JASPER: Special Session on Joint Reliability And Security Assessment of SPlit Computing for Edge Robustness
Authors: Enrico Magliano, Giuseppe Esposito, Amir Hossein Shahdadian, Rama Mounika Kodamanchili, Juan David Guerrero Balaguera, Juan Esteban Rodriguez Condia, Annachiara Ruospo, Roberta Siciliano, Stefano Di Carlo, Maksim Jenihhin, Marco Levorato, Alessandro Savino, Matteo Sonza Reorda, Christian Herglotz, Michael Hübner, Mahdi Taheri
Organizations: Dept. of Control and Computer Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, Turin, Italy · Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, University of Naples ”Federico II”, Naples, Italy · Dept. of Computer Systems, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, EE · Computer Science Department, University of California, Irvine, US · Dept. of Computer Engineering, Brandenburg University of Technology, Cottbus, DE · Dept. of Computer Science, Chair of Computer Engineering, Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Split Computing (SC) enables efficient deployment of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) by partitioning inference between edge devices and cloud servers. However, intermediate feature representations are simultaneously exposed to hardware faults and adversarial attacks, which are traditionally evaluated independently. This paper presents a unified framework for the joint assessment of reliability and security in Split Computing. First, reliability is characterized through neuron-level fault injection using the Mean Relative Accuracy Degradation (MRAD) while security through feature-map-aware adversarial attacks simulations using the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Based on these complementary analyses, the Joint Vulnerability Score (JVS) is introduced, along with a confidence-aware extension that jointly captures prediction errors and confidence degradation. The framework is evaluated on ten Split Computing configurations based on ResNet-50 trained on ILSVRC-2012. Experimental results show substantial differences across compression strategies, with MRAD ranging from 44.3% to 61.2% under fault injection, while adversarial attacks achieve up to 98.8% ASR. Furthermore, the proposed joint metrics reveal vulnerability trends that remain hidden when reliability and security are analyzed independently, providing a more comprehensive methodology for designing dependable Split Computing systems.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1 : Overview of the reliability and security threats considered in SC and their impact on safety-critical inference.
Fig. 2 : A general scheme from [ 11 ] of physical defects propagation across system components ( Left ), and an illustration of fault propagation effects on matrix multiplication operations through different levels of the tiling ( Right ).
Fig. 3 : MRAD as a function of the fault-corruption magnitude (BER).
Fig. 4 : MRAD VS Magnitude of corruption (i.e., BER) VS Confidence Gap Deviation
Fig. 5 : ASR VS magnitute of corruption (i.e., ϵ )
Fig. 6 : Normalized SΔ VS magnitute of corruption (i.e., ϵ )
Fig. 7 : JVS for different perturbation patterns under different security configurations.
Fig. 8 : Evolution of reliability ( Rtot ) and security ( Stot ) vulnerability metrics under different corruption levels and Split Computing configurations. The first two panels report reliability degradation as a function of Bit Error Rate (BER), while the last two report security degradation as a function of adversarial perturbation magnitude ( ϵ ).
Fig. 9 : Extended JVS joint reliability and security metric for different configurations and target layers. It accounts for both accuracy degradation and confidence score degradation.
Split Computing enables collaborative inference between edge devices and the cloud by partitioning a deep neural network into an edge-side head and a server-side tail, reducing latency and limiting exposure of raw input data. However, inference performance often degrades in practical deployments due to user-specific data distribution shifts, unreliable communication, and privacy-oriented perturbations, especially in closed environments where model architectures and parameters are inaccessible. To address this challenge, we propose SALT (Split-Adaptive Lightweight Tuning), a lightweight adaptation framework for closed Split Computing systems. SALT introduces a compact client-side adapter that refines intermediate representations produced by a frozen head network, enabling effective model adaptation without modifying the head or tail networks or increasing communication overhead. By modifying only the training conditions, SALT supports multiple adaptation objectives, including user personalization, communication robustness, and privacy-aware inference. Experiments using ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 show that SALT achieves higher accuracy than conventional retraining and fine-tuning while significantly reducing training cost. On CIFAR-10, SALT improves personalized accuracy from 88.1% to 93.8% while reducing training latency by more than 60%. SALT also maintains over 90% accuracy under 75% packet loss and preserves high accuracy (about 88% at sigma = 1.0) under noise injection. These results demonstrate that SALT provides an efficient and practical adaptation framework for real-world Split Computing systems.
Yuya Okada, Takayuki Nishio
School of Engineering, Institute of Science Tokyo, Tokyo 152-8550, Japan
Preprocessing-based defenses are the standard first-line response to adversarial attacks on edge vision systems, requiring no retraining, no architectural changes, and widely recommended as model-agnostic mitigations. Yet the foundational evaluations of these defenses were conducted on residual or Inception-class architectures, not on the depthwise-separable CNNs that dominate edge deployments. This untested assumption leaves a gap in the security evaluation literature. This paper closes that gap by evaluating six preprocessing defenses against adversarial perturbations across both architecture families. Across all perturbation levels and defenses tested, the two depthwise-separable architectures show consistently poor recovery while the residual architecture shows partial recovery; ablation results are consistent with an architectural rather than parametric explanation, though only three architectures and one attack family are evaluated. Crucially, this failure is not merely a negative result. The same output divergence that disqualifies preprocessing as a recovery mechanism reveals a detection opportunity: preprocessing consistently disrupts clean predictions while leaving adversarial predictions largely unchanged, an asymmetry that is directly measurable without retraining or architectural modification. We further show that standard image quality metrics are unreliable proxies for defense effectiveness, a methodological gap in current evaluation practice. A practitioner decision framework is provided for adversarially resilient edge vision deployment.
Split learning (SL) enables collaborative training by partitioning a neural network across clients and a central server. However, the cut-layer interface introduces a key challenge: high-dimensional activations incur substantial communication overhead while exposing representations vulnerable to reconstruction attacks. Existing approaches typically address efficiency or privacy in isolation. We propose LightSplit, which limits information exposure and reduces communication overhead via a lightweight fixed orthogonal random projection at the cut layer. Based on Shannon's information theory, this projection acts as an information bottleneck that restricts instance-specific information and suppresses exploitable per-sample signals. With low-dimensional projections sent instead of raw activations, the server operates on lifted representations without requiring changes to existing SL architectures. Adding no trainable client components, LightSplit remains lightweight and suitable for edge devices while preserving end-to-end differentiability via exact gradient propagation. As the projection is non-invertible, part of the original representation is irreversibly discarded at the client, so LightSplit reduces the information available for reconstruction. We evaluate LightSplit on seven benchmarks spanning image classification, tabular data, and language-model fine-tuning, under IID and non-IID client data. At up to 32x compression it retains at least 94% of baseline accuracy on CIFAR-10, FashionMNIST, GTSRB, and UCI HAR, 86% on CIFAR-100, and 91% on average under non-IID client data; at 8x it retains 92% of ImageNet-1k top-1 and raises GPT-2 perplexity by at most 1.15x. Against state-of-the-art reconstruction attacks LightSplit resists inversion; the strongest, co-trained attack loses up to 87.3% of its reconstruction SSIM, and subject re-identification on UCI HAR drops by more than half.
Mert Cihangiroglu, Alessandro Pegoraro, Phillip Rieger +2
University of Pavia · Technical University of Darmstadt