DP-SGD protects training data by adding Gaussian noise to clipped gradients. The amount of noise is usually chosen by running a numerical privacy accountant inside a search. We study DP-SGD with random allocation, where each epoch uses every record once, at a randomly chosen step. For this setting we give a one-line formula that bounds the accuracy of every membership inference attack (MIA) on the trained model. With M steps per epoch, E epochs and noise multiplier σ, and with membership and non-membership equally likely a priori, the attack accuracy is at most 21+41(1+(e1/σ2−1)/M)E−1. The formula comes from the chi-square divergence between a Gaussian distribution and a Gaussian mixture that dominates random allocation. It is interpretable and gives σ in about a microsecond. Where applicable, our formula needs at most about half the noise of the state-of-the-art closed-form bound. To measure how close the bound is, we also derive an exact expression for the attack accuracy of these two distributions and evaluate it numerically. Calibrating to this exact expression requires 13.0% to 20.2% less noise than the formula in our main experiments, and since it is exact, no accountant that knows only M, E and σ can certify a smaller σ. In training, the resulting σ outperforms the formula and matches a published accountant in test accuracy. It is found in seconds and certified in minutes, whereas every search we ran with that accountant took longer or returned at least 0.62% more noise. We show that MIAs on the trained models stay below the bound.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The record is in one of the M steps of each epoch, chosen uniformly at random, so averaging over the step divides the chi-square divergence by M , and 1+χ2 multiplies over the independent epochs.
setting σ
training
σ
noise above exact
find
certify
find and certify
CIFAR-10
linear CIFAR-100
SST-2
AG News
closed form
14.9 – 25.3 %
0.7 – 1.5μ s
none
0.7 – 1.5μ s
39.68±0.26
53.58±0.11
85.89±0.87
89.61±0.14
exact
0
8.8 – 10.4 s
70 – 670 s
79 – 680 s
40.75±0.37
55.96±0.15
87.47±0.52
90.05±0.17
accountant
0.24 – 0.52 %
–
6.5 m– 7.1 h
5.5 – 249 h
40.76±0.30
55.91±0.15
87.47±0.59
90.04±0.17
exact minus closed form
+1.08
+2.38
+1.58
+0.43
exact minus accountant
0.00
+0.05
0.00
+0.01
Table 1: Noise and time of three ways of setting σ for the target λ=0.10 , and the test accuracy of training with each. Closed form is Corollary 3.4 , exact is Theorem 4.1 , and accountant is that of Feldman and Shenfeld (2026) with its default route. Noise and time are ranges over the nine cells M∈{100,250,500} , E∈{10,20,40} , with find the time to find σ , certify the time to certify that a given σ meets the target, and find and certify the time for both, on one CPU core. The closed form needs no run to certify, and exact is certified as in Appendix C.5 . The accountant’s search runs the accountant at each σ it tries and certifies the σ it returns, so it has no separate find time. The search ran with no limit on threads, and the accountant’s certify is the runs at the returned σ , in one direction, until one certified it. Under training, the first three rows give the mean test accuracy in percent (validation accuracy for SST-2), and the last two rows give differences in points.
model
M
E
σ
bound
Gaussian pair
optimal
measured
ResNet-18
100
10
1.737
0.55
0.5394
–
0.513±0.007
ResNet-18, ClipBKD
100
10
1.737
0.55
0.5394
–
0.510±0.006
linear
128
125
5.039
0.55
0.5394
0.5391
0.533±0.007
linear, exact σ
128
125
3.994
0.564
0.5500
0.5492
0.552±0.009
linear
128
125
1.561
0.70
0.6374
0.6242
0.613±0.012
linear, x⋆=0
128
125
1.561
0.70
0.6374
0.5000
0.500±0.000
Table 2: Membership inference attacks on trained models, against the closed-form bound and the Gaussian pair. Each trial trains two models that differ only in one target record, and the attacker sees one of them. Bound is 21+21U(cE) of Theorem 3.3 , Gaussian pair is the attack accuracy of (PM⊗E,QM⊗E) from Theorem 4.1 , and optimal is the attack accuracy Φ(μ/2) of the optimal attack on the released linear model, with μ=E/M/σ for the target 2Cx^ and μ=0 for x⋆=0 . Measured is the balanced accuracy of our attack with one standard error, over 150 trials for ResNet-18 and 300 for each linear row. Values of σ are rounded to three decimals, and the runs and computed columns use the unrounded values.
