When LLMs Manipulate: Measuring Behavioral, Social, and Temporal Effects

It is well established that large language models (LLMs) are sensitive to prompt framing, reflecting patterns in their training data or prior prompts. In this study, we investigate the extent to which LLMs reinforce users biases expressed in the prompts and examine the boundary between implicit framing effects and explicit prompt manipulation. Specifically, we evaluate how susceptible LLMs are to direct and suggestive prompts that encourage models to support or challenge particular positions. We evaluate six LLMs using 160 distinct prompts spanning ten topics across opinion-based and factual domains. The prompts systematically vary in prompting strategy, support versus challenge instructions, prompt polarity, users' expressed beliefs, and topic domain, spanning both opinion-based and factual questions. Our results show that LLMs systematically adapt their responses to align with prompt framing, even in factual contexts. This suggests that prompt framing can outweigh factual consistency in model responses. Overall, our findings delineate the extent and boundaries of LLM manipulability. Furthermore, the results imply that LLMs can reinforce subtle user biases and are susceptible to explicit prompt manipulation even in domains where responses should remain factually stable.

As users increasingly turn to LLMs for practical and personal advice, they become vulnerable to subtle steering toward hidden incentives misaligned with their own interests. While existing NLP research has benchmarked manipulation detection, these efforts often rely on simulated debates and remain fundamentally decoupled from actual human belief shifts in real-world scenarios. We introduce PUPPET, a theoretical taxonomy and resource that bridges this gap by focusing on the moral direction of hidden incentives in everyday, advice-giving contexts. We provide an evaluation dataset of N=1,035 human-LLM interactions, where we measure users' belief shifts. Our analysis reveals a critical disconnect in current safety paradigms: while models can be trained to detect manipulative strategies, they do not correlate with the magnitude of resulting belief change. As such, we define the task of human belief shift prediction and show that while state-of-the-art LLMs achieve moderate correlation (r=0.3-0.5), they exhibit systematic directional biases, with certain models over or under-predicting the magnitude of human belief change. This work establishes a theoretically grounded and behaviorally validated foundation for AI social safety efforts by studying incentive-driven manipulation in LLMs during everyday, practical user queries.

Large Language Model (LLM) assistants routinely decide whether they can trust users and third parties whose competence, intentions, and integrity they cannot verify. This uncertainty matters for safety, as trusting the wrong party can lead an agent to comply with harmful requests or act on malicious instructions encountered during tool use. To study this problem, we define trust as an assistant's willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party and ask whether such behavior can be causally controlled through model activations. We build 2,000 contrastive conversations spanning ability, benevolence, and integrity, where paired responses complete the same request but differ in whether the assistant trusts the user. From these pairs, we learn steering matrices while keeping the model parameters frozen and test them across six instruction-tuned models from three families, finding that steering changes trust decisions monotonically in both directions. We then ask whether this effect extends to several safety-related agent settings involving harmful requests, prompt injections, and insider threats, while using benign-task and reasoning as controls. Our findings provide evidence that trust in the user can be causally controlled along linear directions in model activations and provide a way to study how trust shapes safety-relevant behavior in language models.