Anthropomorphism in the age of Large Language Models: An overview of potential risks and mitigations
Authors: Ismael T. Freire, Marceau Nahon, Maud van Lier, Katie Evans, Hélie Bazin, Michele Farisco, Kathinka Evers, Raja Chatila, Mehdi Khamassi
Organizations: Institute of Intelligent Systems and Robotics, CNRS, Sorbonne University, Paris, France · Sciences, Norms, Democracy, CNRS, Sorbonne University, Paris, France · Sorbonne Center for Artificial Intelligence, Sorbonne University, Paris, France · Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden · Bioethics Unit, Biogem, Biology and Molecular Genetics Research Institute, Ariano Irpino, Italy.
Large Language Models (LLMs) and more broadly Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are often described and understood in human-like terms, a phenomenon known as anthropomorphism. This paper provides a synthesis of recent literature on anthropomorphism in AI, covering theoretical frameworks, the role of language in framing AI as human-like, the various risks of anthropomorphizing machines, and strategies to mitigate these issues. After examining why we tend to anthropomorphize AI systems and whether we are right to do so, we highlight the impact of linguistic framing on anthropomorphism. Then, we introduce a conceptual taxonomy of risks associated with AI anthropomorphism. This taxonomy groups twenty-one concerns within five analytical categories: epistemic, affective, human agency, normative, and societal and institutional risks. Finally, we relate these concerns to proposed interventions in design, communication, education, and governance. We argue that a better understanding of AI systems requires concepts and theories grounded in their organization and demonstrated capacities. The linguistic shaping of anthropomorphic perceptions should form part of this scientific effort, since our descriptions influence both how these systems are understood and the roles we allow them to occupy in society.
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Figure 1: Conceptual taxonomy of concerns associated with anthropomorphic framing of AI systems. Twenty-one concerns are grouped by their primary locus into five overlapping dimensions: societal and institutional, human agency, normative, epistemic, and affective. The categories are analytic rather than mutually exclusive, and equal-width tiles do not represent prevalence, severity, causal strength, or effect size.
Anthropomorphism in AI studies how people attribute human traits, minds, and social roles to artificial systems, and how design and language shape those perceptions.
Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to technology, is an automatic and unconscious response that occurs even in those with advanced technical expertise. In this position paper, we analyze hundreds of thousands of research articles to present empirical evidence of the prevalence and growth of anthropomorphic terminology in research on large language models (LLMs). We argue for challenging the deeper assumptions reflected in this terminology -- which, though often useful, may inadvertently constrain LLM development -- and broadening beyond them to open new pathways for understanding and improving LLMs. Specifically, we identify and examine five anthropomorphic assumptions that shape research across the LLM development lifecycle. For each assumption (e.g., that LLMs must use natural language for reasoning, or that they should be evaluated on benchmarks originally meant for humans), we demonstrate empirical, non-anthropomorphic alternatives that remain under-explored yet offer promising directions for LLM research and development.
Public discourse about artificial intelligence (AI) often uses anthropomorphic language: language that attributes human capabilities and characteristics to AI systems. This practice has been criticized for setting misleading expectations, inflating claims, and fueling hype around AI, which may distort public understanding of AI and impact policy priorities. We study the effects of anthropomorphic framing by comparing changes in participants' perceptions of AI (N=815) when reading passages with and without anthropomorphic language, designed to reflect realistic public-facing AI discourse. We further examine whether these effects differ across two types of AI technologies -- large language models and recommendation systems -- and measure changes in perceptions of AI across several dimensions that are prominent in current public discourse. In a separate condition using a text that explicitly discusses the dangers of AI, we show that individuals' views of AI can shift in response to reading a text; yet in the main conditions of the experiment, where we compare anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions, we find that whether the text uses anthropomorphic language does not substantially affect participants' perceptions of AI. Our results indicate that any immediate effects on opinions of AI are modest, although they leave open the possibility that anthropomorphic language could have an effect in naturalistic settings, or over gradual, continued exposure.
This essay offers a philosophical analysis of the field of AI safety based on recent technical reports, with particular focus on Anthropic's study on "agentic misalignment" in frontier language models. It examines the recurring anthropomorphism in the field: the tendency of researchers and developers to project categories such as "intention," "persona," and even "feelings" onto AI systems without adequate conceptual problematization. It argues that this anthropomorphism affects not only the interpretation of results, but also the very methodological construction of safety evaluations. Through the analysis of two central experiments -- the blackmail case involving the agent "Alex" and the so-called "hallucination" of the shopkeeping agent "Claudius" -- the essay problematizes the inevitable use of subject-predicate grammar and its effects on AI safety engineering. Drawing on Nietzsche's critique of language, it questions the insistence on positing an "agent" underlying the verbal production of models. In order to deconstruct this agentic projection onto LLMs, the essay proposes provisional concepts more compatible with the process of machine linguistic generation, even if only in an approximate technical sense. It concludes with the hypothesis that the central risk addressed by the field of AI safety does not lie in a supposed "emergent agency," but rather in the combination of structural incoherence and anthropomorphic projections which, particularly in militarized and corporate contexts, hinder an adequate understanding of this mathematical-linguistic phenomenon, an undeniable philosophical event in the Greek sense of thaumas.
Mariana Lins Costa
Universidade Estadual do Ceará (Brazil), Professor of Philosophy