Appendix figures & tables11 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
M=100 , E=10 , σ=1.4262
M=500 , E=10 , σ=0.8344
α
pair
chi-square
total variation
pair
chi-square
total variation
0.1
0.1516
0.1767
0.2000
0.1523
0.1771
0.2000
0.01
0.0191
0.0354
0.1100
0.0194
0.0356
0.1100
0.001
0.0023
0.0091
0.1010
0.0024
0.0091
0.1010
Appendix
Table 3: True-positive rate of the optimal test and two upper bounds on it at false-positive rate α , at the exact σ of two cells of Table 1 for λ=0.10 . Pair is the true-positive rate of the optimal test on (PM⊗E,QM⊗E) , chi-square is the bound α+cEα(1−α) of Proposition B.2 , and total variation is α+λ . By ( 7 ) both bounds hold for every test on the released model.
M
E
exact σ
h
η
cap
bound on d\TV
certify (s)
first grid (s)
100
10
1.426215
0.001
5×10−5
512
0.0999999543
47
23
100
20
1.907073
0.0005
3×10−5
128
0.0999999580
36
81
100
40
2.610518
0.0003
2×10−5
32
0.0999999743
43
345
250
10
1.024495
0.0003
1×10−5
2000
0.0999999977
598
71
250
20
1.309428
0.001
3×10−5
1024
0.0999999624
119
108
250
40
1.732809
0.0004
2×10−5
256
0.0999999826
95
316
Appendix
Table 4: The certificate of Appendix C.5 at the exact σ of each cell of Table 1 . The grid spacing h and the cap on Y are those of step (i), and η is the spacing of the logarithms of the epoch grid of step (iii). The bound is 1−O , rounded up, and every bound is below λ=0.10 . Certify is the time of one run on these grids, and first grid is the time of an earlier run at the same σ on a coarser grid, which certified the bound only at M=500 , E=10 . Each run used one CPU core and 100 bits of precision.
search
one run of the accountant
M
E
exact (s)
accountant (h)
coarse (min)
coarse above exact
FFT (min)
FFT above exact
time (min)
loss discretization
100
10
9.8
5.5
4.5
4.31%
4.9
0.26%
6.5
0.003
100
20
9.4
12.6
9.5
4.75%
6.5
0.27%
19.6
0.0025
100
40
8.8
27.5
20.4
5.04%
10.6
0.28%
40.2
0.0025
250
10
10.1
19.0
18.3
2.90%
6.5
0.71%
36.1
0.003
250
20
10.4
45.4
42.4
3.39%
8.1
0.44%
131.7
0.003
Appendix
Table 5: Time to find σ in each cell of Table 1 . The first group ran on the machine that ran the accountant’s search for that cell. Exact is the root search on Theorem 4.1 , accountant is the search that gave the trained σ , coarse is the same search at numerical accuracy 0.05 without escalation, and FFT is the search on the accountant’s fast Fourier route. Coarse and FFT are each followed by the noise of their σ above the exact σ . The second group is one run of the accountant with its default route in one direction at its trained σ , with no search, at the largest loss discretization that certifies that σ . Every run except the accountant’s search used one thread. Appendix E describes the searches and defines the numerical accuracy and the loss discretization.
M
E
closed
exact
accountant
100
10
0.727
0.949
0.942
100
20
0.724
0.940
0.934
100
40
0.723
0.939
0.933
250
10
0.733
0.970
0.963
250
20
0.725
0.944
0.938
250
40
0.724
0.939
0.934
Appendix
Table 6: The ε at δ=10−5 of the three values of σ in each cell of Table 1 . The closed-form σ is the largest of the three and the exact σ the smallest, so in each cell the closed form has the smallest ε and the exact σ the largest. Each entry is the upper end of the interval that the privacy loss distribution accountant of Feldman and Shenfeld (2026) gives at numerical accuracy 0.01 , in the larger of the add and the remove direction.
M
E
λ
exact σ
exact (s)
fast Fourier certifies
default route (time)
100
1
0.10
0.6770
6.5
1.005× exact
7 s
1,000
1
0.10
0.4520
42.9
none
47 s
10,000
1
0.10
0.3532
32.8
none
2 min
100,000
1
0.10
0.2970
38.0
none
5 min
100
100
0.10
4.0400
9.9
1.005× exact
24 min
1,000
10
0.10
0.7048
12.0
none
31 min
Appendix
Table 7: The accountant of Feldman and Shenfeld (2026) with its two routes against the exact σ over larger settings, on one CPU core. The fast Fourier column gives the smallest of 1.005 and 1.02 times the exact σ and the closed form ( 12 ) that the fast Fourier route certifies at grid budget 4×108 , loss discretization 10−5 and tail truncation 10−8 , and none means that it certifies none of the three. The default column times one run of the default route in both directions, the library’s default, at 1.02 times the exact σ , loss discretization 0.01 and tail truncation 10−8 , which certifies that σ in every setting where it finished within 4 hours. At E=1 the exact σ is found with ( 16 ) as in Table 10 in Appendix F , and otherwise as in Table 1 . Each setting ran on one machine with one thread.
