Transferable Spatial Temporal Coherence Adversarial Attack on Black-Box Vision Language Models for Autonomous Driving

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly used in autonomous driving because they combine visual perception with language-based reasoning, supporting more interpretable decision-making, yet their robustness to physical adversarial attacks, especially whether such attacks transfer across different VLM architectures, is not well understood and poses a practical risk when attackers do not know which model a vehicle uses. We address this gap with a systematic cross-architecture study of adversarial transferability in VLM-based driving, evaluating three representative architectures (Dolphins, OmniDrive, and LeapVAD) using physically realizable patches placed on roadside infrastructure in both crosswalk and highway scenarios. Our transfer-matrix evaluation shows high cross-architecture effectiveness, with transfer rates of 73-91% (mean TR = 0.815 for crosswalk and 0.833 for highway) and sustained frame-level manipulation over 64.7-79.4% of the critical decision window even when patches are not optimized for the target model.

Spatiotemporal intelligence in autonomous driving (AD) requires an agent to integrate multi-view observations into a coherent scene representation, maintain object continuity across viewpoints and time, and reason about spatial relations, interactions, and future dynamics. However, existing AD vision-language benchmarks largely focus on single-view, static, ego-centric, or single-source question answering, leaving it unclear whether current Vision-Language Models (VLMs) can truly construct and reason over dynamic driving scenes. We introduce DriveSpatial, a benchmark of 15.6K human-verified QA pairs across 20 tasks from five large-scale AD datasets. DriveSpatial evaluates four abilities: Cognitive Scene Construction, Multi-view Relational Understanding, Temporal Reasoning, and Generalization. Unlike prior benchmarks, DriveSpatial is generated from a dynamic multi-relational scene graph that encodes object states, spatial relations, interactions, camera visibility, and temporal correspondences, enabling QA pairs that enforce genuine cross-view and spatiotemporal reasoning. Evaluating 15 representative VLMs reveals a substantial human-model gap: the strongest model trails humans by 28.4 points, with Cognitive Scene Construction emerging as the key bottleneck. Further diagnostics show that language-only prompting is insufficient, while explicit BEV grounding consistently improves performance. These results suggest that current VLMs lack the scene-construction ability needed for reliable spatiotemporal driving intelligence. DriveSpatial and its construction pipeline will be released to support future research.

Vision-language agents (VLAs) are increasingly used to interpret complex driving scenes and support safety-critical reasoning. This report presents the CVPR 2026@AdvML Workshop Challenge on adversarial multimodal attacks against autonomous-driving VLAs. Built on DriveLM-style multi-view visual question answering, the challenge represents each scene with six synchronized camera images and a structured collection of driving-related question-answer pairs. Participants generate adversarial images and suffix-only textual perturbations that induce model responses to deviate from reference answers while preserving image fidelity and limiting textual cost. The competition comprises two phases, with Phase II adding a hidden black-box model to assess transferability. We describe the task design, submission rules, evaluation protocol, and leaderboard results, and then examine five leading submissions for which technical reports were available. Across these reports, several recurring patterns emerge: image-side attacks are favored by the suffix penalty; scene-level, multi-view optimization is more effective than treating views in isolation; QA types and graph structure provide useful priors for allocating attack budget; feature-space objectives can improve black-box transfer; and typographic content embedded in camera images exposes a persistent vulnerability in driving VLAs. These findings provide a practical reference for future robustness evaluation and defense design in multimodal autonomous-driving systems.