Modal Sense Disambiguation in Language Models: The Role of Context, Training Domain, and Input Frequency

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.

Language models (LMs) are used for a diverse range of tasks, from question answering to writing fantastical stories. In order to reliably accomplish these tasks, LMs must be able to discern the modal category of a sentence (i.e., whether it describes something that is possible, impossible, completely nonsensical, etc.). However, recent studies have called into question the ability of LMs to categorize sentences according to modality (Michaelov et al., 2025; Kauf et al., 2023). In this work, we identify linear representations that discriminate between modal categories within a variety of LMs, or modal difference vectors. Analysis of modal difference vectors reveals that LMs have access to more reliable modal categorization judgments than previously reported. Furthermore, we find that modal difference vectors emerge in a consistent order as models become more competent (i.e., through training steps, layers, and parameter count). Notably, we find that modal difference vectors identified within LM activations can be used to model fine-grained human categorization behavior. This potentially provides a novel view into how human participants distinguish between modal categories, which we explore by correlating projections along modal difference vectors with human participants' ratings of interpretable features. In summary, we derive new insights into LM modal categorization using techniques from mechanistic interpretability, with the potential to inform our understanding of modal categorization in humans.

Human language is highly polysemous. Many common words (e.g., 'bank' or 'palm') carry several distinct meanings that shape what humans communicate and imagine. Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to understand this multiplicity of meaning, but much less is known about how polysemy surfaces in other modalities such as images. We study this across 17 text-to-image and 15 text-generation models by giving each a polysemous word with no context to fix its meaning and measuring which senses are produced over many samples. We find a clear multimodal gap, where within every model family, generated images settle on far fewer senses than generated sentences (normalized entropy 0.10 vs. 0.25), and both are far less varied than what people imagine for the same words (normalized entropy 0.47). However, when we instead ask a model to list how often it would generate outputs corresponding to each possible meaning of a word, it predicts distributions that are more diverse than the actual space of outputs. These results reveal a multimodal gap in how foundation models express meaning, and how their understanding may not transfer faithfully nor equally across modalities.