model
λ
noise (%)
closed form
exact
gain
positive
CIFAR-100 linear
0.01
24.9 to 25.4
6.12
8.63
+2.51
27/27
0.05
19.9 to 25.3
41.83
46.60
+4.77
27/27
0.10
14.9 to 25.3
53.58
55.96
+2.38
27/27
0.20
13.3 to 25.6
58.58
59.66
+1.08
27/27
CIFAR-10 ResNet-18
0.01
25.1 to 25.3
16.25
17.98
+1.73
6/6
0.05
22.1 to 24.2
33.78
35.76
+1.97
6/6
Appendix
Table 8: Test accuracy at the closed-form and the exact σ for four targets λ . The linear classifier on CIFAR-100 uses the nine cells and ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10 the cells (M,E)=(100,10) and (500,20) , each with three seeds. In each cell and seed the two runs share the seed, initialization and allocation, so only σ differs. Noise is how much larger the closed-form σ is than the exact one, over the cells. Test accuracies are means over cells and seeds in percent, gain is exact minus closed form in points, and positive counts the (cell, seed) pairs with a positive gain. The rows at λ=0.10 use the runs of Table 1 in these cells.
σ
ResNet-18 on CIFAR-10
exact minus
M
E
closed
exact
accountant
closed
exact
accountant
closed
accountant
100
10
1.7370
1.4262
1.4333
37.63±1.27
39.11±1.00
39.16±0.96
+1.48
−0.05
100
20
2.3621
1.9071
1.9169
39.13±0.54
40.28±0.65
40.33±0.65
+1.14
−0.06
100
40
3.2689
2.6105
2.6241
40.60±0.63
42.14±0.53
42.20±0.64
+1.54
−0.06
250
10
1.2088
1.0245
1.0282
38.46±0.46
39.17±0.35
39.09±0.40
+0.71
+0.08
250
20
1.5826
1.3094
1.3152
40.13±0.45
40.64±0.74
40.70±0.75
+0.51
−0.06
Appendix
Table 9: Noise multipliers and test accuracy in each cell of Table 1 . The three values of σ depend only on M , E and λ=0.10 , so every model uses the same σ in a cell. Test accuracy is in percent (validation accuracy for SST-2). It is the mean over three seeds with their standard deviation. Each difference is the exact run minus the other run, in points, averaged over the seeds and computed before rounding, so it can differ by 0.01 from the difference of the printed means.
Figure 2: The membership score of the target in 150 trials of ResNet-18. (a) The score of one released model, trained with the target (blue, solid) or without it (orange, dashed). The dotted line is the threshold chosen on the pilot trials. (b) The difference between the two models of each trial. It is positive on average, but much smaller than the spread in (a). The two panels have different horizontal scales.
Figure 3: Monte Carlo estimates of Acc∗(PM⊗E,QM⊗E) at σ=1.5 along E≈M (sublinear) and E≈0.10M (linear), with 2×105 samples per point, against the prediction Φ(μ/2) of Theorem 3.5 with μ=E(e1/σ2−1)/M at each point (lines).
method
bound/exact
noise
time
closed form ( Corollary 3.4 )
1.2533 – 1.2561
7.4 – 16.7%
≈1μ s
at the nine targets
1.25 – 2.13
exact ( Theorem 4.1 )
1
0
0.27 – 42 s
FS, q=1/M
1.58 – 1.75
9.0 – 34.3%
104 – 343 s
FS, q tuned
1.019 – 1.586
0.2 – 3.5%
608 – 2181 s
van Dijk and Ertan (2026)
10.7 – 20.0
128 – 267%
0.19 – 0.20 s
Appendix
Table 10: Comparison of five ways of setting σ for a total-variation target at one epoch. Bound/exact divides the method’s bound on d\TV by the exact value ( Theorem 4.1 ) at four settings of (σ,M) , and for the closed form also at its σ for the nine targets. Noise is how much larger the method’s σ is than the exact σ , over nine targets. Time is the wall-clock time to find σ , with the scan over q for FS with q tuned. FS is Theorem 4.3 of Shenfeld and Feldman (2025) with auxiliary Poisson rate q , and its rows are the values that the library dp_accounting computes. All rows bound the same random-allocation pair, and Appendix F lists the settings. For the accountant of Feldman and Shenfeld (2026) at one epoch, see Table 7 in Appendix E .
