Vision-language models (VLMs) can infer sensitive information such as geolocation from subtle visual cues, creating privacy risks when responses disclose more detail than the visual context warrants. We study visual-contextual privacy in geolocation disclosure, where a VLM should reveal location information only at the granularity appropriate to the visual context depicted in the image. We first show that this contextually appropriate granularity is recoverable from pre-generation hidden states, even when generated responses are misaligned, with disclosure levels exhibiting an ordered structure along a common hidden-state direction. Motivated by this, we propose an inference-time route-and-steer framework: an ordinal granularity router maps visual-contextual privacy representations to a disclosure route, and a disclosure-level-conditioned steering module applies route-specific hidden-state interventions during decoding. Across four VLM backbones, our method improves visual-context-aware disclosure alignment, better balances over- and under-disclosure, and incurs only modest changes on general capability benchmarks. It further transfers to another dataset with a distinct data distribution and privacy-risk taxonomy.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Visual-context-aware geolocation disclosure control. The same location-inference request can require different disclosure granularities depending on the visual context depicted in the image, such as a private residential scene versus a public landmark. Without steering, the VLM may over-disclose or under-disclose location information; with steering, the response is shifted toward the contextually appropriate disclosure granularity.
VLM response
Linear Probe
Model
F1
Accuracy
F1
Accuracy
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
39.2
39.9
59.0
58.8
Qwen3.5-4B
42.4
47.3
57.2
57.6
Llama-3.2-11B-Vision-Instruct
36.4
38.7
57.5
58.4
InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B
29.5
28.0
54.2
54.3
Table 1: F1 and accuracy (%) against gold disclosure targets, using disclosure levels extracted from VLM responses or predicted by linear probes from pre-generation hidden states.
Figure 2: Framework of context-aware activation steering. Condition states grouped by gold disclosure targets yi∗ define an ordinal router, while answer states grouped by judged disclosure labels zi define behavior vectors vA and vC . At inference time, an unsteered prompt pass predicts route y^ using a scalar score and ordered thresholds. Routes A and C apply fixed-strength interventions to reduce disclosure or increase detail, respectively; route B applies no intervention.
Figure 3: Class-conditional disclosure granularity coordinate distributions on VLM-GeoPrivacy across four backbones.
Granularity Alignment
Disclosure Errors
Backbone
Method
F1 ↑
Accuracy ↑
G-MAE ↓
Over ↓
Under ↓
AV ↓
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
Vanilla
39.2
39.9
68.3
23.0
37.0
54.1
Privacy Policy Prompt
36.9
39.5
72.8
18.1
42.4
42.9
Static CAA
41.6
43.0
65.3
19.0
38.0
45.4
LoRA-SFT
51.1
51.4
55.6
19.3
29.2
43.9
Ours
51.2
54.1
62.0
16.9
28.9
33.0
Table 2: End-to-end visual-context-aware disclosure alignment performance. An LLM judge maps each VLM response to a disclosure-granularity label, which is compared with the human-annotated contextual target to compute the metrics (Appendix A.5 ). All metrics are computed over valid responses (labels A/B/C), excluding D. Best and second-best results within each backbone are shown in bold and underlined , respectively.
Routing
End-to-End Performance
Backbone
Method
Accuracy ↑
F1 ↑
Accuracy ↑
G-MAE ↓
Over ↓
Under ↓
AV ↓
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
Ours
56.4
51.2
54.1
62.0
16.9
28.9
33.0
Prompt-based Routing
40.7
42.4
45.3
68.3
14.4
40.3
33.7
Oracle Routing
100.0
70.6
72.7
28.5
12.8
14.5
26.8
Prompt-based Steering
—
44.2
45.9
66.1
17.4
36.8
39.8
Table 3: Component analysis of disclosure granularity routing and disclosure-level-conditioned behavior steering. Prompt-based Routing and Oracle Routing replace the router while keeping downstream activation steering fixed (Section 5.3.1 ). Prompt-based Steering retains the routing decisions of Ours and replaces activation steering with disclosure-level-specific text instructions (Section 5.3.2 ).
Vanilla
Ours
Model
F1 ↑
Acc ↑
F1 ↑
Acc ↑
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
22.5
20.8
35.5
44.0
Qwen3.5-4B
13.7
13.9
32.7
37.0
Llama-3.2-11B-Vision-Instruct
21.0
19.8
29.8
29.7
InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B
24.6
34.7
35.0
38.7
Table 4: Disclosure-granularity alignment on DoxBench (%). Ours improves F1 and accuracy across all four backbones.
