Steerable Pluralistic Policy Alignment from Anonymized Crowd Feedback

Pluralistic alignment needs to accommodate diverse preferences under limited human feedback. Using AI simulators to label preference comparisons reduces annotation costs, but variation in simulation accuracy across individuals can leave some people's preferences poorly represented in training. We study how to allocate human feedback across people to construct training data for pluralistic alignment, and how this allocation affects the trained policy. To make this allocation explicit and controllable, we define a social welfare objective over individual supervision utilities that measure label quality. Each query's marginal welfare gain depends on its expected supervision improvement, the recipient's current utility, and application-designated priority. Welfare-Aware Preference Acquisition (WAPA) uses auxiliary reference models to estimate query gains and individual utilities, then selects queries by estimated marginal welfare gain while updating recipient utilities. We prove exact optimality of the acquisition algorithm for the estimated welfare objective under a fixed query budget and model predictions. Experiments on six Roleplay collections and four OpinionQA regions demonstrate improved supervision and controllable allocation tradeoffs. Policy training on four Roleplay collections improves preference prediction for both seen and unseen individuals. When prioritizing a designated group and poorly represented individuals, acquiring human labels for 20% of comparisons recovers 75-86% of the average predictive utility gap between policies trained entirely on AI-generated labels and entirely on ground-truth labels.

Aligning robot policies with human preferences is essential for deployment to diverse end users. In per-user alignment approach, preference feedback is often sparse, so learning becomes unstable and vulnerable to human preference noise, and a growing number of individualized policies makes validation difficult before deployment. A single shared policy approach to user alignment avoids this cost but fails to capture heterogeneous preferences and often neglects minority preferences. To address these challenges, we introduce Preference-based REward Clustering (PREC), a novel framework that learns a compact set of policies from binary preference labels provided by diverse users. From a dataset of user trajectories and their preference labels, PREC first sets the labels aside and aggregates trajectories across users to learn a population-level shared trajectory encoder, alleviating limited per-user coverage and avoiding label noise during representation learning. Using this representation, PREC jointly assigns users to preference-coherent clusters and learns a representative reward model per cluster using preference labels, from which a policy is optimized for each cluster. Clustering similar users compensates for the limited number of labels available from each user and mitigates the effect of label noise. At the same time, maintaining a manageable number of reward models reduces the validation burden at deployment. Experiments across diverse simulated locomotion environments show that PREC groups users who label different trajectory subsets into preference-coherent clusters more accurately than baseline methods. Under sparse and noisy feedback, policies trained with PREC improve all three social welfare metrics over an existing single shared-policy user-alignment approach and even outperform per-user alignment approaches.

Prevailing alignment methods target a fixed set of preferences and therefore risk forcing value lock-in as societal norms evolve over time. We introduce Adaptive Pluralistic Alignment (APA), a modular pipeline for updating pluralistically aligned AI systems to track evolving values and avoid value lock-in without repeating costly pretraining or large-scale data collection. APA has three stages: (1) learning compact personalized reward models via low-rank reward basis decomposition, (2) using these models as a jury that collectively selects among candidate outputs through social-choice-theoretic voting, and (3) efficiently adapting the jury over time by fitting new annotator weights over the fixed reward bases as values shift. The resulting system is efficient, explainable, steerable, and modular. We implement a proof-of-concept instantiation using simulated historical annotators, demonstrate how jury composition and the choice of voting rule can substantially affect outcomes, and bound value tracking error given a sliding-window jury. We provide full code at https://github.com/RachelFreedman/apa.