Lineage-Aware Memory Governance: A Derivation-Gated Framework for Privacy-Preserving Column-Level Access Control in Enterprise AI Agents

Agent memory enables enterprise agents to retain knowledge acquired during work and reuse it across tasks and agents, turning execution experience into persistent organizational knowledge. Realizing this potential requires both source--memory integration, through which enterprise sources and accumulated memory can be utilized together, and memory governance, through which shared memory remains subject to organizational policies throughout its lifecycle. These requirements interact when information from enterprise sources persists in memory. As this information is repeatedly derived and reused under changing principals and policies, source restrictions may be bypassed, resulting in information leakage. Preventing such leakage requires authorization continuity, under which source restrictions remain effective throughout source-to-memory and memory-to-memory derivation and reuse. Existing approaches address these concerns individually, but do not treat source--memory integration, memory governance, and authorization continuity as combined core design targets across the memory lifecycle. We define Governed Enterprise Memory as agent memory designed around this combined scope and present AkasicMEM as its realization. AkasicMEM realizes authorization continuity through transitive lineage, policy composition during memory formation, and policy re-evaluation during retrieval. It is built on GraphAI's AkasicDB, a unified vector--graph--relational database whose storage and execution substrate enables the underlying operations of these mechanisms to be jointly optimized and executed.

We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats this as a chain-of-custody problem rather than a filtering problem. It is a six-module design around an RFC-6962 Merkle log over per-principal Ed25519-signed entries: a weighted derivation DAG records which retrieved entries influenced each new memory, and a max-of-strong-edges propagation rule makes Untrusted-Path Persistence hold for any chain whose attribution edges remain above threshold. The sensitive-action gate then refuses dispatches whose active justification descends from an external ancestor, while still allowing benign recall. We evaluate three defense cells against three memory-poisoning workloads on a deterministic mechanism-isolation harness; MemLineage is the only configuration in that harness that drives all three columns to zero ASR, while sub-millisecond per-operation overhead keeps it well below the noise floor of any LLM call. A Codex-backed AgentDojo bridge further separates strong-model behavior from defense-layer behavior: under an intentionally vulnerable tool-output profile, no-defense and signature-only baselines fail on all six banking pairs, while all MemLineage rows reduce strict AgentDojo ASR to zero. The core deterministic artifacts are byte-equal CI-verified; hosted-model AgentDojo and live-model sweeps are recorded as auditable logs rather than byte-pinned artifacts.

Memory benchmarks for LLM agents largely assume single-user settings, leaving shared assistants for hospitals, workplaces, campuses, and households understudied. In these deployments, multiple principals write to a common memory pool and query it under different roles, scopes, and relationships, so memory quality requires governance as well as recall. We introduce GateMem, a benchmark for multi-principal shared-memory agents. GateMem jointly evaluates utility for legitimate long-horizon requests with state updates, access control across contextual authorization boundaries, and agent-facing active forgetting after explicit deletion requests. It spans medical, office, education, and household domains, with long-form multi-party episodes, incremental memory injection, hidden checkpoints, structured judging, and leak-target annotations. Across diverse baselines and backbone models, no method simultaneously achieves strong utility, robust access control, and reliable forgetting. Long-context prompting often yields the best governance score at high token cost, while retrieval-based and external-memory methods reduce cost yet still leak unauthorized or deleted information. These results show current memory agents remain far from reliable shared institutional deployment.