Figure 4: Alignment tax across methods and benchmarks, computed as Vanilla minus intervention scores in percentage points; positive values indicate degradation. Error bars show 95% paired bootstrap confidence intervals, and dashed lines mark zero tax.
Appendix figures & tables8 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Partition
Total
A
B
C
Construction
717
290
144
283
Validation
238
97
47
94
Test
243
98
49
96
Total
1,198
485
240
473
Appendix
Table 5: Class distribution of the fixed construction, validation, and test partitions.
Backbone
ℓr
ℓs
τAB
τBC
αA
αC
Qwen2.5-VL-3B
33
28
−17.9672
−18.7784
1.50
3.00
Qwen3.5-4B
17
16
0.3707
0.0562
2.50
3.50
Llama-3.2-11B-Vision
39
24
2.5480
2.5401
3.25
2.75
InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B
16
16
0.7672
0.5881
2.75
3.75
Appendix
Table 6: Frozen component configurations on VLM-GeoPrivacy. Routing and steering layers use zero-based indices. Cut points apply to the centered projected routing score and are rounded to four decimal places. The B route uses αB=0 .
Figure 5: Validation F1 in local 4×4 windows for all four backbones.
Figure 6: DoxBench construction-set distributions of the projected routing coordinate. Each contextual target class has a unit-area density; coordinate scales are backbone-specific.
Backbone
Method
G-MAE ↓
Over ↓
Under ↓
AV ↓
Coverage ↑
Qwen2.5-VL-3B
Vanilla
85.1
67.3
11.9
96.9
100.0
Ours
66.0
45.0
11.0
46.2
99.0
Qwen3.5-4B
Vanilla
121.8
83.2
3.0
100.0
100.0
Ours
90.0
55.0
8.0
63.1
99.0
Llama-3.2-11B-Vision
Vanilla
96.0
73.3
6.9
93.8
100.0
Ours
83.2
65.3
5.0
75.4
100.0
Appendix
Table 7: Additional disclosure metrics on DoxBench. AV is computed over gold-A examples with valid responses (labels A/B/C), excluding D from the denominator. Lower is better for the four error metrics, with the best value within each backbone in bold, including ties. Coverage is reported without bolding.
Qwen2.5-VL-3B
Qwen3.5-4B
Method
VQAv2 ↑
TextVQA ↑
MMMU ↑
VQAv2 ↑
TextVQA ↑
MMMU ↑
Vanilla
83.25
76.55
50.48
81.35
81.60
45.24
Privacy Policy Prompt
82.85
76.75
49.05
80.45
79.55
50.00
Static CAA
83.25
76.40
49.52
80.65
82.20
44.76
LoRA-SFT
83.80
77.00
49.05
79.10
80.20
44.76
Ours
81.95
77.75
49.52
80.40
80.80
43.81
Appendix
Table 8: General-capability scores (%) on fixed validation subsets of VQAv2, TextVQA, and MMMU, containing 200, 200, and 210 questions, respectively. VQAv2 and TextVQA use answer-consensus scoring; MMMU uses task accuracy with the frozen deterministic fallback for unparseable multiple-choice responses. Higher is better for all columns.
Clean
Iterative
Malicious
Backbone
Method
Acc ↑
Over ↓
Under ↓
Acc ↑
Over ↓
Under ↓
Acc ↑
Over ↓
Under ↓
Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct
Vanilla
39.9
23.0
37.0
36.2
30.9
32.9
36.2
47.3
16.5
Privacy Policy Prompt
39.5
18.1
42.4
36.2
23.0
40.7
36.2
43.2
20.6
Static CAA
43.0
19.0
38.0
39.1
28.8
32.1
32.1
44.4
23.5
LoRA-SFT
51.4
19.3
29.2
46.9
32.9
20.2
36.2
46.5
17.3
Ours (original)
54.1
16.9
28.9
39.9
56.4
3.7
39.7
55.0
5.4
Appendix
Table 9: Disclosure control under clean and adversarial prompting(%). Acc measures disclosure-target matching; Over and Under measure overly specific and insufficiently specific disclosure, respectively. All three metrics exclude D assignments. Iterative scores use the final attempted response, with at most four requests. Bold and underlined values denote the best and second-best distinct scores among six methods within each backbone and column; displayed ties share a rank. Ours (original) is the frozen main-text method. The exploratory mixed-prompt variant refits only the router on construction-set representations from all three prompt families.
