Abstract
Humanoid face robots can now move their lips in sync with speech and show detailed facial expressions. Give such a robot the face of a real person and drive it with generated speech, and you get a new kind of presentation attack: a face that talks and reacts in front of the camera, recorded as a real object with no edited pixel. We call this a RoboFake and ask whether current defenses are ready for it. We test three public face presentation attack detection (PAD) models and six public deepfake detectors on video of a physical lip-syncing face robot, on a synthesized video of the same robot, and on rendered robot faces. Thresholds are fixed on human data (BPCER 5% on FaceForensics++), and every result is compared with real human faces processed the same way as the robot videos and turned to the same head angle. A small mobile PAD model detects every physical robot frame (APCER 0%) and is not affected by compression, but its BPCER on processed human video rises to 14%; the two PAD models trained on CelebA-Spoof miss the robot in the direct capture, and one of them also misses most panel frames. Among the deepfake detectors, three flag almost every robot frame and two fewer than 7%; masking shows that the response comes from the face but does not track synthesis, and JPEG compression pushes most robot frames below the threshold for some detectors. Our results suggest that current models catch today's robots because their faces do not look human, not because they recognize the attack. We state three testable hypotheses about realistic, interactive RoboFakes.
More in this topicDeepfake detection identifies manipulated or AI-generated media to support trustworthy communication, identity verification, and forensic analysis.
See all 241 papers → Jul 23, 2026
Talking-face (TF) deepfake generation synthesizes photore- alistic facial video from a static source image and an au- dio signal, producing forgeries that current image-based detectors consistently fail to identify. Unlike face-swap ma- nipulation, TF synthesis has no underlying real video from which to inherit physiological characteristics, making re- mote photoplethysmography (rPPG) a uniquely motivated detection modality for this forgery category. We propose a detection framework that extracts per-video rPPG wave- forms via RhythmFormer and trains a suite of lightweight classifiers to distinguish real from synthesized physiologi- cal signals. Evaluated on the TF subset of Celeb-DF++ un- der a strict subject-independent protocol, where test identi- ties are completely separated from training identities, our 1D ResNet achieves an AUC of 0.806 and EER of 27.8%, placing it within 2.4 points of the best published general- purpose detector (Effort, ICML 2025) while operating ex- clusively on the physiological channel. We document a con- trolled reproduction study of DeepFakesON-Phys, the rep- resentative prior rPPG detector, demonstrating degrada- tion from AUC 0.999 on legacy face-swap data to 0.622 on the TF subset of Celeb-DF++. We further show that detec- tion difficulty is strongly method-dependent: AUC ranges from 0.985 (Real3DPortrait) to 0.690 (IP-LAP) across the seven TF generators, with the ranking remaining perfectly stable across all evaluation protocols. This spread reflects an interpretable physiological property of each generator rather than evaluation noise, and constitutes the primary theoretical contribution of the work.
Othmane Harraq, Tamer Aldwairi
Temple University
Aug 20, 2026
Advances in speech synthesis have made deepfake audio highly realistic. Earlier studies reported 70-80% human detection accuracy, but relied primarily on older synthesizers. We compare human detection for three selected voice synthesis tools released in 2019, 2022, and 2024 with 82 IT professionals, and benchmark humans against six pretrained detectors on the same material. For fully synthetic speech (full spoofs), the F1 score drops from about 90% for RTVC and YourTTS to 48% for ElevenLabs, although listeners were explicitly warned that deepfakes were present. For partial spoofing, where only one sentence of an utterance is altered, strict accuracy falls to 9%, and listeners classify the synthetic sentence as bona fide 77% of the time. Humans and detectors fail in complementary ways, and neither reliably localizes short manipulations. Additionally, listeners increasingly mislabel bona fide speech as fake, eroding trust in unmanipulated audio. These findings show that human perception alone is unreliable for the selected modern and partial-spoof conditions and motivate procedural verification, provenance, watermarking, and segment-level detection.
Milan Šalko, Anton Firc, Kamil Malinka +4
Jun 3, 2026
We introduce IRIS-GAN, a specialist forensic detector for synthetic face images under cross-generator shift. Rather than addressing universal synthetic-image detection, we focus on faces generated by generative adversarial networks (GANs), which are state-of-the-art in deepfake content, and train the detector through staged exposure to increasingly demanding GAN families while retaining earlier generators. The final model reaches fake-detection rates above 99% across the GAN families considered and classifies an external real-face dataset with 98.9% accuracy. Grad-CAM analysis further reveals measurable generator-dependent spatial response patterns, which remain informative for a secondary heatmap-only classifier. Out-of-family tests on diffusion-generated faces confirm that IRIS-GAN is a specialist detector, with some capability to reach non-GAN deepfakes. These results establish staged training as an effective strategy for robust GAN-face forensics.
Jaume M. Trenchs, Veronica Sanz
aDepartamento de Física Teórica, Universitat de València, Burjassot, Spain · bInstituto de Física Corpuscular (IFIC), CSIC–Universitat de València, Valencia, Spain