Robust Representation Learning for Spiking Neural Networks based on Conditional Information Bottleneck

A central goal of current Spiking Neural Network (SNN) research is to improve their accuracy toward becoming low-power alternatives to Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). This work further argues that realizing this ambition requires improving not only accuracy but also robustness, defined as the ability to maintain correct predictions under input perturbations. We identify two key issues in existing SNN methods that undermine robustness. First, binary spiking activations can produce large activation-state changes under small perturbations. Second, the lack of effective weight constraints makes network outputs more sensitive to input variations. To this end, we propose Burst Spiking Neural Networks (BuSNNs), built upon Burst-enhanced Spiking Neurons (BSNs) and a Dynamic Weight Constraint (DWC) mechanism. BSNs incorporate burst firing to provide a graded spiking pattern. This spiking mechanism mitigates perturbation-induced transitions in activation states and thereby enhances robustness. DWC penalizes connection weights based on activation states, effectively reducing weight magnitudes and improving robustness while preserving accuracy. We provide theoretical analyses to support these robustness effects. Experimental results further show that, on smaller-scale benchmarks such as CIFAR-10, BuSNNs outperform both SNN and ANN counterparts in accuracy and robustness. On large-scale ImageNet, BuSNN with the MS ResNet-34 backbone further improves top-1 accuracy and corruption robustness over the corresponding SNN baseline by 3.18% and 2.66%, respectively. Despite using spike-based activations, BuSNNs surpass 4-bit activation-quantized ANN baselines and approach 8-bit ANN baselines on ImageNet. They also preserve SNNs' low-power advantage. This work studies the accuracy-robustness problem in SNNs, advancing their practical viability in robust and energy-efficient applications.

Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) have attracted increasing attention due to their impressive temporal dynamics, energy efficiency, and brain-inspired mechanisms. Although SNNs have demonstrated promising performance in image classification tasks, recent studies have shown that they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, where imperceptible perturbations are added to input images to mislead model predictions. Existing defense methods mainly focus on training strategies, while the role of input encoding remains less explored. An observation is that the robustness advantage of Poisson encoding over direct encoding may benefit from its inherent randomness. Motivated by this, we propose a stochastic quantization encoding method that encodes the input image with controllable randomness adjusted by the quantization scale, thereby improving the adversarial robustness of SNNs. We further show that this method constitutes a general framework that reduces to both Poisson encoding and direct encoding under different choices of the quantization scale. Since it enhances robustness at the input encoding stage, it can be combined with existing training-based defenses for further gains. Experimental results on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed stochastic quantization encoding method. To sum up, this work highlights the importance of input encoding for the adversarial robustness of SNNs, providing a new perspective for understanding and improving it.

Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) communicate through sparse binary spike events rather than dense activations, enabling energy-efficient inference on neuromorphic hardware and motivating their use in always-on, battery-powered edge systems. We show that this same efficiency advantage creates a distinct security risk: sponge attacks can increase inference-time spike activity and synaptic workload, inflating energy consumption while remaining difficult to detect through correctness-based monitoring alone. Prior input-space efficiency attacks on SNNs have focused on per-sample optimization, primarily in rate-coded settings. We extend this threat to native event-based binary inputs and study two attack models. First, we develop a per-sample sponge attack that crafts a custom adversarial spike train for each input via gradient-based optimization. This attack increases per-inference SynOps by 1.5-2.6x on three SNN models for the NMNIST, SHD, and IBM DVS Gesture datasets, while preserving the predicted class on at least 98% of evaluated samples. Second, to the best of our knowledge, we introduce the first universal sponge attack for native event-based SNN inputs: a fixed binary perturbation computed offline and applied via XOR to all subsequent inputs. Although weaker, it still inflates SynOps by 1.09-1.24x across all three datasets and represents a more realistic deployment threat because it requires no per-input optimization. Mapping SynOp inflation to estimated Loihi-1 energy yields per-inference overheads from 14 $μ$J to 13.24 mJ. These results show that native event-based SNNs are vulnerable to practical input-space efficiency attacks, and that reusable universal perturbations can accumulate into meaningful battery drain in continuously deployed edge systems.