When Do Attention-Head Ablations Support Causal Claims? Projection-Level Confounds, Floor Effects, and Matched Controls

Large language models (LLMs) excel at multi-step reasoning but incur substantial inference cost. We introduce Causal Attribution Pruning (CAP), a training-free method that identifies critical attention heads by measuring their causal impact on reasoning tasks and uses these head-level scores to guide fine-grained weight pruning. For each attention head, CAP estimates the expected performance degradation when the head is masked during forward passes on a small calibration set of reasoning problems. These causal scores are then converted into weight-level importance values for the corresponding projection matrices. Unlike magnitude-only or activation-based criteria, CAP's interventional measurement directly captures each head's functional contribution, yielding relative accuracy gains of up to 61% over Wanda on ARC-Challenge at 20% sparsity. We evaluate CAP on GSM8K, StrategyQA, and ARC-Challenge using Llama-3-8B-Instruct and Mistral-7B-Instruct at 10%, 20%, and 50% sparsity. At moderate sparsity (10-20%), CAP improves over Wanda in most model-benchmark configurations. with especially large gains on ARC-Challenge for Llama-3. Our results suggest that attention-head-level causal attribution can better preserve reasoning performance on downstream benchmarks than correlational pruning criteria at equivalent sparsity, while remaining limited by coarse MLP attribution at 50% sparsity.

Brain-AI alignment is often interpreted as a sign that model and brain perform similar computations. Whether the aligned units are causally involved in model computation is rarely checked. On an abstract pattern-completion task (AAABAAA $\rightarrow$ B), we compare LLM attention-head representations with human EEG and test how ablating those heads affects task performance. Alignment and causation dissociate: brain-aligned heads contribute to performance, but their removal is substantially less disruptive than removal of heads selected via attribution patching. We compare two head sets that prior interpretability work defines without reference to the brain: concept vectors (CVs), which represent abstract patterns across formats, and function vectors (FVs), selected for their contribution to correct-answer prediction. Brain alignment shows little association with FV scores, while its association with CV scores varies across models. Among brain-aligned heads, we find recurring attention profiles: one emphasizes distinctive elements (novelty heads), the other repeating elements (repetition heads). The novelty family tracks salience and attends to the same elements that humans look at, yet its removal is less damaging than random ablation on average. Repetition heads contribute modestly to performance and are associated with abstract-pattern representation (CVs). Across 17 models spanning 3B-72B parameters, FV-ranked removal is substantially more disruptive than brain-ranked removal. Brain alignment thus captures how the model reads the stimulus, and only faintly captures how it represents the pattern and solves the task.

In mechanistic interpretability, attention heads are commonly elevated to role claims (e.g., "this head represents addition") when they are necessary for a behavior, encode it linearly, and recover that behavior when restored after ablation. We show this evidence is insufficient: across three 7-8B instruction-tuned models and five computation families, heads passing all three checks routinely fail to transfer the computation when their activations are patched into a different prompt under matched controls. We introduce KID (Knowing / Intent / Doing), a role-assignment lens for attention heads, and pair it with a three-stage pipeline: capability-selective screening (CSS), singular value decomposition (SVD), and activation transduction under matched controls. Our results document a preliminary role taxonomy (including prompt-trajectory stabilizers, answer-side logit-bias heads, and soft computation-pattern carriers) and show that the same-answer control (a transduction target sharing the answer string but not the requested computation) is an underused check that exposes broad state transfer masquerading as semantic specificity.