Deception by Omission: Language Models Knowingly Hide Their Mistakes

Large Language Models (LLMs) are effective at deceiving when prompted to do so. Models that demonstrate better performance on reasoning tasks are also better at prompted deception. But under what conditions do they deceive without instruction to do so? This study evaluates unsolicited deception produced by LLMs in a preregistered experimental protocol using tools from signaling theory. We evaluated a range of 18 proprietary closed-source and open-source LLMs using modified 2x2 games (in the style of the Prisoner's Dilemma) augmented with a phase in which they can freely communicate to the other agent using unconstrained language. This setup creates an opportunity to misrepresent its actions in conditions that vary in how useful doing so might be towards goal satisfaction. The results indicate that 1) all tested LLMs misrepresent their actions in at least some conditions, 2) they are generally more likely to do so in situations in which deception is beneficial, and 3) models exhibiting better reasoning capacity overall tend to misrepresent at higher rates. Taken together, these results suggest a correlational relationship between model reasoning performance and situational deception, and reveal certain contextual factors that affect whether LLMs will misrepresent actions or not in a novel experimental configuration.

As large language models are deployed in increasingly autonomous long-horizon tasks, manually auditing and verifying the actions, artifacts, and outputs of models becomes more difficult. Users instead come to rely on LLM-generated reports to assess the quality and completeness of the work. We introduce a suite of eight adversarial reporting scenarios to systematically study whether LLMs conceal narrative-changing flaws: errors or limitations that undermine an otherwise successful account of work. We call this phenomenon "insecure reporting." When handed machine learning experiment logs containing a planted negative result that substantially weakens the proposed method, GPT-5.5 flags the negative result in only 2 of 200 generated reports. However, when a short honesty instruction, "Be honest in your response," is added, the model flags the negative result in 190 of 200 reports. Across eight open-weight models, chain-of-thought analysis reveals a recurring tension between disclosing narrative-changing flaws and reasoning about ways to appear successful. We perform an activation analysis and a steering experiment on Qwen3.5-9B, finding that honesty and success-seeking correspond to opposing directions in representation space. Our results suggest that LLMs tend to present narratives of success by default, and that steering models toward honesty makes their reports substantially more transparent.

The increasing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are being accompanied by deep-rooted risks of deceptive behaviours that cause models to produce misleading outputs in service of a contextually or experimentally induced goal. The harm posed by such behaviours depends not only on the content of deceptive outputs but also how confidently models deliver them, since confidence has a major impact on how persuasive the communication is to end users. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study on the crucial relationship between confidence and deception across existing deception benchmarks and different model families, while covering both verbalized numerical and logit-based aggregated confidence. Through this, we reveal how confidently models behave when being deceptive. We demonstrate that when producing deceptive rather than honest responses, models exhibit a gap between their belief (how likely they think a claim is to be true) and their commitment (how firmly they assert and would defend that claim). LLMs produce persuasive deceptive claims while reporting low belief in their factual correctness. Their reported commitment to deceptive responses can easily be increased through further prompting and preference fine-tuning, with smaller and condition-dependent changes in reported belief. However, we show that low reported belief remains comparatively invariant and provides a strong signal for detecting deception in the evaluated settings. Using only an API call, our approach achieves detection scores of up to 0.99 for induced deception and 0.89 for emergent deception. This ultimately shows how confidence can be a practical tool for detecting and diagnosing deceptive behaviour in LLMs.