
A→B,¬B⊢¬A
XOI : EXCLUSIVE_DISJUNCTION_INTRODUCTION
A,¬B⊢A⊕B;¬A,B⊢A⊕B
XOE : EXCLUSIVE_DISJUNCTION_ELIMINATION
A⊕B,A⊢¬B;A⊕B,¬A⊢B
DS : DISJUNCTIVE_SYLLOGISM
A∨B,¬A⊢B
CI : CONJUNCTION_INTRODUCTION
A,B⊢A∧B
Appendix
Table 10: Predicate-logic rules covered by the ProverQA training data.
Rule
Symbolic form
UIC : UNIVERSAL_IMPLICATION_CHAINING
∀x(A→B),∀x(B→C)⊢∀x(A→C)
UPI : UNIVERSAL_PROPOSITIONAL_INFERENCE
∀x(A→B),∀x(A→C)⊢∀x(A→(B∧C))
EI : EXISTENTIAL_INTRODUCTION
A(a)⊢∃xA(x);A(a),B(a)⊢∃x(A(x)∧B(x))
ECE : EXISTENTIAL_CONJUNCTION_ELIMINATION
∃x(A∧B)⊢∃xA;∃x(A∧G)⊢G(x∈/FV(G))
EIE : EXISTENTIAL_IMPLICATION_ELIMINATION
∃xA,∀x(A→B)⊢∃xB
ECI : EXISTENTIAL_CONJUNCTION_INTRODUCTION
∃xA,G⊢∃x(A∧G)(x∈/FV(G))
Appendix
Table 11: Training-time-unseen rule families and their representative symbolic forms.
Model
Rule group
FVR
RVR
Backbone
Rtrain
64.71
39.73
Runseen
63.24
34.92
SFT
Rtrain
62.02
39.77
Runseen
67.50
45.71
Proof-R1
Rtrain
81.55
58.87
Runseen
86.21
63.08
Appendix
Table 12: FVR/RVR (%) under RFOLIO on frozen Qwen3-8B FOLIO outputs, grouped by whether the current rule belongs to Rtrain or Runseen .
Category
Parameter
Value
LoRA
Rank
8
Alpha
16
Target modules
[Q, K, V, O, GATE, UP, DOWN]
Rollout
Group size ( K )
8
Sampling temperature
0.8
Top- p
0.95
Appendix
Table 13: Training and rollout parameters. Unless stated otherwise, these settings are shared by SFT, GRPO, PRoSFI, and Proof-R1 .
Figure 11: Training trajectories of response length and policy divergence during reinforcement learning. Left: Mean response length of different methods on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct during training. Right: Sequence-level KL divergence of the Qwen3-8B policy from the frozen reference policy during training. Solid lines denote EMA-smoothed trajectories, and shaded regions indicate one exponentially weighted local standard deviation.
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct
Qwen3-8B
Method
h/100 steps
tokens/response
h/100 steps
tokens/response
Backbone
0.00
354.2
0.00
1,213.8
LogicAgent
0.00
2,054.5
0.00
12,572.6
GoV
0.00
2,004.7
0.00
9,127.9
SFT
0.11
373.6
0.19
1,229.9
GRPO
2.64
836.4
4.70
1,176.3
Appendix
Table 14: Computational cost on ProverQA. Time is measured in hours per 100 optimization steps. Inference-time token consumption is the mean number of generated tokens per response.
Verifiers are crucial components for enhancing modern LLMs' reasoning capability. Typicalverifiers require resource-intensive superviseddataset construction, which is costly and faceslimitations in data diversity. In this paper, wepropose LOVER, an unsupervised verifier regularized by logical rules. LOVER treats theverifier as a binary latent variable, utilizinginternal activations and enforcing three logical constraints on multiple reasoning paths:negation consistency, intra-group consistency,and inter-group consistency (grouped by thefinal answer). By incorporating logical rulesas priors, LOVER can leverage unlabeled examples and is directly compatible with any offthe-shelf LLMs. Experiments on 10 datasetsdemonstrate that LOVER significantly outperforms unsupervised baselines, achieving performance comparable to the supervised verifier(reaching its 95% level on average). The sourcecode is publicly available at https://github.com/wangxinyufighting/llm-lover.
Xinyu Wang, Changzhi Sun, Lian Cheng +4
Department of Computer Science and Technology, East China Normal University · Institute of Artificial Intelligence (TeleAI), China Telecom
While large language models (LLMs) have achieved strong performance on mathematical problems with verifiable answers, many advanced problems are proof-based and require evaluating full proofs. However, training such verifiers requires diverse and trustworthy question-proof-check (QPC) examples at scale, which are scarce. To address this challenge, we develop a human-audited, LLM-assisted data pipeline that produces large-scale QPC triplets with limited human effort. By systematically varying problem sources, generation strategies, and generator models, the pipeline creates diverse problem-proof pairs spanning multiple difficulty levels, linguistic styles, and error types. We combine multi-LLM agreement with hierarchical human auditing to obtain accurate proof-correctness labels. Using these data, we train generative proof verifiers and introduce an auxiliary fluency filter together with balanced token weighting to stabilize binary-reward long-form verification RL. Experiments show that our verifier improves proof-judgment accuracy across different proof styles and provides useful guidance for test-time selection. Overall, our results provide a practical data and training framework for natural-language proof verification.
A standard recipe for distilling the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) is to sample chains of thought from the model, keep those that reach the correct final answer, and fine-tune on the survivors. When sampling fails, a common fix shows the generator the gold answer and asks it to write a chain that reaches that answer. We show that this second step degrades the training data in a way that correctness filtering cannot catch. We run a controlled experiment that fixes the generator, the problem set, and the correctness filter, and varies only whether the chain is generated under answer-conditioning, the gold answer shown with a request to reach it. Training a strong instruction-tuned reasoning model on its own answer-conditioned chains sharply lowers its verifiable-reasoning accuracy. The loss grows with difficulty, reaching as much as about 27 points on the hardest competition problems. The mechanism is legible in the chains themselves, which rationalize backward from the shown answer instead of deriving it, with the early final-answer statement as the measurable symptom. The harm is a property of the data rather than the generator, read off unlabeled generations before any fine-tuning, ordering the penalty across eight thinking models from four families, and transferring across teacher families. A prompt ablation localizes it to the rationalize-toward instruction rather than the answer's bare visibility. The practical takeaway is to generate answer-blind, because no correctness filter can see this damage in the data.
Jungseob Lee, Seungyoon Lee, Suhyune Son +4
1Korea University · 2Zoom Communications · 3Yonsei University