Does a Hosted Decision Model Respect Irrelevant Alternatives? A Pre-Registered Test of Option-Set Dependence in Jev

An ordinary-looking background detail can turn a correct model decision into a confident mistake. We demonstrate this fragility in four decision systems, including Jev, across seven datasets covering knowledge, reasoning, and tool routing. Within 64 accepted target evaluations per decision, we uncover short context additions that redirect 61.4%-73.2% of each system's initially correct decisions toward a wrong option fixed in advance. The additions supply background or procedural information rather than explicit answer-selection instructions, leaving the original question and choices intact. We construct them through probability-guided context optimization, which uses shifts in the option distribution to refine surrounding text under naturalness and answer-preservation constraints. Redirection affects initially confident decisions, often produces high-confidence wrong choices, and transfers across models. In blinded human evaluation, 91.6% of 250 sampled successful contexts are judged natural, answer-preserving, and free of decisive answer-changing evidence by a majority of three independent annotators. These findings expose a weakness in current decision models: context that looks entirely compatible with an input can redirect the choices that agents, routers, and evaluators rely on.

A typed decision model answers a fixed question about an input by returning a probability for each of several caller-defined options. Each option carries a short label and a written definition, which is where a developer states the rule the model should apply. Jev introduced this interface for routing, moderation and triage, open implementations followed, and the same operation occurs whenever a language model is used as a classifier by scoring label strings. We study the open implementations, whose weights we can inspect and patch, and ask whether the probability follows the definitions or the labels. A preference for the label we call option-label bias. Across four open-weight typed decision models, three ways of reading an answer from a Qwen2.5 backbone, eleven classification tasks and PolicyBench, a synthetic routing suite we introduce in which the rule appears only in the definitions, the answer is mostly the labels. Deleting every definition leaves accuracy unchanged (laya-td: 0.8559 against 0.8487), although those definitions support 0.7971 on their own, and renaming the options to A and B raises accuracy by +0.1511 [+0.1377, +0.1646]. One system, von, is unaffected, and the two code bases differ in one expression: laya writes each option as "{label}: {definition}", while von writes only the definition. Changing that expression in both directions, with no weight changed, makes all three laya checkpoints exactly invariant (+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]) and creates the effect in von, whose accuracy falls from 0.8511 to 0.2281 when a label contradicts its definition. Earlier work attributed this failure to the constrained decision head these models use in place of a text decoder; our results locate it in the prompt rendering. We give a two-call test that tells a practitioner which case applies to their model, and measure what four mitigations are worth.

Decision models return normalized probability distributions over candidate choices, which downstream applications can use to select among choices. Although their providers emphasize the reliability of these probabilities, calibration on tasks with a single correct choice does not establish their reliability when multiple choices are correct. We evaluate three decision models (Jev, Liquid d1, and GPT-6 Luna Decisions) on three diverse datasets (MetaTool, HotpotQA, and ECtHR) to study probability allocation and thresholding. Even when models rank every correct choice above every distractor, in 28% to 50% of those lists, at least one correct choice receives a probability below the uniform probability of 1/n, where n is the number of choices. We also present each model with five identical copies of a correct choice and observe probability disparities, with mean gaps ranging from 17 to 79 percentage points. We further show how these allocation disparities affect the recovery of multiple correct choices under probability thresholding. Decision-model probabilities can rank correct choices, but a probability threshold does not identify the set of correct choices.