On Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transforms for Byzantine-Robust Optimization

We consider distributed optimization under Byzantine attacks in the presence of $(L_0,L_1)$-smoothness, a generalization of standard $L$-smoothness that captures functions with state-dependent gradient Lipschitz constants. We propose Byz-NSGDM, a normalized stochastic gradient descent method with momentum that achieves robustness against Byzantine workers while maintaining convergence guarantees. Our algorithm combines momentum normalization with Byzantine-robust aggregation enhanced by Nearest Neighbor Mixing (NNM) to handle both the challenges posed by $(L_0,L_1)$-smoothness and Byzantine adversaries. We prove that Byz-NSGDM achieves a convergence rate of $O(K^{-1/4})$ up to a Byzantine bias floor proportional to the robustness coefficient and gradient heterogeneity. Experimental validation on heterogeneous MNIST classification, synthetic $(L_0,L_1)$-smooth optimization, and character-level language modeling with a small GPT model demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach against various Byzantine attack strategies. An ablation study further shows that Byz-NSGDM is robust across a wide range of momentum and learning rate choices.

In collaborative and distributed learning, Byzantine robustness reflects a major facet of optimization algorithms. Such distributed algorithms are often accompanied by transmitting a large number of parameters, so communication compression is essential for an effective solution. In this paper, we propose Byz-DM21, a novel Byzantine-robust and communication-efficient stochastic distributed learning algorithm. Our key innovation is a novel gradient estimator based on a double-momentum mechanism, integrating recent advancements in error feedback techniques. Using this estimator, we design both standard and accelerated algorithms that eliminate the need for large batch sizes while maintaining robustness against Byzantine workers. We prove that the Byz-DM21 algorithm has a smaller neighborhood size and converges to $\varepsilon$-stationary points in $\mathcal{O}(\varepsilon^{-4})$ iterations. To further enhance efficiency, we introduce a distributed variant called Byz-VR-DM21, which incorporates local variance reduction at each node to progressively eliminate variance from random approximations. We show that Byz-VR-DM21 provably converges to $\varepsilon$-stationary points in $\mathcal{O}(\varepsilon^{-3 })$ iterations. Additionally, we extend our results to the case where the functions satisfy the Polyak-Łojasiewicz condition. Finally, numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

We study distributed optimization over networks with Byzantine agents that may send arbitrary adversarial messages. We propose Gradient Tracking with Probabilistic Edge Dropout (GT-PD), a stochastic gradient tracking method that preserves the convergence properties of gradient tracking under adversarial communication. GT-PD combines two complementary defense layers: a universal self-centered projection that clips each incoming message to a ball of radius $τ$ around the receiving agent, and a fully decentralized probabilistic dropout rule driven by a dual-metric trust score in the decision and tracking channels. This design bounds adversarial perturbations while preserving the doubly stochastic mixing structure, a property often lost under robust aggregation in decentralized settings. Under complete Byzantine isolation ($p_b=0$), GT-PD converges linearly to a neighborhood determined solely by stochastic gradient variance. For partial isolation ($p_b>0$), we introduce Gradient Tracking with Probabilistic Edge Dropout and Leaky Integration (GT-PD-L), which uses a leaky integrator to control the accumulation of tracking errors caused by persistent perturbations and achieves linear convergence to a bounded neighborhood determined by the stochastic variance and the clipping-to-leak ratio. We further show that under two-tier dropout with $p_h=1$, isolating Byzantine agents introduces no additional variance into the honest consensus dynamics. Experiments on MNIST under Sign Flip, ALIE, and Inner Product Manipulation attacks show that GT-PD-L outperforms coordinate-wise trimmed mean by up to 4.3 percentage points under stealth attacks.