The Geometry of Knowledge Accessibility in Large Language Models

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is often credited with improving language model reasoning at the expense of knowledge. We challenge this narrative by showing that reasoning models consistently outperform their instruction-tuned versions on pure knowledge recall tasks. These gains do not reflect newly acquired information, but rather an improved procedural skill in navigating and searching existing knowledge hierarchies within the model parameters. Structured prompting, which explicitly guides models through hierarchical traversal -- recovers most of the instruct-reasoning gap across five model families. A controlled RL experiment on unseen, non-extractable facts improves recall of held-out frequent but previously inaccessible facts, ruling out simple data exposure. On depth-stratified retrieval tasks, reasoning models exhibit superior traversal as retrieval depth grows. Layerwise activation analysis further shows that while factual representations maintain high cosine similarity between instruct and reasoning models, query representations diverge noticeably, indicating that reasoning primarily reshapes how models traverse knowledge rather than the knowledge representation itself. Finally, we find that distilled models often fail to match reasoning models on knowledge recall because they imitate self-correction without acquiring the exploratory behavior needed for hierarchical navigation. Together, these findings suggest that improving factual recall in LLMs depends not only on expanding what models know but also on teaching them to navigate it -- motivating future post-training methods that optimize traversal.

We study reasoning for accessing world knowledge stored in a language model's parameters. For example, recalling that Canberra is Australia's capital may benefit from thinking through major cities and the concept of purpose-built capitals. While reasoning language models are trained via reinforcement learning to produce reasoning traces on tasks such as mathematics, they may not reason well for accessing their own world knowledge. We first find that models do not generate their best world knowledge reasoning by default: adding a simple "think step-by-step" cue demonstrates statistically significant improvement in knowledge recall but not math. Motivated by this, we propose training models to reason over their parametric knowledge using world-knowledge question answering as a verifiable reward. After reinforcement learning on TriviaQA (+9.9%), performance also improves on Natural Questions, HotpotQA, SimpleQA, and StrategyQA by 4.2%, 2.1%, 0.6%, and 3.0%, respectively. Reasoning models are under-optimized for parametric knowledge access, but can be easily trained to reason better.