What Lies Beyond Perception: A Partition Theory of the Limits of AI Evaluation and Oversight

Frontier language models sometimes recognize that they are under evaluation and adjust their behavior which can undermine validity of benchmark results. Yet the field studies it without a shared foundation, conflating flaws of the evaluation with capabilities of the model, and detection with behavioral response. We ground evaluation awareness in social psychology, decomposing it into an environment component and a model component that separates recognition from propensity. We operationalize the environment component through eight categorized trigger factors, such as placeholder entities and grading-style output formats, and study recognition and behavior through chain-of-thought monitoring. Across nine frontier models and four benchmarks, recognition rates depend on the specific pairing of model and benchmark. Recognition rarely associates with behavioral change, and when it does, the direction depends on the type of evaluation perceived. Models are also more sensitive to safety than capability evaluations, placing safety benchmark validity at greater risk. To study which factors each model is sensitive to and how they interact, we propose EvalAwareBench, a factor-controlled benchmark of 100 paired safety-capability tasks where each of the eight factors can be independently toggled, varying evaluative signals while holding the underlying request fixed. Through EvalAwareBench, we find that no single factor uniformly affects all models, but stacking factors progressively raises evaluation awareness across all of them. Our framework and EvalAwareBench provide the tools to measure, attribute, and mitigate evaluation awareness, building the foundation for future solutions.

Evaluators often produce correct labels via flawed reasoning, a critical failure for agentic systems gating actions, routing reviews, or supplying training feedback. Standard evaluation only verifies final label correctness, ignoring whether judgment changes stem from valid evidence, consistent rules, or proper rule applicability. We formalize evaluator reasoning accountability via three core sources: grounds, norms, and authority. Varying these sources yields an eight-cell counterfactual judgment cube to characterize judgment updates. We define judgment receipts as minimal source replacement sets that reproduce revised verdicts to explain judgment transitions. We derive certification cost bounds for black-box evaluators and present ReasonBench, a policy and logical reasoning benchmark with verifiable receipts covering 19,520 cases and 7,200 controls. In frozen evaluations, Qwen3-1.7B reaches 98.41% receipt accuracy, while cube prediction scores 96.99%, a consistent 1.42-point drop validated by Qwen3-0.6B replication. Strong standard accuracy masks severe robustness flaws. Meaning-preserving source permutations reduce valid receipt recovery to 54.8% and 49.2% for direct and cube prediction. Models trained on simple single-source changes retain 93.75% verdict accuracy but recover only 7.16% of receipts for complex multi-source updates. Permutation retraining boosts consistency to 96.6% yet worsens cube prediction deficits. Structured counterfactual supervision fails to guarantee robust reasoning. We show reason-aware evaluation must decouple prediction and certification, reporting transformation consistency alongside standard accuracy for trustworthy evaluator auditing.

Recent published evidence from frontier laboratories shows that contemporary AI models can recognise evaluation contexts, latently represent them, and behave differently under those contexts than under deployment-continuous conditions. Anthropic's BrowseComp incident, the Natural Language Autoencoder findings on SWE-bench Verified and destructive-coding evaluations, and the OpenAI / Apollo anti-scheming work all document instances of this phenomenon. We argue that these findings create a claim-validity problem for safety conclusions drawn from frontier evaluations. We introduce the Evaluation Differential (ED), a conditional divergence in a target behavioural property between recognised-evaluation and deployment-continuous contexts, define a normalised effect-size form (nED) for cross-property comparison, and prove that marginal evaluation scores cannot identify ED. We develop a typology of safety claims (ED-stable, ED-degraded, ED-inverted, ED-undetermined) by their warrant-status under documented divergence, and specify TRACE (Test-Recognition Audit for Claim Evaluation), an audit protocol that wraps existing evaluation infrastructure and produces restricted claims rather than capability scores. We apply the framework retrospectively to three publicly documented evaluation incidents and discuss governance implications for system cards, conformity assessment, and the international network of AI safety and security institutes. TRACE does not eliminate adversarial adaptation; it disciplines the claims drawn from evaluation evidence by making explicit the conditions under which that evidence was produced.