λ
M
E
σ
exact d\TV
accountant
Monte Carlo
ratio
0.10
100
10
1.7370
0.07885
[0.07434,0.08359]
0.07884±0.00002
1.2683
0.10
100
20
2.3621
0.07887
[0.07436,0.08364]
0.07888±0.00002
1.2679
0.10
100
40
3.2689
0.07888
[0.07439,0.08364]
0.07889±0.00002
1.2678
0.10
250
10
1.2088
0.07880
[0.07486,0.08286]
0.07877±0.00002
1.2691
0.10
250
20
1.5826
0.07886
[0.07487,0.08286]
0.07886±0.00002
1.2681
0.10
250
40
2.1352
0.07887
[0.07491,0.08289]
0.07888±0.00002
1.2678
Appendix
Table 11: Exact total variation at the closed-form σ on 27 configurations, checked against the accountant and Monte Carlo. Each σ is from Corollary 3.4 for the target λ , and exact d\TV is that of (PM⊗E,QM⊗E) from Theorem 4.1 . Accountant is the interval between the largest lower bound and the smallest upper bound on the total variation that the privacy loss distribution accountant of Feldman and Shenfeld (2026) gives in the add and the remove direction. Monte Carlo uses 2×107 samples, ± one standard error. Ratio is the bound λ divided by the exact value.
We derive a tight analysis of the trade-off function for Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) with subsampling based on random shuffling within the f-DP framework. Our analysis covers the regime σ≥3/lnM, where σ is the noise multiplier and M is the number of rounds within a single epoch. Unlike f-DP analyses for Poisson subsampling, which yield non-closed implicit formulas that can be machine computed but are non-transparent, random shuffling admits a tight analysis yielding transparent and interpretable closed-form bounds. Our concrete bounds, derived via the Berry-Esseen theorem, are tight up to constant factors within the proof framework. We demonstrate worked parameter settings for a single epoch (E=1) with a corresponding trade-off function ≥1−a−δ, that is, only δ below the ideal random guessing diagonal 1−a: For δ=1/100 and σ=1, roughly M≈1.14×106 rounds and N≈1.14×107 training samples suffice to achieve meaningful differential privacy. This is in contrast to recent negative results for the regime σ≤1/2lnM. Our concrete bounds can be composed over multiple epochs leading to δ having a linear in E dependency, which restricts E=O(M). To go beyond Berry--Esseen, we introduce a new proof technique based on a generalization of the law of large numbers that yields an asymptotic random guessing diagonal-limit result: if E=cM2M with cM→0, then the E-fold composed trade-off function satisfies f⊗E(a)→1−a uniformly in a∈[0,1] with δ having only an O(E) dependency. We compare this asymptotic regime with the corresponding Poisson subsampling asymptotic, and highlight the characterization of explicit convergence rates as an open question.
Marten van Dijk, Murat Bilgehan Ertan
CWI Amsterdam · ∗Affiliated with Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Poisson subsampling is the default sampling scheme in differentially private machine learning, largely because its unstructured randomness yields tractable privacy amplification analyses. Yet this same randomness introduces substantial participation variance: each sample appears in very different numbers of training iterations. In this work, we show that this variance is not merely a practical artifact to be tolerated, but a fundamental source of suboptimal privacy amplification. We prove that Balanced Iteration Subsampling (BIS), a structured scheme in which each sample participates in exactly a fixed number of iterations, achieves stronger privacy amplification than Poisson subsampling and is optimal at both extremes of the noise spectrum (σ→0 and σ→∞). Our analysis reveals that the privacy-noise tradeoff is governed not by maximizing randomness, but by eliminating participation variance while preserving uniform marginal participation across iterations. To translate this asymptotic theory into finite-noise guarantees, we introduce a practical near-exact Monte Carlo accountant for BIS, which removes the analytical slack of existing RDP and composition-based PLD analyses. Evaluations across more than 60 practical DP-SGD configurations show that BIS consistently outperforms Poisson subsampling in the low-noise regimes most relevant for high-utility private training, reducing the required noise multiplier by up to 9.6%. These results overturn the common intuition that more sampling randomness necessarily yields stronger privacy amplification: in DP-SGD, structured participation can be both more practical and more private. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/dong-xin-ao-andy/bis-mc-accountant.
Understanding the relationship between generalization and privacy remains a challenge in modern machine learning theory, particularly for deep networks that are trained by variants of differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP- SGD). In this work we make progress on this persistent open problem. First, we derive explicit upper bounds on the approximate max-information of any algorithm that fulfills (ε,δ)-differential privacy or Rényi differential privacy, thereby going beyond the classical results for pure ε-differential privacy. Subsequently, we show even stronger guarantees for two common private learning algorithms, output perturbation with the Gaussian mechanism, and streaming DP-SGD, by exploiting the structure of their internal randomization. As an application of our results, we demonstrate how to obtain non-vacuous PAC-Bayes generalization bounds for deep networks, in which the prior distribution is learned by DP-SGD instead of the classical way of choosing it in a data-independent way.
Christoph H. Lampert, Max Cairney-Leeming, Hossein Zakerinia
Institute of Science and Technology Austria (ISTA) Klosterneuburg, Austria