Commit or Abstain? System One Decision Models, LLMs, and Missing Legal Authority

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into legal drafting and research workflows, where incorrect citations or fabricated precedents can cause serious professional harm. Existing legal benchmarks largely emphasize statutory reasoning, contract understanding, or general legal question answering, but they do not directly study a central common-law failure mode: when asked to provide case authorities without external grounding, models may return plausible-looking but incorrect citations or cases. We introduce LegalCiteBench, a benchmark for studying closed-book citation recovery, citation verification, and case matching in legal language models. LegalCiteBench contains approximately 24K evaluation instances constructed from 1,000 real U.S. judicial opinions from the Case Law Access Project. The benchmark covers five citation-centric tasks: citation retrieval, citation completion, citation error detection, case matching, and case verification and correction. Across 21 LLMs, exact citation recovery remains highly challenging in this closed-book setting: even the strongest models score below 7/100 on citation retrieval and completion. Within the evaluated models, scale and legal-domain pretraining provide limited gains and do not resolve this difficulty. Models also frequently provide concrete but incorrect or low-overlap authorities under our evaluation protocol, with Misleading Answer Rates (MAR) exceeding 94% for 20 of 21 evaluated models on retrieval-heavy tasks. A prompt-only abstention experiment shows that explicit uncertainty instructions reduce some confident fabrication but do not improve citation correctness. LegalCiteBench is intended as a diagnostic framework for studying authority generation failures, verification behavior, and abstention when external grounding is absent, incomplete, or bypassed.

Large language models show promise for legal applications, but deploying frontier models raises concerns about cost, latency, and data privacy. We evaluate whether sub-10B parameter models can serve as practical alternatives by testing nine models across three legal benchmarks (ContractNLI, CaseHOLD, and ECtHR) using five prompting strategies (direct, chain-of-thought, few-shot, BM25 RAG, and dense RAG). Across 405 experiments with three random seeds per configuration, we find that a Mixture-of-Experts model activating only 3B parameters matches GPT-4o-mini in mean accuracy while surpassing it on legal holding identification, and that architecture and training quality matter more than raw parameter count. Our largest model (9B parameters) performs worst overall. Chain-of-thought prompting proves sharply task-dependent, improving contract entailment but degrading multiple-choice legal reasoning, while few-shot prompting emerges as the most consistently effective strategy. Comparing BM25 and dense retrieval for RAG, we find near-identical results, suggesting the bottleneck lies in the language model's utilization of retrieved context rather than retrieval quality. All experiments were conducted via cloud inference APIs at a total cost of $62, demonstrating that rigorous LLM evaluation is accessible without dedicated GPU infrastructure.

Large language models increasingly justify legal decisions by naming the statute or precedent behind a verdict, treated as evidence that the decision follows from it. We test this directly: holding case facts fixed, we substitute the named legal authority for an unrelated one and decode a model's evolving verdict from its hidden states. Across seven open-weight models (8B-70B) and four benchmarks spanning judicial and contractual reasoning, when explicitly required to justify a verdict by naming the governing authority, models name the correct one in 66.7%-100% of generations, while the verdict changing when the authority changes is far less consistent: 0.0%-21.7% on CaseHOLD, 30.0%-76.7% on ECHR and SCOTUS, and 43.3%-50.0% on ContractNLI. Neither scale nor a purpose-built legal-reasoning model (a best-effort LoRA reproduction; Section 6) closes this gap. A red-teaming evaluation on five core models finds compliance with an adversarial instruction hidden in the case facts (73.3%-96.4%) exceeds verdict-swap sensitivity by a wide margin, holding without exception across model rankings. Naming a legal authority is thus a poor proxy for a verdict's dependence on it, while the same verdict remains separately vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Both findings replicate across checks ruling out prompt-wording noise and confounded sampling, and bear directly on the use of generated legal explanations as compliance or audit artefacts.