WaveSpec: Multi-Spectral Iris Presentation Attack Detection via Wavelength-Conditioned Spectral Coherence Adaptation

Iris recognition systems are vulnerable to presentation attacks (PAs), including textured contact lenses, print replays, and synthetic irises. Existing PAD methods rely on supervised learning with attack data, limiting generalization to unseen attacks and new sensors. We propose Diff-IrisPAD, an unsupervised framework based on Brownian Bridge Diffusion that models bona fide iris distributions without using attack samples. The method reconstructs clean iris textures from degraded inputs and detects attacks via reconstruction inconsistency using ViT scoring and pixel-level measures. Experiments on a large-scale multi-sensor dataset (125K+ images, NIR and VIS, 8 attack types) show that Diff-IrisPAD achieves an overall ACER of 30.52, significantly outperforming diffusion-based baselines while demonstrating strong generalization to unseen attacks. These results highlight the effectiveness of diffusion-based bona fide modeling for robust and scalable iris PAD.

Vision foundation models have demonstrated strong transferability across diverse visual recognition tasks and are increasingly considered for biometric applications. Their suitability for iris Presentation Attack Detection (PAD), particularly under realistic open-set operating conditions, remains insufficiently examined. This work presents a systematic failure analysis of general-purpose vision foundation models for open-set iris PAD using periocular imagery. Five representative foundation models are evaluated under three open-set protocols that explicitly separate different sources of distribution shift: unseen Presentation Attack Instruments (PAIs), unseen datasets captured with different sensors and cross-spectral transfer from near-infrared (NIR) to visible spectrum (VIS) imagery. Both frozen feature representations and parameter-efficient task adaptation using Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) are assessed within a unified experimental framework. The results indicate that foundation models can transfer across datasets with similar sensing characteristics, but fail to generalise reliably to unseen attack instruments and degrade sharply under cross-spectral evaluation. While LoRA improves performance in certain cross-dataset settings, it frequently amplifies failure under attack-level and spectral shifts. Additional validation experiments using segmented iris inputs, full backbone fine-tuning, joint cross-dataset and cross-PAI shifts, and reverse VIS to NIR transfer further confirm that these failures are not simply artefacts of periocular input, weak adaptation, or one-directional spectral evaluation. These findings show that strong closed-set or cross-dataset performance should not be treated as evidence of robust open-set security, and highlight the need for PAD representations that maintain sensitivity to presentation artefacts while remaining stable under realistic deployment variation.

Human perceptual priors have shown promise in saliency-guided deep learning training, particularly in the domain of iris presentation attack detection (PAD). Common saliency approaches include hand annotations obtained via mouse clicks and eye gaze heatmaps derived from eye tracking data. However, the most effective form of human saliency for raising generalization to unknown attack classes in iris PAD remains under-explored. In this paper, we conduct a series of experiments comparing hand annotations, eye tracking heatmaps, segmentation masks, and foundation model embeddings to a state-of-the-art deep learning-based baseline on the task of unknown attack type classification for iris PAD. Results in a leave-one-attack-type out paradigm indicate that denoised eye tracking heatmaps show the best generalization improvement over cross entropy in Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) at Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) of 1%. Along with this paper, we offer trained models, code, and saliency maps for reproducibility and to facilitate follow-up research efforts.