Bridging Digital Deception and Physical Fidelity: A Spatio-Temporal Attack on Cognitive Radars

Deep neural networks have demonstrated excellent performance in SAR target detection tasks but remain susceptible to adversarial attacks. Existing SAR-specific attack methods can effectively deceive detectors; however, they often introduce noticeable perturbations and are largely confined to digital domain, neglecting physical implementation constrains for attacking SAR systems. In this paper, a novel Adversarial Attenuation Patch (AAP) method is proposed that employs energy-constrained optimization strategy coupled with an attenuation-based deployment framework to achieve a seamless balance between attack effectiveness and stealthiness. More importantly, AAP exhibits strong potential for physical realization by aligning with signal-level electronic jamming mechanisms. Experimental results show that AAP effectively degrades detection performance while preserving high imperceptibility, and shows favorable transferability across different models. This study provides a physical grounded perspective for adversarial attacks on SAR target detection systems and facilitates the design of more covert and practically deployable attack strategies. The source code is made available at https://github.com/boremycin/SAAP.

In this article, we propose an online electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) framework designed to conceal the strategic decision-making processes of a cognitive radar (CR) operating under adversarial surveillance. We model the CR under two distinct decision paradigms: a static constrained utility-maximizing behavior and a dynamic expected utility-maximizing behavior. The radar's utility function is modeled via a von Mises--Fisher (vMF) distribution, with the distributional parameter constituting the private information to be protected from adversarial inference. We adopt a distribution privacy framework to conceal this private information and provide formal distribution privacy guarantees for cognition masking. In this work, we develop cognition-hiding algorithms for both static constrained utility maximization (WDPCH-SU), and dynamic expected utility maximization (WDPCH-DU). Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we show that both WDPCH-SU and WDPCH-DU satisfy $ε$-distribution privacy ($ε$-DistP) against inference-based adversarial attacks and present the privacy--performance trade-off bounds, quantifying utility loss (in static setting) and expected utility deviation (in dynamic setting) as functions of $ε$. Numerical results show that WDPCH-SU gives about 15% improvement in utility loss at maximum privacy compared to the existing methodology while WDPCH-DU achieves a greater reduction in adversarial Fisher information without requiring explicit Fisher information constraints, at a moderate, analytically bounded utility deviation. These results are highly promising in many 6G communication scenarios such as network slicing for automated driving and swarm UAV coordination, where it is essential to keep the resource allocation policy robust against privacy attacks.

As a critical application of computational intelligence in remote sensing, deep learning-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) image target recognition facilitates intelligent perception but typically relies on centralized training, where multi-source SAR data are uploaded to a single server, raising privacy and security concerns. Federated learning (FL) provides an emerging computational intelligence paradigm for SAR image target recognition, enabling cross-site collaboration while preserving local data privacy. However, FL confronts critical security risks, where malicious clients can exploit SAR's multiplicative speckle noise to conceal backdoor triggers, severely challenging the robustness of the computational intelligence model. To address this challenge, we propose NADAFD, a noise-aware and dynamically adaptive federated defense framework that integrates frequency-domain, spatial-domain, and client-behavior analyses to counter SAR-specific backdoor threats. Specifically, we introduce a frequency-domain collaborative inversion mechanism to expose cross-client spectral inconsistencies indicative of hidden backdoor triggers. We further design a noise-aware adversarial training strategy that embeds $Γ$-distributed speckle characteristics into mask-guided adversarial sample generation to enhance robustness against both backdoor attacks and SAR speckle noise. In addition, we present a dynamic health assessment module that tracks client update behaviors across training rounds and adaptively adjusts aggregation weights to mitigate evolving malicious contributions. Experiments on MSTAR and OpenSARShip datasets demonstrate that NADAFD achieves higher accuracy on clean test samples and a lower backdoor attack success rate on triggered inputs than existing federated backdoor defenses for SAR target recognition.