cs.CROct 21, 2026

Beyond End-to-End Recovery: Towards a Better Understanding of LLM Steganography via Rolewise Decomposition

Authors: Om Tailor, Yucheng Pan, Solaleh Mohammadi, Xinyan Liu, Kaiqing Zhang

Organizations: University of Maryland, College Park

Abstract

In large language model (LLM) steganography, an encoder hides a private message in an otherwise ordinary response, as text transmitted to a decoder, who attempts to recover it. The success of this private-message transmission is commonly measured through end-to-end (E2E) recovery, which checks whether the decoder correctly reconstructs the private message. However, E2E recovery cannot distinguish encoding failures from decoding failures or reveal how the private message is represented in the encoder's transmitted text. To address these limitations, we introduce a rolewise decomposition framework that separately examines how private messages are represented in encoder transmitted texts, what decoders recover, and what deterministic verification can establish. Across 7,200 encoder responses, we identify 168 verifiable encodings missed by decoders and 706 responses containing private messages reconstructed through word-length or token-initial patterns not explicitly specified in the encoder's instructions. These findings demonstrate that E2E recovery alone may obscure important distinctions between encoding and decoding, motivating their separate evaluation to better understand and mitigate the safety issues caused by LLM steganography.

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