Convex-Analytic View of Query Selection for Safety Verification of Markov Decision Processes

{\em Specification-Guided Reinforcement Learning (RL)} has largely concerned itself with learning an optimal policy against a formal specification in an unknown {\em Markov Decision Process (MDP)}. We take up the dual question. Given a policy already in hand, can one verify that it is correct against a formal specification in an unknown MDP, using sampling access alone? Such a question arises naturally in safety-critical systems. We investigate it for the {\em almost-sure reachability property}, whose correctness is witnessed by a {\em ranking supermartingale (RSM)} certificate. Our first finding is negative. In the absence of any further information about the MDP, one can neither learn such a certificate nor verify a candidate one with probabilistic guarantees. On the positive side, we show that, under a mild restriction, a known lower bound $p_{\min}$ on nonzero transition probabilities, a correct certificate can be learned with PAC-style guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study of learning and verifying certificates for almost-sure reachability in unknown MDPs from sampling access alone. Finally, our experiments show that the $p_{\min}$-based sufficient condition, while sound, is conservative: the learned certificate often remains valid on the true MDP even when the condition fails.

Robust Markov Decision Processes (RMDPs) generalize classical MDPs by allowing uncertainty in transition probabilities and optimizing against their worst-case realization. We consider $(s,a)$-rectangular RMDPs with linearly defined uncertainty sets and study parity objectives, which are a canonical representation of $ω$-regular objectives. An uncertainty set is linearly defined if it is described by linear inequalities over the transition distribution together with auxiliary variables, which capture the standard $L_1$ and $L_\infty$ balls as well as general polytopic uncertainty sets. The quantitative value is the supremum, over all agent policies, of the satisfaction probability guaranteed against the adversarial environment. Previous work studied the qualitative analysis, namely the almost-sure (resp. positive) problem that asks whether a single agent policy guarantees satisfaction with probability one (resp. positive probability) against every environment policy. In this work, we solve the exact quantitative problem. Our contributions are threefold. First, we show that both the agent and the environment admit pure memoryless optimal policies. Second, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for quantitative parity on linearly defined robust Markov chains and use it as a subroutine in a policy-iteration algorithm for RMDPs. The algorithm combines quantitative one-step improvements with qualitative almost-sure improvements. Finally, we report experiments comparing our approach with the explicit reduction to stochastic games.

Safe reinforcement learning (RL) is commonly formalized as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), in which an agent maximizes expected reward while keeping its expected cumulative cost below a specified safety bound. Existing safe RL benchmarks predominantly report whether an algorithm is safe on average, following this expectation-based guarantee. We argue that this convention is insufficient to reliably characterize an algorithm's true safety: it fails to capture how often and how severely the safety bound is violated, whether this holds consistently across tasks and safety bounds, and whether training-time behavior is representative of behavior of the final converged policy. Therefore, we introduce (i) evaluation metrics for safe RL that address each of these concerns and in addition allow for aggregation across tasks and safety bounds. We furthermore define (ii) a safety tier system to systematically categorize and compare algorithms in terms of safety and reliability at both training and for a final policy. Using this framework, we provide (iii) an empirical safety evaluation across multiple safety navigation tasks. Our results show that aggregate metrics, distributional reporting, and task- and safety bound-specific results each reveal information the other metrics cannot. We therefore recommend reporting all three jointly, rather than compressing this information into a single value, as is common practice. We provide SafeRLEval, an open-source evaluation suite to support the reliable characterization of safety in future safe RL research.