Penalty-Framed No-Valid-Option MCQA: Analyzing LLM Abstention under Invalid Choices

Multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) benchmarks in NLP use number-right scoring (accuracy), but in educational testing, the scoring scheme, the combination of the response mode models follow and the rule for grading responses, is a key design choice that dictates which abilities to reward. We examine how alternatives to number right change what MCQA measures with six education-inspired schemes that assess abilities beyond accuracy: distractor elimination, abstention, confidence calibration, and self-correction. On LLM benchmarks, these schemes: 1) shift rankings of 31 LLMs beyond rephrased number right prompts; 2) better predict the LLMs users prefer in LLM Arena; and 3) reveal distinct model capabilities, like that GPT-5 rarely abstains and readily self-corrects, while weaker open-weight models often abstain and hesitate to eliminate choices. Given the benefits of alternative scoring schemes, we discuss ways to extend them to tasks beyond MCQA.

A model should refuse two different things: answers it would get wrong, and questions it should not answer at all, such as unanswerable ones or ones resting on a false premise. The usual recipe thresholds a single confidence score, which cannot tell these apart. Across five instruction-tuned models from three families (2B to 14B), we find they are separate axes. Ordinary answer-confidence tracks whether an answer is right but is nearly blind to whether the question is answerable; a linear probe on hidden states does the reverse. The blind spot does not shrink with scale. It is worst on naturally occurring false-premise questions (CREPE). There, answer-confidence, P(IK), P(True), and even asking the model outright whether a premise is false all stay near chance, while a hidden-state probe reaches 0.69 to 0.77 AUROC: the model represents a problem it will not report. This turns out to be fixable. Instructing a model to check premises backfires, because it then disputes sound and false premises alike (57% false challenges), unable to tell them apart; routing the same instruction with the probe roughly triples challenge precision. We turn the two axes into a calibrated policy that answers only when an answerability score and a correctness score each clear a separately certifies behave differently: the unanswerable-answer rate is controllable at every scale, while the wrong-answer rate is capped by model accuracy, so the guarantee tightens as threshold policy certifies both budgets at 0.75 coverage of correct answers, against 0.31 for a single threshold; at 14B it is the only policy that certifies at all.

Language models often receive a question together with a claim about what another source answered. We audit whether such claims destabilize answers in multiple-choice question answering. For each item, we hold one wrong option fixed across misleading conditions and vary the cue template attached to it. We introduce \emph{neutral-conditioned misleading cue adoption rate} (NC-MCAR), which measures switches to that option only on valid cued trials where the same model first selected the gold answer under a neutral prompt. This is a measure of answer instability, not proof that the model knew the answer or that all deference is irrational. We evaluate four instruction-following models on MMLU-Pro and IndicMMLU-Pro in English, Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, and Telugu. Across 220{,}000 outputs, the expert template yields 41.1% aggregate NC-MCAR, compared with 12.5% for the majority template. These two conditions use the same wrong option and final instruction. Filler accuracy remains well above expert-wrong accuracy, while correct-cue prompts have high valid-response accuracy. The audit documents answer instability relevant to grounding under the tested forced-choice prompts: a bare, unverified source claim can outweigh an answer that was previously consistent with the task evidence.