Figure 7: Breakdown of Vanilla errors on VLM-GeoPrivacy. Each bar is normalized over one backbone’s Vanilla-incorrect test examples. Both denotes examples correctly classified by the fixed-layer Linear Probe and corrected by Ours; Probe only , Ours only , and Neither denote the remaining outcomes. Correctness refers to disclosure-target matching, with D counted as incorrect.
Privacy protection in vision-language models limits sensitive information exposure while preserving useful image understanding and multimodal reasoning.
Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex visual understanding. However, this very power introduces a critical yet underexplored privacy threat: adversaries can exploit MLRMs to precisely infer users' geographic locations from casually shared photographs, by performing structured reasoning over subtle visual cues such as architectural styles, vegetation, and lighting conditions. In this work, we present a systematic study of MLRM-driven geolocation privacy leakage. We first reveal that refusal-based safeguards are critically insufficient, as carefully crafted jailbreak prompts can raise model response rates to 100%. We further identify that existing defenses, which inject imperceptible perturbations into shared images, suffer from structural limitations intrinsic to their pixel-space optimization, resulting in degraded black-box transferability and pronounced visual artifacts. Motivated by these findings, we propose a diffusion-based framework that provides targeted, proactive defense against geolocation privacy leakage. By injecting perturbations into the latent space of a diffusion model during reverse sampling, our method operates directly on high-level semantic representations, thereby resolving the effectiveness-utility bottlenecks by construction. We further ground our optimization with GeoCLIP, a model explicitly aligned with GPS coordinates, as a surrogate to pinpoint and disrupt the geographic signals that MLRMs exploit for location inference. This targeted semantic disruption yields significantly stronger black-box transferability while preserving perceptual image quality, offering a seamless integration on social media platforms. Code is available at https://github.com/RachelWolowitz/Hiding_in_plain_sight.
Yining Wang, Xi Li, Mi Zhang +4
Fudan University · East China University of Science and Technology · Shanghai University of Electric Power
The rapid advancement of large vision language models (LVLMs) has made geolocation inference from images highly accurate and accessible. This poses serious privacy risks: a passive adversary with black-box LVLM access can infer a user's location from a single photo with no metadata. Existing protection methods rely almost exclusively on adversarial perturbation, which introduces perceptible visual artifacts and utility degradation. We identify the visual-geolocation asymmetry: geolocation-decisive clues, such as street signs, tend to be visually peripheral but dominate location inference. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose GeoCloak, an agentic framework for semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection. It acts as a clue-aware planner that analyzes each image to identify geolocation-relevant clues, dispatches targeted semantic edits to directly suppress peripheral clues, and autonomously configures adversarial perturbation to further suppress residual geolocation features, all under iterative utility-aware feedback. We evaluate GeoCloak on four diverse datasets spanning 108 countries and 576 cities against five LVLMs and three inference methods. GeoCloak reduces overall city-level accuracy from 41.2% to 9.9%, approximately half of the best-performing baseline, while achieving substantially superior utility preservation both qualitatively and quantitatively. We hope this work takes a meaningful step toward practical, semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection, giving users greater control over the location information inadvertently embedded in their shared images.
Yixin Wu, Mingjie Li, Yun Shen +2
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security +1
Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled accurate image-based geolocation, raising serious concerns about location privacy risks in everyday social media posts. Yet, a systematic evaluation of such risks is still lacking: existing benchmarks show coarse granularity, linguistic bias, and a neglect of multimodal privacy risks. To address these gaps, we introduce KoreaGEO, the first fine-grained, multimodal, and privacy-aware benchmark for geolocation, built on Korean street views. The benchmark covers four socio-spatial clusters and nine place types with rich contextual annotations and two captioning styles that simulate real-world privacy exposure. To evaluate mainstream VLMs, we design a three-path protocol spanning image-only, functional-caption, and high-risk-caption inputs, enabling systematic analysis of localization accuracy, spatial bias, and reasoning behavior. Results show that input modality exerts a stronger influence on localization precision and privacy exposure than model scale or architecture, with high-risk captions substantially boosting accuracy. Moreover, they highlight structural prediction biases toward core cities.
Xiaonan Wang, Bo Shao, Hansaem Kim
Yonsei University, South Korea · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany